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Abstract
Background/Purpose: Hospital spending comprises the largest share of health
care expenditures in the United States, and is projected to continue to grow
rapidly. To align payment incentives with high quality, efficient care, Maryland
piloted an innovative payment model called the Total Patient Revenue (TPR)
program starting in 2010. Eight rural acute care hospitals voluntarily agreed
to revenue caps covering inpatient and outpatient services starting in 2010. In
2014, the program was slightly modified and expanded to all hospitals in the
state as the Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program. This study assesses the
impact of TPR on population-level rates of total and preventable utilization.
Methods: We use data on all discharge abstracts in Maryland hospitals from
the state’s Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) for years 2008-
2013, linked to ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) level data from Claritas
Demographic Reports and county-level data from various sources. We ana-
lyze ZCTA-level rates of inpatient and outpatient utilization per capita, in-
cluding total admissions, inpatient days, outpatient encounters, observation
stays, and Emergency Department (ED) visits. We also distinguish between
ii
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preventable vs. non-preventable and deferrable vs. non-deferrable utiliza-
tion. Preventable inpatient utilization includes readmissions and admissions
due to ambulatory care sensitive conditions as defined using the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)’s methodology for Prevention Qual-
ity Indicators (PQIs). Preventable outpatient utilization includes emergent
preventable and primary-care treatable ED visits as defined by the validated
Billings algorithm. To empirically examine the effect of TPR’s implementation
on changes in utilization over time, we compare changes in utilization rates
pre- and post-intervention using a difference-in-differences (DD) approach with
ZCTA and year fixed effects. We estimate different models using four different
control groups, starting with the service areas of three rural non-participating
hospitals and expanding to the entire state.
Results: We observe a statistically significant 8.19 percent reduction in total
outpatient visits. In contrast, total hospital admissions decreased only slightly
in areas affected by the TPR reform by 1.77 percent relative to control areas,
but the effect is not statistically significant. The TPR program, however, led to
a statistically significant decrease of 5.09 percent in total inpatient days. The
rates of preventable hospitalizations showed statistically insignificant reduc-
tions, driven mostly by chronic ACSCs (composite indicator PQI #92) including
asthma, diabetes, and heart failure. These results are generally robust to a
number of sensitivity analyses. We also find little effect on preventable and
primary care treatable ED visits.
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Conclusion/Implications: Hospital global budgets are a promising policy for
decreasing preventable hospitalizations in rural hospitals, but may be difficult
to implement for hospitals competing in overlapping service areas. Moreover,
they may have to be adapted to other states lacking hospital rate-setting au-
thority across all payers.
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Policy makers throughout the world are seeking to improve the allocation of
limited health care resources to achieve better population health and long-term
financial sustainability (OECD 2010; WHO 2014). Faced with aging popula-
tions and a steady shift in disease burden towards chronic conditions, govern-
ments are under pressure to strike an elusive balance between prevention and
curative care (Hirshon et al. 2013). Moreover, evolving patient preferences,
the introduction of new and expensive medical technologies and the spread of
health insurance coverage create new dilemmas for those concerned about both
equity and economic efficiency.
The United States, despite spending more per capita than any other country
in the world, still lags behind other industrialized nations in many measures
of population health (Squires and Anderson 2015). Its complex health care
system has some of the highest prices in the world for many basic services (An-
derson et al. 2003; Squires 2012), yet still leaves a significant share of the US
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population without health insurance coverage and therefore exposed to high
medical expenses. There is widespread recognition that a major cause for this
state of affairs is the fragmentation of health care financing and delivery (Rein-
hardt 2012; Sutherland, Fisher, et al. 2009), both enabled and exacerbated by
fee-for-service payment systems that reward more, but not necessarily better
care (Baicker et al. 2009; Fisher and et al. 2009).
As researchers have begun to recognize the limitations of demand-side in-
centives induced through benefits package and insurance cost-sharing design
(Manning et al. 1987), the focus has shifted markedly towards the methods
of reimbursement used by insurance funds, both public and private, and how
they can be used to promote the development of the health care system and
to achieve policy objectives (Ellis et al. 1993). Part of this approach has been
tried before, even though with a different twist. Most prominently, the man-
aged care revolution, which started gaining traction in 1973 with the passage,
of the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act, passed in 1973, focused
on developing networks of providers that could deliver integrated care. This
movement ultimately led to the creation of Medicare Advantage and popu-
larized managed care plans throughout the US. However, in the late 1990s,
provider push-back and the backlash to what the public saw as unacceptable
limits on access led to a scale-down and dilution of this form of care delivery.
The current wave of care transformation is based on the principle that pay-
ment reform should create the incentive environment that rewards what so-
ciety considers valuable in health care, while providers should be allowed to
2
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evolve naturally into integrated organizations. A prominent strategy of the
federal and state governments in the quest for higher value in health care over
the past several years has therefore been to transform health care delivery by
reforming provider payment (Obama 2016). The goal has been to gradually
shift provider incentives from a focus on service volume to rewarding higher
quality and reductions in wasteful care.
There are at least three reasons for this strategy. First, payment is a read-
ily available policy lever, since government financing still accounts for a large
portion of health care expenses via Medicare and Medicaid. Moreover, private
plans often follow the lead taken by public payers on reimbursement methods.
Second, altering payment models is more likely to be viewed as less intru-
sive by providers and other stakeholders in the system than other top-down
approaches. Third, altering the system’s incentives could likely draw change
organically, therefore improving the prospects of long-term success.
Even after deciding that payment was the right intervention point, policy
makers have been largely agnostic about the specifics. They avoided being
too prescriptive and have instead enabled a wide array of pilot programs and
demonstrations. For instance, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innova-
tion (CMMI) was created within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) to test different payment models and to draw lessons for policy
using a ”rapid-cycle evaluation” approach (Shrank 2013). The fundamental
operating premise has been that in a market of ideas, those ideas that actu-
ally work in practice would eventually ”rise to the top”. The hope was that
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over time enough evidence would be accumulated to permit informed decision
making while also allowing enough local flexibility in the absence of a general
consensus on specific delivery models.
The alternative payment models currently tested within Medicare include
the formation of risk-taking Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), bundled
payments, primary care transformation initiatives, and pay-for-performance
(P4P) programs (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 2017a). Most
likely, the shift to value-based payment is only set to accelerate, as CMS has set
a goal of tying 50 percent of Medicare payments to quality or value (as opposed
to volume) by the end of 2018, up from around 30 percent currently (Burwell
2015).
Hospitals have been the target of many of these payment initiatives, either
directly or indirectly. Hospital expenditures comprise nearly one trillion dol-
lars, thus making up for the largest component of total US health spending
(Martin et al. 2016). Traditionally, hospitals have been the bedrock of health
care provision in most industrialized countries, as most medical services used
to be provided for acute episodes of illness or injury during inpatient stays (Cy-
lus et al. 2010). The transition to case-based payments began in the 1980s
with Medicare’s Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and was a ma-
jor improvement in efficiency compared to the highly inflationary retrospective
cost-based reimbursement system used previously. But while the IPPS de-
creased lengths of stay and led to a reduction in admissions (contrary to initial
expectations) (Rosenberg et al. 2001), the system was not conducive to care co-
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ordination and population health management. The growing recognition that
this system has become less and less tenable is at the core of the new push for
hospital incentive realignment.
Alongside Medicare initiatives, alternative payment models have also been
developed by commercial payers and Medicaid programs (Muhlestein et al.
2016). For example, the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) in Massachusetts,
launched by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, the state’s largest com-
mercial payer, pays providers risk-adjusted global budgets (Chernew et al.
2011). The program seems to have produced substantial savings, ranging from
7 to 9 percent of medical spending, both through price and utilization reduc-
tion (Song et al. 2014). Another example, this time in Medicaid, is Colorado’s
Accountable Care Collaborative (ACC) program. Under ACC, the state’s Med-
icaid agency contracts with seven Regional Care Collaborative Organizations
(RCCOs) to create primary care networks which ensure coordination of care
for Medicaid enrollees with hospitals, specialist physicians, and social services
(Rodin et al. 2013). As of 2016, the 38 awardees of the CMS State Innovation
Models (SIM) Initiative included 34 states, three territories, and the District of
Columbia, across the different phases of the program.
In this climate of state innovation models, the State of Maryland imple-
mented Total Patient Revenue (TPR), a global budget payment program, in
eight rural hospitals in 2010 (Patel et al. 2015). The program, described in
detail in Chapter 2, leverages Maryland’s unique hospital rate-setting system,
in place since the late 1970s. TPR essentially achieves a system of global bud-
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gets by allowing the state rate-setting agency to set hospital-specific revenue
constraints based on projections of utilization in each hospital’s service area.
If a hospital’s revenue falls below that target, it is allowed to keep the differ-
ence as a reward. Alternatively, if the hospital’s revenue exceeds the target,
it is subject to penalties to the following year’s budget, thus achieving a two-
sided risk sharing model. Although the model was expanded to suburban and
urban Maryland hospitals in 2014 and now serves as one of the critical com-
ponents of the state’s revised CMS waiver (Rajkumar et al. 2014), the impact
of global hospital budgets on population-level metrics has not been compre-
hensively evaluated. Mortensen et al. (2013) analyzed the early effects of the
program on 30-day readmissions, but their study’s limited outcomes and lack of
a population-based approach leave many questions unanswered. Specifically,
can global budgets limit overall hospital use in an entire hospital service area?
With budget constraints covering both inpatient and outpatient revenues, are
both types of utilization targeted by the hospitals? Importantly, beyond a fo-
cus on total hospital care use, can the program limit the use of preventable
utilization, or low-value care?
To fill these gaps in the literature, this dissertation examines the impact
of TPR on hospital care utilization and preventable quality indicators in rural
Maryland. We focus on utilization rates since payment rates are fixed and to-
tal hospital revenues are capped. Our study combines all-payer administrative
data on inpatient and outpatient episodes from all hospitals in the state with
population estimates of state residents. We use a well-established difference-
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in-differences (DD) econometric technique on data aggregated at the ZIP Code
Tabulation Area (ZCTA) level and use several different sets of control groups
for the rural areas participating in TPR. We use a baseline of two years (2008-
2009) and focus on the first four years of the program (2010-2013), which covers
the program’s first contract cycle (Maryland Health Services Cost Review Com-
mission 2010).
We find a modest and statistically insignificant reduction in the rate of over-
all inpatient admissions but a significant reduction in outpatient visits, on top
of the strong downward trend in utilization present in the state prior to the re-
form. This suggests that the TPR revenue constraint acts as a slightly stronger
incentive to limit hospital use compared to the payment tapering mechanisms
already enforced by the state’s hospital regulating agency, the Health Services
Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) (Kalman et al. 2013).
One of the critical policy questions is whether TPR can induce hospitals to
increase quality by limiting the use of low-value care, as opposed to indiscrim-
inately reducing all forms of care. Our follow-on analysis finds that no signif-
icant reduction in potentially preventable hospitalizations due to chronic Am-
bulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs) in TPR areas compared to Mary-
land control areas. Although the effects are small in magnitude, they indicate
that global budgets can potentially be an effective tool for improving population
health.
Our analysis also reveals no significant effect on preventable Emergency
Department (ED) visits–including those that are non-emergent, treatable in
7
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
primary care settings, or potentially avoidable, although these results are more
sensitive to model specification and the particular control group used. This sug-
gests the implausibility that some of the patients may have ended up seeking
care in the Emergency Room, as opposed to being admitted to the hospital. Our
findings also highlight the importance of examining the program’s impacts on
a wide range of measures, and the need for continuous monitoring to test a pri-
ori assumptions and the program’s architects’ hopes about how it would affect
the use of hospital care.
Although the results are specific to the particular setting of all-payer rate
setting in Maryland, they suggest that the TPR program can potentially serve
as a basis for Medicare reimbursement for hospitals that serve beneficiaries in
a relatively well-defined geographic area, such as rural hospitals. Around the
US, rural hospitals in particular are showing signs of great distress. More than
eighty have closed since 2010 (North Carolina Rural Health Service Program
2017) and many others are struggling to remain financially sound (Kaufman
et al. 2016). While approaches that do not fundamentally change the financial
incentives for these hospitals in the face of decreasing demand and growing
economic distress in rural America are likely bound to fail, global budgets may
provide a long-term, feasible solution (Sharfstein 2016).
In fact, other states are following Maryland’s lead and in some cases going
even farther. Pennsylvania recently entered an agreement with the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to test an all-payer global budget model
for its rural hospitals over the next seven years (Center for Medicare and Med-
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icaid Innovation 2017b). Under this agreement, the state commits to achieving
at least $35 million in Medicare hospital savings over the course of the model,
while keeping the model budget-neutral overall for Medicare. Across all partic-
ipating payers, Pennsylvania also agrees to keep the annual all-payer hospital
spending growth rate below 3.38 percent, which is the average annual growth
rate for Pennsylvania’s gross state product from 1997 to 2015. If successful,
the program would demonstrate that having an underlying rate-setting sys-
tem like the one in Maryland is not indispensable to the implementation of
global budgets, as Pennsylvania’s model has all payers agree to pay specific
shares of the hospitals’ budgets, based on their enrollee populations.
Similarly, Vermont entered a new agreement with CMS (Green Mountain
Care Board 2016). Vermont’s model goes even farther than Maryland’s or Penn-
sylvania’s, by introducing a system of global budgets for all health care spend-
ing, not just spending on hospital care. Vermont’s experience could show what
is possible for Maryland if it decides to take the next natural step of expanding
global budgets beyond hospital care when its agreement with CMS is up for
renewal in 2019.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the context
in which the TPR global budget policy intervention was introduced and out-
lines its critical components. Chapter 3 reviews the conceptual frameworks
for understanding payment system incentives and summarizes the empirical
evidence regarding the effects of hospital global budgets, both in the US and
internationally. Chapter 4 outlines an economic theoretical model of hospital
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behavior under a change in payment incentives and then specifies testable as-
sumptions regarding the effects of TPR.
Chapter 5 describes the data, the study design, and the analytical approach
of the study. Chapter 6 presents our estimates of the reform’s effects on total
and preventable inpatient hospital utilization and Chapter 7 presents effect
estimates on total and preventable outpatient utilization. Finally, Chapter 8
interprets the study results, discusses its limitations, and suggests future di-
rections for research and policy.
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Chapter 2
Policy Context and Reform
This chapter provides the institutional background of Maryland’s health care
regulatory environment and describes the most salient features of the Total
Patient Revenue hospital payment reform. Understanding Maryland’s system
and its evolution over time is helpful to put the findings of our analysis into the
proper perspective and distinguish what is generalizable from what is context-
specific. Moreover, this background information assists with the development
of the study hypotheses and the empirical design by better focusing on pol-
icy relevant questions and allowing for proper empirical identification of the
reform’s impacts.
2.1 Health financing and delivery in Maryland
In 2010, health care spending in Maryland totaled $7,698 per resident, includ-
ing expenditures on hospital care, professional services, prescription drugs,
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and long-term care. This level was 8.9 percent higher than the national av-
erage (Maryland Health Care Commission 2012), with Maryland ranking 14th
among the 50 US states. The growth rate of per capita health care spending
in Maryland had been declining steadily over the previous ten years, from 8.6
percent in 2001 to 2.5 percent in 2010, but these growth rates were slightly
higher than the US as a whole. Of this amount, 37.3 percent was spent on
hospital care, while physician and clinical services made up 23.6 percent of the
total.
There were 46 acute care hospitals in Maryland in 2013, totaling 10,348 li-
censed acute care beds (Maryland Health Care Commission 2013). The number
of beds grew by 8.1 percent from 2004 to 2010 but then declined by 4.9 percent
between 2010 and 2013 (Figure 2.1). The State of Maryland is unique in that
it is the only state that still operates an all-payer rate-setting system for hospi-
tals1. This rate-setting system and the Medicare waivers that facilitate it have
a long history in Maryland, elements of which are depicted schematically on
the timeline in Figure 2.2.
Rate-setting for Maryland hospitals originated in the early 1970s, when
rapid hospital cost inflation was putting tremendous pressure on health care
budgets. In Maryland, the mean cost per hospital admission was at the time
more than 25 percent above the US average (Murray and Berenson 2015).
1Although several states operated similar all-payer systems in the 1980s and 1990s, these
states have all gradually eliminated the rate-setting regulations. The West Virginia Health
Care Authority was established in 1983 to set rates for inpatient admissions to commercial
payers, thus excluding government payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and the Public Employees
Insurance Agency (PEIA). However, beginning in July 2016, the ability of the Authority to
regulate hospital rates was eliminated (West Virginia Legislature 2016).
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Figure 2.1: Total Licensed Acute Care Beds in Maryland Hospitals, 2008-2013
Note: Data is shown by Fiscal Year. Source: Maryland Health Care Commission 2013.
Health care regulation was at the height of its popularity during this decade
both nationally and in the state. Regulation was seen as a powerful tool not
just for constraining spending, but also for improving equity among payers and
supporting hospitals by reducing the levels of uncompensated care. Through-
out the 1970s, both the American Hospital Association (AHA) and the Health
Insurance Association of America (HIAA, now AHIP) supported state rate-
setting (Crozier 1982). Spurred by the federal National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974, many states instituted health planning
agencies and Certificate-of-Need (CON) programs in an attempt to constrain































Figure 2.2: Timeline of Important Changes in Maryland’s Hospital Payment System, 1971-2014
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Consistent with this national trend, Maryland established the Health Ser-
vices Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) in 1971 as an independent state agency
responsible for hospital rate setting within its Department of Mental Health
and Hygiene (DHMH). The Commission gained regulatory authority to set hos-
pital payment rates and publicly disclose hospital operating performance data
beginning on July 1, 1974, but started rate regulation for some hospitals in
1975 and then for all hospitals in 1977 (Biles et al. 1980).
The Commission initially had authority over private commercial payers
only. Its all-payer rate setting authority was established as a result of a waiver
granted by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), now Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). At the time, given HCFA’s interest
to experiment with new forms of hospital payment, Maryland and a few other
states (New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, West Virginia, and Washing-
ton) applied for waivers granting them the ability to devise different systems
to cover Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. Maryland’s waiver, described in
more detail below, was the first to be approved in 1977 as a “demonstration”
waiver. It became permanent in 1980 when it was incorporated into section
1814(b) of the Social Security Act, being the only waiver ingrained into Federal
statute (Murray and Berenson 2015).
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Structure and operation of HSCRC
HSCRC’s mandate has been to promote cost containment, access to services,
equity, financial stability, and accountability to the public (Colmers et al. 2010).
In doing so, it acknowledged certain failures of the health care market and the
need for robust, but not overreaching, government intervention to correct them.
By statute, the services covered under HSCRC’s jurisdiction include hos-
pital inpatient services and hospital outpatient services provided “at the hos-
pital,” but exclude physician and professional fees, other operating revenue,
non-operating revenue, and other services like those provided by skilled nurs-
ing facilities, home health, and outpatient renal dialysis centers. Initially, the
Commission had the authority to regulate the fees of hospital-based physi-
cians. This authority ended in 1981, when the Court of Appeals of Montgomery
County ruled that the professional fees of physicians were not costs of the hos-
pital and were thus beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction (Murray and Beren-
son 2015).
Because the establishing law was broadly worded, the HSCRC was able to
adapt its regulations over time to the changing forces in the health care market
(Murray 2009). Unlike the other states using hospital rate setting, Maryland’s
statute did not specify the details of the rate setting methods to be used. It
did stipulate that the system must be prospective, but left considerable discre-
tion to the regulators (Murray and Berenson 2015). Moreover, the HSCRC has
sustained a more cooperative relationship with the hospital industry, which al-
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lowed it to largely avoid the abrupt changes displayed by other state programs
(McDonough 1997).
Maryland funds the Commission’s activities through an assessment on hos-
pital rates. This funding method means that its budget is outside of the state’s
general fund, thus protecting the political independence of the Commission
(Murray and Berenson 2015). But in contrast to states like West Virginia and
Massachusetts, which appointed and paid full-time commissioners, Maryland’s
seven commissioners are part-time, unpaid experts appointed by the governor.
This voluntary commission model is based on the belief that the state’s salary
scale would not attract sufficiently qualified individuals. However, it has the
disadvantage that part-time commissioners often do not have the time to fully
understand the rate-setting system or changes proposed by the professional
staff (Murray and Berenson 2015).
Several broad features of Maryland’s rate-setting scheme have remained
relatively constant since its inception. But, as described below, the system has
also evolved considerably over time, as specific elements were introduced or
phased out in response to trends in health care costs or changes in the State’s
economic conditions. One essential aspect is the structure of the waiver nego-
tiated with the Federal Government, including the constraints placed on the
State regarding the funding for its Medicare and Medicaid populations. These
constraints affected the ability of Maryland’s HSCRC to influence the behavior
of hospitals in the state through regulatory policies.
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2.2 The hospital payment system prior to global
budget reform
This section focuses on the hospital payment system in effect before the use
of global budgets in both the 2010 rural TPR pilot program and the 2014
statewide GBR program. It describes the prior payment system’s most salient
features, many of which were actually maintained under the TPR (and GBR)
system, with the addition of the hospital revenue constraints, as described
below, which essentially create the new global budget constraint. Where ap-
propriate, we also provide evidence regarding the impact of specific payment
elements on pre-reform trends in utilization and spending.
Maryland’s prior hospital payment system can be characterized as a ”hy-
brid” between fee-for-service and case-based reimbursement. The fee-for-service
part of the rate-setting process stems from its micro-costing process for deter-
mining payment rates for each service specific to each hospital. The case-based
part of the rate-setting process consists of constraints to how much each hospi-
tal could charge per admission, set using Diagnostic-Related Groups (DRGs).
The unit rates
Under the first part of the rate setting process, the HSCRC first calculates al-
lowed unit rates per cost item for each hospital. Cost items are the types of
services provided under each of 65 revenue centers and classified into three
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categories: inpatient, outpatient, and ancillary. Inpatient revenue centers in-
clude, for example, the medical surgical acute unit, the pediatric intensive care
unit, and the burn care unit. The units of service for these revenue centers are
simply patient days. Outpatient revenue centers are paid based on different
units depending on the specific services they provide. For example, Relative
Value Units (RVUs) are used for clinic services, hours for the observation unit,
and visits for the psychiatry day and night care units. Similarly, units for ancil-
lary revenue centers range from minutes for anesthesiology to Maryland RVUs
(a state-specific unit) for occupational therapy.
The unit rates are hospital-specific and are determined from detailed data
collected by the HSCRC on costs based on hospital activity. This data is sup-
plied by hospitals through a detailed accounting system as a condition of eligi-
bility for Medicare reimbursement. The HSCRC allocates direct and indirect
costs to each revenue item and calculates unit costs for each revenue center.
The unit rates are then obtained by applying markups to unit costs and are
subsequently adjusted to reflect the patient demographic mix and local labor
market conditions for each hospital, resulting in prospective rates for a base
period that could differ substantially across different hospitals. The rates also
differ among the hospitals depending on the amount of uncompensated care
they provide (Kastor et al. 2011).
The unit rates are also updated each year by applying an update factor
composed of several elements. First, the update factor reflects price inflation
in the underlying health service production input factors (Brown 2009). Sec-
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ond, the HSCRC has the discretion to use the update factor as a policy tool for
achieving certain objectives, such as encouraging capital investment. Third,
the factor could include further adjustments based on hospital specific pro-
grams endorsed by the Commission.
The case-based constraints
Under the second part of the rate setting process, the HSCRC layered a set
of hospital specific per-case revenue constraints. This process had the role of
controlling aggregate resource use per case while still reflecting each hospi-
tal’s specific cost structure described above. The constraints were calculated
differently for inpatient and outpatient services.
Inpatient admissions were categorized into one of 320 All Patient Refined
Diagnosis Related Groups (APR-DRG). APR-DRGs classify cases into clinically
cohesive categories based on their medical condition, and each APR-DRG is
then further separated into four “severity of illness” levels. Severity is as-
signed in terms of predicted impact on the patient’s intensity of treatment. In
2005, Maryland became the first state to introduce the use of severity-adjusted
DRGs. Its adoption of this system likely influenced the decision by CMS to
also transition the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) to
Medicare Severity DRG (MS-DRG) (Atkinson et al. 2008).
Outpatient cases are classified using the Enhanced Ambulatory Patient
Group (EAPG) system, introduced in Maryland in 2008. The EAPG classi-
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fication groups outpatient visits based on resource use according to patients’
clinical characteristics (using ICD-9-CM codes), treatments, and procedures
(using HCPCS codes) (3M Health Information Systems 2016). There are a
total of 505 EAPGs classified into 13 different types, including 229 based on
significant procedures, 183 based on medical groups, 12 based on drugs (e.g.,
for chemotherapy), and 66 based on ancillary services.
With the underlying unit rates set for each hospital (as described in the
prior subsection), allowed charges were then assigned to each APR-DRG and
EAPG by aggregating the specific unit rates across cost centers (Atkinson et
al. 2008). Then, the HSCRC calculated hospital-specific revenue targets per
DRG and EAPG category. The targets aggregated allowed charges for all the
cases within a DRG and EAPG over the course of a year, and hospitals faced
a modest penalty if their actual revenues surpass these targets. The implica-
tion of these targets was that even though each hospital could charge for each
case an amount closer to the actual resource used (as opposed to the DRG or
EAPG allowed rate), it would generally monitor its aggregated charges relative
to these targets and perhaps adjust charges over the course of the year to ulti-
mately meet those targets or pay the penalties. Specifically, at the end of the
year, the hospital would be required to invoice insurers for the total authorized
amount equal to the product of the fixed charge per episode and the case mix.
Any penalties would be aggregated and applied through adjustments to over-
all hospital-approved revenue each year (Murray 2009). Hospitals could thus
offset overbilling by either invoicing a lower price per cost center (within ±5
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percent of the unit rates set by the HSCRC) or by lowering the resources used.
The volume constraints
The HSCRC also employed several other important mechanisms to control uti-
lization pre-TPR, but these mechanisms varied over time. In particular, the
Commission was concerned that hospitals’ cost structure displays considerable
economies of scale, leading marginal costs to be substantially lower than av-
erage costs for large hospitals. Because payments in the DRG-based system
reimburse for average costs, hospitals are incentivized to invest in expensive
technology and induce demand for services, thereby driving up costs.
Therefore, the HSCRC implemented a mechanism for attenuating payments
called the Variable Cost Factor (VCF). Any increase in activity beyond the rev-
enue budgets was billed at 50 percent of the allowed charge. This allowed
the HSCRC to capture marginal revenues that result from an increase in vol-
ume. However, the VCF was temporarily eliminated in 2001 at the hospitals’
request. This apparently minor and relatively obscure change in policy was
strongly associated with a dramatic change in utilization, with inpatient ad-
mission rates increasing significantly, as shown in Figure 2.3. In 2008, HSCRC
decided to reintroduce the VCF in the rate-setting process at a higher rate of
85% for volume growth above baseline and changed its charge-per-case con-
straints. The result was that the growth in admission rates first leveled off and
subsequently began to decrease quickly across Maryland hospitals (Kalman et
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Figure 2.3: Hospital Inpatient Admissions per 1,000 capita in Maryland vs. the
United States, 1999-2013
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts 2015.
al. 2013).
In addition, two further constraints were imposed on hospital activity. The
first one was called the volume governor and restricted the growth in hospital
volumes to 2 percent per year. The second one was case-mix governor and
restricted growth in hospital case mix to 0.5 percent per year. As hospitals
monitored their own activity, they would adjust their intensity of treatment to
stay within the authorized revenue after accounting for the rate attenuation
mechanism. Any differences would be applied upwards or downwards in the
next year.
Although allowed charges calculated by the HSCRC are mandatory for both
public and private payers, including for out-of-state patients admitted to Mary-
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land hospitals (Brown 2009), revenue for non-Maryland residents was excluded
from maximum revenue calculations and volume policies.
Other rate setting elements
The above description of Maryland’s rate-setting mechanisms makes it clear
that the system has never imposed the same rate paid for each service to a
given hospital by all payers and patients. In reality, Maryland’s rate regula-
tion system establishes systematic methods to determine how much rates may
vary. Notably, Medicare and Medicaid receive a 6 percent discount on charges,
intended to recognize their role in reducing uncompensated care, while com-
mercial plans face higher rates to offset these differentials. Similarly, the Blue
Cross plan CareFirst has received discounts for its perceived role in increasing
access and reducing uncompensated care by offering open enrollment through-
out the year (Murray and Berenson 2015).
Moreover, since 2002 the State has used an assessment on hospital rates to
subsidize the premiums for those in the “high-risk pool” insurance plan to, in
turn, decrease uncompensated care. In 2008 these mark-ups were equalized
across hospitals to increase the fairness of the system (Murray 2009).
Maryland’s old waiver test
As mentioned above, Maryland’s waiver was innovative at the time of its adop-
tion and allowed the state to effectively operate an all-payer rate-setting sys-
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tem. In exchange for this flexibility, the state has had to pass a Medicare-
specific ”waiver test”. Specifically, until 2014, this test relied purely on the rate
of growth in Medicare Part A inpatient reimbursement per discharge. Under
this methodology, Maryland’s rate of increase had to remain below the national
average rate of increase in Medicare Part A payments per discharge, with the
base period set to calendar year 1980.
Over time, Maryland had managed to stay under this level, partly because
its baseline hospital cost per case in the 1970s exceeded the national average by
about 25 percent (Intner et al. 2014). However, since then, the “cushion” avail-
able for growth shrank steadily, as a result of Maryland’s inability to reduce
costs per admission, though perhaps linked to the state’s successful attempts
to reduce lower-cost admissions. By the end of FY 2012, the waiver margin
had declined to 1.7 percent, putting Maryland close to the brink of losing its
Medicare waiver. This explains Maryland’s negotiation of a new waiver with
CMS, the features of which are described below.
Other incentive programs
Other innovative payment initiatives were also introduced in Maryland over
time, often with the goal of targeting specific types of hospital utilization or
more comprehensive care transformation programs. These programs are simi-
lar to those implemented nationally, but often were introduced earlier and had
critical Maryland-specific differences. This section provides a brief overview of
29
CHAPTER 2. POLICY CONTEXT AND REFORM
these programs in order to better understand the policy context in Maryland
before and during the implementation of TPR.
The Quality-Based Reimbursement (QBR) Program, introduced in 2008, fo-
cused initially on a set of clinical process measures in four domains related to
heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical prevention. The measures
are updated annually to reflect changes from CMS and the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) recommendations. Pa-
tient experience measures based on Consumer Assessment of Health Plans and
Systems (CAHPS) survey scores were incorporated in 2012, and mortality was
added as an outcome measure in 2015. The HSCRC calculates hospital-specific
scores and places a portion of hospital all-payer revenue at risk based on these
scores in a revenue-neutral manner. QBR is similar to Medicare’s Value-Based
Payment (VBP) program, but the latter also includes certain efficiency mea-
sures which the HSCRC considers are already addressed by its rate-setting
methodology.
The Maryland Hospital-Acquired Conditions (MHAC) Program was intro-
duced in 2009 with the goal of reducing hospital-acquired conditions. But in
contrast to the similar program implemented by CMS nationally, MHAC was
based on a more expansive set of conditions included in the 3M Health Infor-
mation Systems’ list of Potentially Preventable Complications (PPCs). Under
MHAC, the HSCRC compares the risk-adjusted rates of these complications to
the state average, with the conditions weighted based on their estimated cost
or resource use. Hospitals are then ranked based on these rates, and a percent-
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age of hospitals’ revenue is placed at risk for their performance. An evaluation
of the program’s early experience found that it had reduced included PPCs by
more than 18 percent in the first two years, while the rates of excluded compli-
cations increased modestly by almost 3 percent (Calikoglu et al. 2012).
The Admission-Readmission Revenue (ARR) Program, implemented in 2011,
was a voluntary program incentivizing hospitals to reduce 30-day readmissions
by making bundled payments for an episode of an index admission and its sub-
sequent readmissions. This program, ultimately implemented in 27 hospitals,
was deemed necessary considering the higher readmission rates among Mary-
land’s Medicare beneficiaries compared to the national rate.
The Maryland Multi-Payor Patient Centered Medical Home Program (MMPP)
started as a three-year pilot program introduced in 2011 with the goal of test-
ing the Patient Centered Medical Homes (PCMH) model in Maryland. Distin-
guishing this program from other national initiatives was the broad diversity
of participating health plans, including the five largest private payers in Mary-
land and other state and federal government payers. An early evaluation of the
program found some cost savings and some improvements in the utilization of
physician services and hospital admissions due to asthma (IMPAQ Interna-
tional 2014).
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2.3 The 2010 TPR reform
The experience with the rate-setting system’s admissions-based payments con-
vinced Maryland regulators that total hospital utilization and total spending
per capita, not spending per admission, was a much more meaningful target
for policy. In addition, the HSCRC had experimented with global budgeting
for a long time, as one hospital (Garrett County Memorial Hospital) had been
paid using a guaranteed revenue methodology resembling a global budget since
1994 and another (Edward McCready Memorial Hospital) since 2008.
Thus, the HSCRC decided to move towards global revenue constraints for
the other rural hospitals in Maryland. Rural hospitals were targeted first be-
cause they were either sole community provider hospitals or hospitals without
highly overlapping service areas. The expectation was that setting their bud-
gets would therefore be less complicated by patient choice among multiple hos-
pitals. The TPR reform was also viewed more like a pilot from which lessons
could be drawn for potential statewide implementation of hospital global bud-
gets. The eligibility criteria resulted in a total of 11 hospitals operating as
sole community providers in rural Maryland counties. Of these, eight hospi-
tals enrolled in the program and three hospitals declined participation (Table
2.1). The TPR reform established a revenue target for each hospital, covering
the care for the entire population in the hospital’s service area. The program’s
stated objective was to provide hospitals with a financial incentive to manage
their resources efficiently in order to slow the rate of increase in the cost of
32
CHAPTER 2. POLICY CONTEXT AND REFORM
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Non-Federal Short-Term Acute Care Hospitals in
Maryland, by TPR Eligibility and Participation, 2010
Hospital name Beds Discharges Revenue
TPR participating hospitals
Chester River Hospital Center 42 2,227 $66,359,390
Dorchester General Hospital in Cambridge 66 16,645 $38,690,745
Calvert Memorial Hospital 113 8,140 $148,025,790
Union Hospital 141 5,762 $153,372,942
Carroll Hospital Center 158 12,637 $259,282,620
Shore Medical Center at Easton 178 10,697 $299,959,579
Western Maryland Regional Medical Center 247 14,052 $367,301,120
Meritus Medical Center 265 17,792 $357,561,605
Average 151 10,994 $211,319,224
Eligible but declined participation (rural control hospitals)
Charles Regional Medical Center (Civista) 110 8,522 $137,800,705
Upper Chesapeake Medical Center 181 14,000 $290,000,785
Frederick Medical Hospital 298 17,585 $435,664,988
Average 196 13,369 $287,822,159
Ineligible (urban and suburban hospitals)
Fort Washington Medical Center 31 2,185 $46,372,500
UMD Harford Memorial Hospital 89 4,731 $103,630,000
MedStar Saint Mary’s Hospital 90 8,591 $166,187,036
Bon Secours Hospital 115 5,994 $159,912,960
Laurel Regional Hospital 123 6,757 $126,786,366
MedStar Montgomery General Hospital 138 9,291 $175,573,519
UMD Rehabilitation and Orthopaedic Institute 153 4,453 $115,271,846
Maryland General Hospital 155 8,084 $223,477,540
MedStar Harbor Hospital 187 11,637 $277,723,132
Doctors Community Hospital 207 10,875 $217,638,601
Suburban Hospital 229 13,283 $286,000,879
Union Memorial Hospital 236 14,073 $550,116,063
Howard County General Hospital 249 19,454 $278,901,588
Northwest Hospital 250 13,355 $258,860,391
Washington Adventist Hospital 252 11,671 $245,940,174
Prince George’s Hospital Center 262 12,465 $296,427,996
MedStar Southern Maryland Hospital 263 16,195 $281,257,689
UMD Saint Joseph Medical Center 267 21,209 $469,947,731
Mercy Medical Center 288 19,496 $480,065,775
Baltimore Washington Medical Center 307 19,722 $405,338,803
Saint Agnes Hospital 311 17,902 $561,353,599
Medstar Good Samaritan Hospital 335 14,207 $440,388,976
Shady Grove Medical Center 353 21,202 $404,330,170
MedStar Franklin Square Medical Center 369 24,366 $619,232,829
Anne Arundel Medical Center 380 33,573 $550,363,683
Greater Baltimore Medical Center 421 17,845 $433,342,307
Holy Cross Hospital 442 36,026 $489,771,326
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore 447 27,921 $873,087,556
Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center 483 20,810 $602,351,377
UMD Medical Center 688 36,054 $1,441,356,346
The Johns Hopkins Hospital 978 49,484 $2,137,134,183
Average 293 17,191 $442,520,740
Source: Discharge data from the American Hospital Directory. Financial data from Medicare
cost reports for period ending 06/30/2013 (HCRIS 524939 - 2010).
Notes: Beds include all staffed beds. Discharges refers to total inpatient discharges. Revenue
refers to gross patient revenue.
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health care. The underlying goal, acknowledged by Maryland regulators, was
to determine hospitals to maximize the value of care they provide to their com-
munities (Rajkumar et al. 2014).
The target budget for each TPR hospital was calculated prospectively us-
ing a model based on four key elements (Maryland Health Services Cost Re-
view Commission 2010). First, the population in the hospital’s service area
was determined, with two types of areas defined for each hospital: the pri-
mary service area, which consists of ZIP codes in which at least 75 percent of
the patient volume is treated by the hospital; and the secondary service area,
which consists of ZIP codes in which between 25 and 75 percent of the pa-
tient volume is treated by the hospital. Second, the base year budget was set
as the most recent Fiscal Year before program implementation, i.e. FY2010.
Third, the regulated services subject to state-approved rates were determined
to include all the inpatient and outpatient services provided at the hospital
campus. Non-regulated services include services provided off-campus or to
non-Maryland residents. Fourth, adjustments were allowed based on projected
changes in patient volume, payer mix, and variation in service prices from the
state-approved rates.
Accounting for these four factors, the HSCRC calculated a budget called the
approved combined total revenue. DRG-based constraints were removed and
hospitals were allowed to continue to charge payers based on the unit rates
set by HSCRC, but could adjust their prices within a ±5 percent corridor (or,
if approved with justification by the HSCRC, within a ±10 percent corridor).
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At the end of the fiscal year the budget was compared to the charged revenue,
and any amount in excess of the revenue constraint simply became a one-time
penalty in the revenue constraint for the subsequent year. Similarly, a shortfall
became a one-time addition to the subsequent year’s revenue constraint.
The budget for each of the subsequent years was calculated similarly start-
ing with the approved combined total revenue as a base and applying an an-
nual update factor that combined adjustments for volume variations, changes
to payer mix, and any one-time adjustments from the previous year’s budget.
Each hospital was also eligible to receive an agreed-upon transitional revenue
as a lump sum for specific hospital investments in the first two years of the
program’s operation. These revenues were intended to aid the hospitals in
changing their service delivery process towards improved care coordination,
chronic disease management, and resource utilization (Rajkumar et al. 2014).
Importantly, because the program was implemented with yearly targets es-
tablished over a three-year time frame, there was little scope for a more dy-
namic recalculation of targets to account for decreased utilization during the
course of the program. In other words, the HSCRC aimed to maintain the
credibility that targets would not be decreased further on a yearly basis as
the program would potentially reduce utilization, leading to a downward spi-
ral whereby hospitals would get penalized in the long term for responding in a
beneficial way by containing utilization in the short term.
The TPR program also relied on continuous monitoring of activity and qual-
ity over the course of its implementation. Hospitals have been required to sub-
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mit monthly reports to the HSCRC detailing their activity, and the HSCRC also
monitored several indicators of performance, including patient satisfaction.
Clinical quality indicators that are monitored include rates of preventable ad-
missions as measured by AHRQs Preventable Quality Indicators, preventable
readmissions, hospital risk-adjusted mortality, and hospital-acquired condi-
tions. Hospitals were eligible to receive additional “scaling revenue” if they
performed well on the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans and Systems
(CAHPS) and clinical process of care results as measured by the state’s Quality-
Based Reimbursement (described below), which added a pay-for-performance
dimension to the global budget program (Maryland Health Services Cost Re-
view Commission 2010). The intention was to counteract any potential in-
centives hospital may have to decrease service quality under the revenue con-
straint.
2.4 The 2014 GBR reform
As noted above, the growth rate in statewide hospital cost per case had acceler-
ated in the late 2000s into the early 2010s, placing the state close to failing the
Medicare waiver test. Losing the waiver would have resulted in an estimated
$1.5 billion loss in additional Medicare payments to Maryland hospitals–an
artifact of the higher Maryland rates established back in 1980, the waiver’s
baseline year. Therefore, the state had a strong incentive to revise its waiver
arrangement to maintain its all-payer rate-setting mechanism (Murray and
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Berenson 2015).
In 2013, Maryland applied for a new five-year waiver from CMS, which was
approved and began functioning in January 2014. Under this revised waiver,
Maryland expanded a slightly modified version of the global budget constraint
under TPR to all general, acute care hospitals in the state. It also committed
to containing inpatient and outpatient expenditure growth within 3.58 percent
for the first three years, with the possibility of adjusting the rate in the fourth
and fifth years based on more recent data. This ceiling was based on the state’s
10-year Gross State Product (GSP) per capita growth rate (Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services 2014).
The waiver includes a separate Medicare cost growth benchmark guaran-
teed by Maryland, totaling $330 million in savings to Medicare over the 5-year
period. This savings is calculated based on the difference in the Medicare per-
beneficiary hospital cost growth in Maryland and the national growth rate.
With the new waiver, Maryland also committed to meeting two quality tar-
gets. The first is a reduction of its all-cause 30-day hospital readmission rate
to the unadjusted national Medicare average. Given the already higher rate
of readmissions among Maryland’s Medicare beneficiaries, this requires Mary-
land to outperform the national rate by at least 2 percentage points over 5
years. The second quality target is a reduction in the rate of Potentially Pre-
ventable Complications (PPCs) by nearly 30 percent over 5 years.
The new CMS waiver relies on a more flexible version of the TPR program
for non-rural hospitals and has been renamed Global Budget Revenue (GBR).
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The GBR methodology adapts the TPR framework to suburban and urban hos-
pitals, which have much more competition in their markets, as well as to aca-
demic centers providing highly specialized tertiary care services, often to a
large number of out-of-state patients (e.g., The Johns Hopkins Hospital and
the University of Maryland Medical Center). The main difference between the
TPR and GBR models is the determination of hospitals’ geographic market
boundaries. While participation in the GBR system is voluntary, it has been
adopted by all the hospitals in the state, which makes the evaluation of the
TPR pilot even more important and timely.
Finally, Maryland agreed to monitor and report progress on a range of pop-
ulation health measures developed by quality measurement groups such as
the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) and National Quality
Forum (NQF), some of which are being used in other initiatives implemented
by the CMS. These include mammography, colorectal cancer screening, opti-
mal diabetes care, blood pressure control, influenza immunization, and others
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2014).
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Provider payment policies are powerful instruments for affecting the quantity
and the quality of medical services as well as the level of integration in the
provision of care (Cutler et al. 2000; Fisher, McClellan, et al. 2009). Design-
ing and implementing effective payment systems, however, is not an easy task,
particularly in a complex health care system (Langenbrunner et al. 2009). Mul-
tiple and often conflicting policy objectives must be balanced, including cost
containment, patient-centeredness, quality improvement, coordination of care,
and equitable access to services. The priority given to these objectives depends
on economic, political, and cultural factors specific to the relevant setting and
its historical background.
Capital-intensive, institutionally complex, and politically powerful providers
like hospitals pose especially difficult challenges to government regulators.
Organizational elements such as leadership capacity and non-pecuniary in-
centives play an important role in how hospitals respond to payment system
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changes. In a complex institution with multiple economic agents, financial
incentives can get diluted or distorted depending on the organizational hier-
archy and interactions between constituents. These distortions may lead to
unintended consequences which must be weighed carefully against any bene-
fits caused by the payment reform.
Moreover, regulators have limited capacity to measure outcomes and en-
force payment policies through legal contracts (Chalkley et al. 2000). Despite
significant progress made in the measurement of quality of care in recent
decades, this field still suffers from an insufficient ability to collect, analyze,
and report data on meaningful indicators as care processes and technologies
evolve. If the measures tied to reimbursement are not perceived as valid or
relevant by hospital staff, reforms could be easily undermined. For exam-
ple, the measurement movement is currently facing a backlash, as providers
report confusion and increased administrative burden as they face different
measures, incentives, and reporting systems (Stempniak 2015). Given the lim-
ited ability for enforcement, the shift of financial risk onto hospitals may lead
them to improve efficiency, but it may also cause them to skimp on care, stop
offering unprofitable services in favor of elective but risky surgeries, or even
select against unfavorable risks. All of these limitations need to be ultimately
addressed by the structure of a payment system.
This chapter reviews two main groups of literature. The first summarizes a
set of papers describing the key technical design elements of hospital payment
mechanisms utilized in modern health care systems. While this literature sum-
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marizes the incentives providers face under different payment mechanisms,
a more formal neoclassical economic model of hospital behavior is presented
in Chapter 4 to examine the likely effects of switching from case-based reim-
bursement to global budgets. The second part of this chapter summarizing the
relevant literature then reviews the empirical evidence for the impact of global
budgets of hospitals internationally and in the United States (a systematic
review of the related literature of the effects of capitation and other payment
reforms on physician behavior is outside the scope of this dissertation chapter).
3.1 Payment design elements
Provider payment methods have been defined as mechanisms used to trans-
fer funds from the purchaser of health care services, while payment systems
encompass the payment methods in combination with its supporting mecha-
nisms, such as contracting, information, and accountability systems (Langen-
brunner et al. 2009).
A useful typology of payment systems developed by Jegers et al. (2002) dis-
tinguishes three main dimensions for classification. First, the retrospective vs.
prospective dimension refers to the link between input costs and reimburse-
ment; see the left side of Figure 3.1. In a retrospective system, a provider’s
costs are fully reimbursed ex post, thus providing little motivation to increase
efficiency. In contrast, in prospective payment systems rates or budgets are set
in advance of service provision, and are therefore disconnected from the costs
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Figure 3.1: Dimensions for Classifying Provider Payment Systems
Source: Adapted from Jegers et al. (2002).
of the provider.
Second, the fixed vs. variable dimension refers to the link between the ser-
vice activities and reimbursement. A payment system which reimburses for
each additional unit of activity is considered variable, whereas one that reim-
burses a constant sum regardless of the provider’s activity is considered fixed;
see the right side of Figure 3.1.
The third dimension concerns whether payments are set based on inputs
(e.g., hospital beds) or outputs (e.g., cases treated, surgeries provided, etc.)
(Langenbrunner et al. 2009); see Figure 3.2. This dimension can fundamen-
tally alter the economic incentives of a payment system, in particular by deter-
mining the levels of staff productivity.
In addition to these three dimensions, payment systems fundamentally dif-
fer based on whether their expenditures are capped at the macro level. These
closed-end systems can have either total budget caps, or partial budget caps
which restrict certain types of health care expenditures. And although prospec-
tively setting a budget cap does not guarantee that it will not be exceeded, hard
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Figure 3.2: Characterization of Provider Payment Methods Based on Timing of
Reimbursement and Relation to Inputs or Outputs
Source: Adapted from Langenbrunner et al. (2009).
caps tend to perform better at cost containment than soft caps, whereby ad-
justments are applied to budgets if they are overrun (Schwartz et al. 1997). A
combination of budget constraints can be imposed at both the micro and macro
levels.
The characteristics and incentives of the five main types of hospital pay-
ment methods are presented in Table 3.1. The cost-based reimbursement uti-
lized by Medicare (and most other payers) before 1983 was retrospective. Un-
der this system, Medicare made interim payments to hospitals throughout
the year, and then reconciled those payments with allowable costs defined by
regulations based on cost reports submitted by hospitals (Office of Inspector
General 2001). Beginning in 1983, the IPPS introduced case-based payments
























Table 3.1: Hospital Payment Methods, Characteristics, and Incentives
Characteristics




Payment basis Provider incentives
Line-item budget Prospectively Prospectively Inputs Underprovide services; refer to other
providers; increase inputs; neglect ef-
ficiency of input mix; spend all re-
maining funds by end of the year
Fee-for-service
(fixed fee schedule)
Prospectively Retrospectively Outputs Increase the number of services in-
cluding above the necessary level; re-
duce inputs per service
Fee-for-service (no
fixed fee schedule)
Retrospectively Retrospectively Inputs Increase number of services; increase
inputs
Per diem Prospectively Retrospectively Outputs Increase number of days (admissions
and length of stay); reduce inputs per
hospital day; increase bed capacity
Case-based Prospectively Retrospectively Outputs Increase number of cases, including
preventable admissions; reduce inputs
per case; improve the efficiency of the
input mix; reduce length of stay; shift
rehabilitation care to the outpatient
setting
Global budget Prospectively Prospectively Inputs or
outputs
Underprovide services; refer to other
providers; increase inputs; improve ef-
ficiency of the input mix
Source: Adapted from Kutzin (2001) and Maceira (1998).
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adopted by private payers and other countries.
A case-based system can induce profound changes to the delivery of hospital
services, incentivizing providers to reexamine the way in which they motivate
and supervise staff and utilize resources (Eichler et al. 2001) but may also
have some unintended consequences (Langenbrunner et al. 2009). Table 3.2
summarizes these intended and unintended consequences. In particular, the
process for defining and differentiating cases based on underlying costs deter-
mine the incentives created and the complexity of the support systems needed.
Moreover, differences in input costs across hospitals are addressed by having
allowable variation depend on policy objectives like increased access in rural
areas or an emphasis on efficiency of resource use.
Global budgets, on the other hand, are prospectively agreed-upon sums
within which hospital operating expenses must be constrained. Further con-
straints may be imposed on the use of the budget, such as certain inputs or
outputs (Dredge 2009). However, in general, global budgets offer hospital
managers considerable flexibility to reallocate resources as they deem neces-
sary, but under the expectation that they will be held accountable for their
performance (Barnum et al. 1995). Moreover, global budgets are generally ad-
ministratively simple and relatively inexpensive to operate compared to other
hospital funding approaches. One very important aspect is that they provide a
large degree of predictability and stability for both hospitals and governments
(Marini et al. 2007; Sharfstein 2016).
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There are three main ways of determining global budgets, although there
can be mixed models combining these three ways (Dredge 2009). First, under
an historical approach, spending for each hospital is analyzed by purchaser,
and patient flows are categorized by specialty and degree of complexity. Then
the patient flows from each purchaser are costed, total costs are reconciled
to current spending, and projections are made for the prorated share of each
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purchaser in the global budget of the hospital. This method continues existing
resource flows, thus providing stability and assuring providers and patients
that current services will be maintained.
Second, under a more complex capitation approach, there is first an agree-
ment on the services that need to be covered and the main characteristics that
drive service use at the population level. Budgets are then allocated to eligible
providers based on the population they cover and the characteristics of that
population in terms of service use drivers. This method requires a significant
degree of sophistication from the budget-setting agency, but it can rectify cer-
tain historical inefficiencies and inequities if the right data and expertise are
available.
Third, under a normative approach, external rate-setting mechanisms de-
termine unit rates for services, which are then applied to the volume of services
required by the purchaser. This approach, while potentially simpler and more
transparent, also allows purchasers to apply a cost benchmark they deem ap-
propriate, inducing efficiency on providers (Dredge 2009).
Finally, under a mixed model, multiple elements from the first three ap-
proaches can be combined, with budgets calculated on the basis of historical
budgets, capitation shares, and benchmark costs. Moreover, performance ele-
ments can be set, either as relative or absolute targets, and certain shares of
the budget can be tied to the achievement of these targets.
In conclusion, the above description allows us to better characterize Mary-
land’s 2010 TPR reform. It can best be thought of as the introduction of a
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fixed, prospective budget constraint calculated based on outputs using a mixed
method, with hospital cash flow driven by case-based payments from multiple
public and private payers. This makes TPR a relatively complex global bud-
get system. The complexity of TPR also resides in the fact that some of the
other mechanisms of case-based reimbursement and rate-setting were kept in
place in order to facilitate the continued interactions between the payers and
the hospitals using the existing system architecture. Moreover, the pre-TPR
system made use of constraints on hospital case volume, which made the tran-
sition to global budgets complex in its own right. In other words, TPR was not
introduced as block payments made in advance to hospitals previously paid
purely on a DRG system.
3.2 Evidence on hospital global budgets
From a normative standpoint, there is a debate among policy-oriented researchers
as to whether global budgets are necessary. Proponents of this approach often
do not favor the use of market mechanisms based on ability to pay to ration ser-
vices, and instead support a more top-down regulatory allocation of resources
(Gottret et al. 2006). Others instead argue that global budgets impede market
efficiency through an artificially imposed spending constraint (Ham 2003). It is
therefore important to examine the empirical evidence on the impact of global
budgets. This section summarizes the most relevant literature from the US
and from international settings.
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In the US the most informative case is the experience with hospitals in
Rochester, New York in the 1980s. Rochester implemented individual and ag-
gregate caps on hospital income between 1980 and 1988 as a voluntary pro-
gram ultimately including seven Rochester hospitals and one outlying hospital
(Griner 1994). Budgets were comprised by inpatient and outpatient revenue
from all payers and were calculated from costs prior to implementation with al-
lowable growth rates set based on a combination of local and state wage trends.
Hospitals agreed to report clinical and administrative data to a community-
wide database. Hospitals were allowed to keep any surplus but were also at
risk for losses. Throughout the period, New York also operated a hospital rate-
setting system for all payers (McDonough 1997). Outpatient payments were
set generously in order to discourage hospital stays, while a fund was set up
for capital investments approved through the state’s Certificate-of-Need (CON)
process. In the last three years the community-wide cap was also extended to
capital costs (Griner 1994).
During the program operation, spending in participating hospitals grew at
rates below the state and national averages. Hospital spending growth also
slowed compared to hospitals in Boston and Minneapolis, adjusted for sex, age,
and wage levels (Block et al. 1987). The financial performance of the Rochester
hospitals, measured by operating margins, improved compared to the rest of
the hospitals in New York (Block et al. 1987; Griner 1994). Moreover, the hos-
pital component of the community’s total health care spending decreased from
55 percent in 1978 to 38 percent in 1990. In the first five years of the program,
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admission rates in Rochester hospitals decreased by 11 per 1,000 capita, while
remaining relatively constant in New England and New York state hospitals
(Block et al. 1987). The program also led to some modest improvements in clin-
ical quality of services, as well as an increase in public satisfaction with care
from 79 percent in 1980 to 96 percent in 1985 (Block et al. 1987). Despite these
promising results, the program ended when the HCFA terminated the state’s
Medicare waiver, leading many to feel like they “threw the baby out with the
bathwater” (Griner 1994).
The Rochester experiment, while generally successful, also had several lim-
itations. In particular, with the fee-for-service physician payment system still
in place, the program provided insufficient incentives to substitute expensive
utilization for more cost-effective services. Moreover, the program’s limits on
capital investments seem to have fallen short of the community’s demand for
new technologies (Griner 1994). These limitations highlight the difficulty of
establishing systems which contain costs by allocating resources towards ef-
fective services while also investing sufficiently in often-unproven innovations
demanded by patients.
Several countries also have experience with various global budget schemes
for hospital care. These countries include Canada, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, India, China, and Hong
Kong. Some of these countries now use a mix of global budgets and other pay-
ment methods for their hospitals (i.e., the Nordic countries, Singapore), while
others use global budgets for some types of hospitals but not for others (e.g.,
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public hospitals in India, rural hospitals in Australia) (Mossialos et al. 2016).
In Canada, provincial governments acting as single payers allocate annual
budgets to each hospital, while also negotiating physician fee schedules with
medical associations. Ontario, for instance, was the first to shift in 1969 from
a line-item budgeting system to a prospective global budget with a formula
for calculating allowed rates of increase. Between 1968 and 1981, hospital
expenditures in Ontario increased by only 16 percent in terms of real inputs,
while in the same period US hospital costs grew by 101 percent (Detsky et
al. 1983). At the same time, average real inputs per patient-day grew at an
average annual rate of only 0.68 percent, compared to 5.19 percent in the US
(Detsky et al. 1983).
Gradually, all Canadian provinces have adopted some form of global bud-
gets for hospitals (Wolfe et al. 1993). But while Canada’s global budgets have
succeeded in limiting hospital expenditures by constraining their budgets quite
drastically during the 1990s, some data suggest that they have extended be-
yond the initial incentives towards efficiency and have rationed valuable care.
Wait times for certain elective surgical procedures were the highest in Canada
among 11 OECD countries (Schoen et al. 2010), despite government efforts
to reduce wait time by increasing allocated budgets (Sutherland, Barer, et al.
2011).
More recently, Canadian provinces started moving in the opposite direction
by introducing case-based payments, termed Activity-Based Funding (ABF).
British Columbia was the first one to make the transition, in 2010, while On-
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tario and Quebec introduced partial reforms more recently (Sutherland, Hell-
sten, et al. 2016). Only the province’s largest hospitals implemented the re-
form, though, as the small and rural hospitals were excluded. Furthermore,
only 20 percent of the hospitals’ revenues were changed to case-based pay-
ments, and the budgets excluded physician costs. An evaluation of reform
experience after three years found the intended increase in the trend for in-
patient and outpatient surgeries (Sutherland, Liu, et al. 2016). At the same
time, the volume of medical inpatients decreased, and average length of stay
increased, likely as a result of a disproportionate reduction in shorter stays.
The reform did not seem to have observable effects on a limited set of quality
measures examined.
The Canadian experience with global budgets is useful for several reasons.
First, it suggests that over time, under fiscal pressures hospital budgets can
become targets for governments, causing a reduction in service volume and
thus potentially worsening access to services like elective surgeries (Deber et
al. 2008; Street et al. 1996). In the US, this is likely to be a significant political
issue. Canadian hospitals also tend to limit services earlier in the year to min-
imize the risk of incurring a deficit at year end. Service reductions can lead to
delays or cancellations for elective procedures and result in longer emergency
department wait times for non-elective admissions (Deber et al. 2008). Second,
global budgets lack incentives to improve productivity, since there is no op-
portunity to generate more revenue by increasing patient throughput. Third,
the basis for the budget updating factors can be an important factor determin-
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ing the performance of global budgets. Payments updated based on historical
growth tend to disincentivize hospitals to focus on shortening lengths of stay
and shifting less acute activities to less costly settings such as outpatient or
home-based care (Sutherland 2011).
However, while the private provision of care and the dual role of the fed-
eral and provincial governments in financing care make the Canadian expe-
rience instructive, its single-payer system with strong government regulation
and predominantly tax-based financing warrant caution when drawing lessons
from its experience for global budgets for the United States.
In France, a payment system with sector-wide expenditure targets and hospital-
specific global budgets was introduced in 1984 to replace the existing per-diem
payment system. This system seems to have been successful in slowing na-
tional health expenditure growth by limiting the flow of real resources into the
hospital sector. The effect on spending seems to have been achieved by de-
creasing the quantity of services provided, while the relative prices of hospital
services remained constant (Redmon et al. 1995). Although the new system de-
creased service utilization, including total inpatient days, it is unclear whether
it lowered access to services or simply represented a reduction in excess supply.
Thus, the experience of France reinforces the important question of whether
the decline in the quantity of hospital services actually leads to better care.
In Hong Kong, the experience also shows that while global budgets may
be effective at controlling costs, access may suffer. There, a strictly limited
budget for hospital care led to regional disparities in the adoption of advanced
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technologies (Chu 1992).
In the Netherlands, budgets were introduced in 1983 for all 176 short-term
hospitals, 90 percent of which were private. Budgets replaced the previous
cost-based reimbursement system using unit rates negotiated between sick-
ness funds and hospitals. Targets were calculated to each hospital based on
historical inpatient and outpatient utilization, and starting in 1985 were de-
fined based on capacity (i.e., number of beds and ambulatory units) and out-
put parameters (i.e., number of admissions and total inpatient days). Output
parameters were negotiated between hospitals and sickness funds, and if ex-
penses exceeded the target by more than 5 percent they would be adjusted
downward the following year (Maarse 1989). Similarly, if a hospital’s spending
fell below the target, it would be allowed to add the difference to its reserves
(Maarse et al. 1993).
In the years after the Dutch policy was enacted, admission rates decreased
at an accelerated pace in all age groups except for the elderly (Casparie et al.
1991). In patients aged 65 and older, admission rates continued to rise, sug-
gesting that there might have been a shift in utilization across age groups.
Surgery rates for non-elderly patients have decreased similarly to admission
rates, while increasing for the elderly. But despite the increase in intensity
of care for the elderly, mortality rates in the country and the percentage of
patients discharged to nursing homes continued to decline the after the intro-
duction of the program (Casparie et al. 1991). Hospital capacity was also low-
ered from 4.5 to 4.2 beds per 1,000 population post-implementation, despite
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a growing and aging population. The program did not change total hospital
spending (11.0 vs. 11.2 billion Dutch guilders in 1982 and 1988, respectively),
although counterfactual spending without the program is likely to have grown
more. There is no reliable evidence on how the program impacted other ser-
vices, such as diagnostic tests or other outpatient procedures.
Italy is an example of a country that moved in the opposite direction, from
global budgets to case-based payments. An observational study of Italy’s re-
form based on regional utilization data found a decrease of 17.3 percent in
hospital admissions and a decrease in the average length of stay from 9.1 days
to 8.8 days (Louis et al. 1999). However, day hospital use increased seven-
fold, suggesting that the hospitals adapted to the new payment mechanism by
attempting to maximize revenue from high-margin services.
In a rare cross-country study, Leonard et al. (2003) compared the incentives
on length of stay induced by the Austrian case-based payment system with the
Canadian global budgeting. In six major clinical categories which are compa-
rable between the two countries, they found significantly higher length of stay
for Austrian patients compared to Canadian patients, suggesting potential re-
ductions in intensity of care associated with a shift to global budgets.
In conclusion, global budgets are not a uniform payment system. The in-
centives induced by global budgets depend on how the budgets are calculated,
what services and populations they cover, and how performance is defined and
monitored. The structure of the payment schemes implemented, as well as the
larger health care policy and regulatory environments in these settings, dif-
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fer widely (Kent 1993). And despite the experience with global budgets being
quite rich internationally, the literature is relatively descriptive in nature and
limited in rigorous empirical assessments of global budgeting schemes. A rel-
atively rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of the TPR reform in Maryland
hospitals would therefore make an important contribution to this literature.
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This chapter presents a simple theoretical model of hospital behavior to illus-
trate the economic incentives resulting from the reform to switch to global bud-
get payments from case-based reimbursement. As with any theoretical model,
our model makes a set of simplifying assumptions for tractability. Where pos-
sible, we comment on how and to what extent these assumptions apply to
the circumstances of Maryland’s specific case of revenue constraints applied
to case-based hospital reimbursement. We believe that, in many instances, a
richer model allowing for a more realistic treatment of hospital interactions
with payers and patients would still yield similar conclusions. In the second
section of this chapter, we derive a set of predictions about hospital behavior
under the new payment system which follow from this theoretical framework.
Finally, we examine how the model’s predictions may be tempered or difficult
to measure in reality.
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4.1 An economic model of hospital behavior
We consider a single hospital servicing a delineated geographic area with a
stable population within a given year. Although this situation rarely applies
in urban hospital markets in the United States, it rather accurately reflects
the situation of rural areas in Maryland subject to the TPR reform. This as-
sumption could also be relaxed to account for multiple hospitals competing in
a market as long as underlying patient populations are clearly defined; this
would be a situation applicable to the GBR program implemented statewide in
2014.
We assume that the hospital interacts with one purchaser paying for health
care services for that population. This assumption is appropriate for single-
payer systems like those found in some European and Asian countries, but
may first seem too strong in our case, as the HSCRC is not a single payer
entity. However, because the Commission has rate-regulating authority over
all hospitals and payers in the state, the model is more consistent with fixed
rates as if set by a single payer. This model could also be easily extended to
account for multiple payers engaged in different contracts with the hospitals.
Let q be the number of hospital visits in a given year. For simplicity in
this model, we do not distinguish between inpatient stays (in which a patient
is hospitalized for at least one night) or outpatient visits (in which a patient
generally visit a hospital-affiliated outpatient department during the day). We
assume that the hospital chooses the quantity q to maximize an objective func-
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tion of the following form:
max
q
Π = R(q)− C(q) + α · U(q) (4.1)
The first term in equation (4.1) represents the total revenues of the hospi-
tal, and its form is dependent on the payment system in effect (to be examined
below). The second term is the total monetary cost incurred by the hospital,
which includes both a fixed component (i.e., cost of capital, medical equipment,
etc.) and a variable component depending on the number of hospital visits per
year. While a large literature seeks to estimate the specific form of hospital
cost functions, we assume that C ′(·) > 0 and C ′′(·) > 0. The third term rep-
resents the altruism (or benevolence) of hospital activity, which is assumed to
equal the product of an altruism parameter α times patient utility (expressed
in monetary terms) from receiving care at the hospital U(q) (Chalkley et al.
2000). A hospital that is completely self-interested has α = 0, while greater
values of α represent increasing amounts of altruism. The patient utility func-
tion is assumed to U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0.
Intuitively, Π therefore represents a linear combination of the hospital’s fi-
nancial surplus and the welfare from providing medical care to the patients.
We believe that this setup is suitable for either for-profit or nonprofit hospitals.
Because the TPR hospitals, as most hospitals in the US and all hospitals in
Maryland, are nonprofit institutions, the surplus cannot be simply posted as
profits but instead consists of either additions to reserves or expenditures that
can be directed towards managerial perquisites (Chalkley et al. 2000).
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We now consider the effect of the TPR reform to switch from using DRGs
for reimbursement to using of global budgets. To do so, we first characterize
the quantity of services under DRGs, q∗DRG, and the quantity of services under
global budgets, s, q∗TPR, and then compare the two. As described in Chapter
2, pre-TPR inpatient services are paid per case, with payments constrained
on the basis of DRGs determined by the patient’s main diagnosis. Similarly,
outpatient payments are calibrated based on EAPGs. For simplicity in the
model, we assume a constant rate paid per case p.
When revenues are based on DRGs, the first-order conditions for the hospi-









When revenues are instead based on global budgets through TPR, the hos-
pital maximizes the objective function:
max
q
Π(qTPR) = R(qTPR)− C(qTPR) + α · U(qTPR) (4.3)
subject to the budget constraint:
qTPR · p = B (4.4)
Thus, each hospital solves a constrained maximization problem of the form:
max
q,λ
L = qTPR · p− C(qTPR) + αUTPR + λ(B − qTPR · p) (4.5)
1As described in Chapter 2, the HSCRC incorporated volume constraints on hospital activity
through the VCF and other policies, but these are not modeled here.
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− λp = 0 (4.6a)
∂L(q∗TPR, λ∗)
∂λ
= B − qTPR · p = 0 (4.6b)
To see how the quantity of services supplied in the case-based payment sys-
tem, q∗DRG, compares to the quantity supplied in the global budget system, q∗TPR,
we simplify the analysis by assuming specific functional forms for the hospital
cost function and patient utility presented above above. Specifically, we as-
sume that C = cq2 with cost parameter c > 0, and that U(q) = q − bq2 with an
overuse disutility parameter b > 0.
With these assumptions, the first-order conditions for hospital optimization
under case-based DRG payment yield:
∂Π(q∗DRG)
∂q
= p− 2cq + α− 2αbq = 0⇒ 2cq + 2αbq = p+ α (4.7)







The interpretation of this result is relatively straightforward. An increase
in hospital visits under DRG payment results from increases in the price, in-
creases in the first-order effect of altruism on patient utility, decreases in the
costs, and decreases in the second-order effect of altruism on patient disutility
from overuse.
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Alternatively, the first-order conditions for hospital optimization under the
TPR global budget situation yield:
∂L(q∗TPR, λ∗)
∂q
= p(1− λ)− 2cq + α− 2αbq = 0 (4.9a)





so that by substituting the price from condition (4.9c) into Equation (4.9b) the




(1− λ)− 2cq + α− 2αbq = 0 (4.10)






Here, too, an increase in hospital visits under global budgets results from
increases in the first-order effect of altruism on patient utility, decreases in the
costs, and decreases in the second-order effect of altruism on patient disutility
from overuse.
The quantity supplied under global budgets is lower than under case-based
DRG payments, which can be seen by noting that:
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This reduction in utilization due to the implementation of TPR is our pri-
mary overarching hypothesis. The interpretation of this expression for the
magnitude of the reform’s effect on reduced utilization is also relatively straight-
forward. First, the expected reduction in quantity caused by the TPR reform
increases with the initial rate p paid per DRG, as higher payment rates imply
that there was more supplier-induced demand before the reform. In contrast,
the reduction in services under TPR decreases with the cost per case. Finally,
the two quantities are closer (i.e., the difference is smaller) as the hospital is
more altruistic (α >> 0). One reason is that it seeks to provide more services
for patients even under a fixed revenue since its objective function includes a
share of patient utility. The other reason is that as higher altruism implies
that there was less supplier-induced demand before the reform because of a
relatively higher valuation of patient disutility from overuse.
One limitation of our model’s framework is that we do not incorporate the ef-
fect of quality on patient demand for hospital services, in the sense that better
quality should attract more patients. Our model assumes that patient demand
is unresponsive to quality levels, as as often patients have insufficient informa-
tion about, or can judge, hospital performance on clinical outcomes. Instead,
the most important determinant of whether a patient demands care from the
hospital is likely to be the distance that she has to travel to that hospital. De-
mand for hospital treatments is also affected by other exogenous factors outside
the hospital’s control, such as the population and epidemiological profile in the
hospital’s service area. While the model ignores quality in relation to patient
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demand, it is still consistent with a setting in which minimal levels of quality
are set by hospital accreditation standards and other regulations enforced by
the HSCRC and Federal Government agencies.
Another limitation or our model’s framework is that it is conceivable that
the introduction of the TPR system increased the fixed costs of the hospital,
as there may be a need to manage the population differently and to ensure
that the budget constraint is not overrun. Meanwhile, the framework above
assumes that the underlying cost structure was unchanged. However, the
HSCRC did provide hospitals with lump sums to cover these operational costs
in the first contract cycle, so this issue is less of a concern.
4.2 Specific study hypotheses
In line with the theoretical predictions outlined above, the overarching ob-
jective of our study is to determine whether the implementation of the TPR
global budget reform decreased inpatient and outpatient hospital utilization
among the population living in the areas served by the participating hospitals
in Maryland. Although the hypothesis of a decrease in utilization is relatively
straightforward, several factors complicate the implementation of global bud-
gets in Maryland.
First, as discussed in Section 3.1, Maryland’s TPR system was not a tradi-
tional global budget as implemented in other settings, whereby hospitals would
truly receive a fixed payment to treat the population in their service area for
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the whole fiscal year. Instead, the HSCRC allowed hospitals to continue charg-
ing for each service in order to drive cash flow and enforced the budgets using
continuous monitoring and adjustment of rates, in addition to year-end adjust-
ments. The structure of the program potentially might not incentivize large
decreases in utilization, but rather small reductions that would still allow a
hospital’s total revenue to fall within close vicinity of its global budget.
Second, as described in Chapter 2, there were volume constraints already
in place under Maryland’s rate-setting system. Particularly, the VCF policy,
under which hospitals were reimbursed partially per DRG above a certain level
of utilization, already had a strong embedded incentive to control utilization.
Its reintroduction in 2008, as mentioned above, had already led to a reversal
in utilization rates in Maryland.
Third, the payment system for physicians was largely unaffected by the
TPR reform. In Maryland hospitals, independent physicians with admitting
privileges to hospitals are still largely paid fee-for-service.2 A conflict therefore
arises between the inflationary physician incentives and the new constraints
for hospital revenues which incentivize economizing on resources. How this
conflict was resolved during the first three years of TPR depends on the inter-
actions between hospital management, hospital physician and nursing staff,
and independent, FFS physicians (which are beyond the scope of this disserta-
2While there is evidence that the number of physicians directly hired by hospitals has been
steadily increasing in the US between 2000 and 2010, the exact prevalence of employment
agreements in Maryland hospitals is largely unknown and even the national statistics vary
widely. Even when the physicians are salaried, they may work for physician outsourcing com-
panies (Keckley 2015).
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tion).
Considering these three mitigating factors together, we expect the magni-
tude of the effect of TPR on inpatient and outpatient services to be relatively
small.
The second main hypothesis of this study is that the TPR reform had a
higher impact on discretionary services. In particular, discretionary services
make a higher proportion of outpatient visits (e.g., ambulatory surgeries), so
we expect a higher decrease in outpatient services relative to inpatient ser-
vices. Moreover, we expect larger reductions in ”potentially deferrable” care
relative to ”non-deferrable” care. In particular, we expect a null effect for more
essential services such as admissions from the ED or treatments for severe,
acute conditions such as hip fractures or Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI),
controlling for temporal changes in underlying population risk factors.
The third main hypothesis of the study is that the TPR program decreased
preventable care more than ”non-preventable” care. Specifically, we examine
changes in a comprehensive set of inpatient and outpatient categories of ser-
vices considered preventable or ”low-value” and identifiable using routinely
collected administrative data, including preventable admissions as specified
by the PQIs. An important question from a policy perspective is whether
the program had a discernible effect on health care efficiency and population
health. As described in Chapter 2, HSCRC regulators hoped that the payment
reform would incentivize hospitals to keep patients healthy and out of the hos-
pital. For instance, perhaps hospital managers could manage patients better
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in outpatient settings, begin investing in prevention, and establish partner-
ships with community-based providers and public health agencies, using the
initial block grants as a subsidy. In addition, the HSCRC stipulated in the
TPR contracts that mortality rates, rates of hospital acquired conditions and
preventable readmissions, as well as AHRQ’s Prevention Quality Indicators
(PQIs), would be monitored closely.
Although rates of preventable ED visits are not monitored by HSCRC, we
also hypothesize the TPR program to affect ED visits differentially depending
on the category of visit. ED visits serve as an indicator of whether there have
been changes in access to care or whether the global budget payment system
spurred the kind of hospital-physician partnerships that would increase dis-
ease prevention (Billings et al. 2000). Often, patients present to the ED since
they cannot be turned down. The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act of 1986 mandates hospitals to treat all patients with medi-
cal emergencies, regardless of their ability to pay. Since it does not apply to
physician offices, it has historically (prior to global budgets) created an incen-
tive to use the ED for care that could be provided in other settings. Moreover,
many medical services are more expensive to provide in an ED compared to a
physician’s office and overuse of ED care has put an unnecessary strain on the
resources in the health care system overall. If being paid a global budget leads
hospitals to substitute office-based care for the ED, then the most affected con-
ditions should be those that are not urgent and can most easily be treated in
an alternative setting.
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In this chapter we first outline the overarching study design strategy and then
we describe in detail the data sources, the construction of the analytical sam-
ple, the main variables, and the empirical estimation specifications.
5.1 Study design
The main difficulty in empirically estimating the causal effect of the TPR policy
change is that estimates may be confounded by concurrent changes in utiliza-
tion over time due to other factors. For instance, there were downward trends
in utilization rates in the state beginning in 2008 and continuing after the im-
plementation of the TPR reform. As discussed in Chapter 2, the reintroduction
of the Variable Cost Factor as a method of tapering payments had led to a re-
versal of the upward trend seen between 2000 and 2008. This study therefore
relies on a pre-post difference-in-differences design with several separate mod-
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els using various control groups. Specifically, we compare changes in utilization
per capita after reform implementation in geographic areas served by hospitals
that implemented the TPR reform to changes in utilization after reform imple-
mentation in the areas served by non-participating hospitals. Our first set of
analyses focus on various inpatient utilization measures and our second set of
analyses focus on various outpatient utilization measures. For each set of anal-
yses, we first consider simpler models with an indicator for whether the TPR
reform is in effect and then consider models with a measure of the number of
years that the TPR reform is in effect.
Although we have access to patient-level data for inpatient and outpatient
utilization, we aggregate the data up to population-level estimates of utiliza-
tion for our analyses because people with no hospital utilization do not appear
in the HSCRC data we use (described in the next section). The population-level
unit of observation for our analyses is the ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA),
as it represents the most granular geographic level present in the Maryland
discharge dataset for which population estimates are also available. A reliable
estimate of the population size for a given geographic area is critical for creat-
ing per-capita measures of utilization. Moreover, the HSCRC uses ZIP codes
when delineating hospital service areas in Maryland. In addition to the main
analyses, we also conducted multiple sensitivity analyses in which the assign-
ment of ZCTAs to study groups follow different methodologies, as described
below.
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5.2 Study samples
The main sample in this study consists of the population of Maryland residents
living in the rural ZCTAs located in the service areas of the exposed and control
hospitals between 2008 and 2013. This time frame uses two years of pre-reform
data and four years of post-implementation data.
In the main analysis, ZCTAs are assigned to hospital service areas based on
HSCRC methodology. The HSCRC assigned to each hospital’s primary service
area (PSA) the first ZCTAs that make up a cumulative proportion of at least
65 percent of all admissions to that hospital. The hospital Secondary Service
Area (SSA) is assigned to ZCTAs which cumulatively make up for the next 20
percent of admissions. ZCTAs assigned to the PSAs and SSAs of the TPR hos-
pitals were also specified in the contracts that each hospital signed with the
HSCRC. We replicate the HSCRC methodology to identify the ZCTAs compris-
ing the service areas of the control hospitals in 2010. We also compare these
ZCTAs to those identified in the TPR contracts which these hospitals signed
later on in 2014.
As noted above, our main analysis uses only rural areas in the state for the
set of control ZCTAs. In order to compare trends in the exposed areas to trends
in other Maryland areas and in the state as a whole, we also examine three
other samples, increasing progressively in size. First, we include all ZCTAs, ex-
cept those which are part of the large urban and suburban areas surrounding
Baltimore and Washington, DC. Specifically, we exclude ZCTAs located in Core-
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Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD) and
47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-WV). A CBSA is defined by
the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as one or more counties an-
chored in an urban center that are socioeconomically tied to that center by
commuting. This approach essentially compares TPR areas to all non-urban
and non-suburban Maryland ZCTAs. Second, we examine a sample which only
excludes Baltimore City (county FIPS code 24510), as this urban area differs
significantly in terms of demographic characteristics from the rural TPR ZC-
TAs and is served by the two large academic medical centers in Maryland,
Johns Hopkins and the University of Maryland Medical Center. Finally, the
third sample consists of all ZCTAs in Maryland, including the urban center of
Baltimore.
One hospital in the intervention group, Western Maryland Regional Medi-
cal Center (WMRMC), was formed in 2009 by the merger of Memorial Hospital
and Sacred Heart Hospital, both located in Cumberland. This merger has the
potential to confound the analysis, as the merger partially coincides temporally
with the introduction of the TPR reform. Therefore, in separate analyses we
exclude the ZCTAs served by this hospital from the analytical sample.
The HSCRC also assigns to the service areas of participating hospitals sev-
eral ZCTAs that are part of the neighboring states Pennsylvania and West Vir-
ginia. To ensure that the results are not confounded by other demographic, reg-
ulatory, and economic differences in these states, our main analysis excludes
these out-of-state ZCTAs. However, secondary analyses which also include
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these ZCTAs in the analytic sample (not shown) do not qualitatively change
the conclusions of the study.
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the Maryland ZCTAs are distributed across these
different analytical groups. The treatment TPR ZCTAs are shown in blue. The
main set of control ZCTAs comprising of the “Rural Controls Only” are shown in
dark red. Moreover, the smaller suburban ZCTAs added to the first alternative
“No Large Urban Areas” control group are shown in medium red, the larger
suburban ZCTAs added to the second alternative “No Inner City Baltimore”
control group are shown in medium-to-light red, and the Baltimore City ZCTAs
added to the third “All of Maryland” control group is shown in light red. As a
result, the control ZCTAs comprising the first alternative “No Large Urban
Areas” control group include both the dark red and medium red ZCTAs on the
map. As discussed in Chapter 2, two small hospitals in Maryland have also
utilized a payment system similar to TPR for a long time. The ZCTAs assigned
to these hospitals’ service areas are shown on the map in gray and are excluded
from all the control groups.
While our main analyses use HSCRC’s allocation of ZCTAs to hospitals (ac-
tually tied with the change in TPR reimbursement), we conduct additional
analyses to determine if alternative allocations of ZCTAs to hospitals generate
different results. Specifically, in a set of separate analyses, we use crosslink
files from the Dartmouth Health Atlas research group at the Dartmouth In-
stitute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice to assign ZIP codes to Hospital
Service Area (HSA)s and link these with their respective hospitals (Wennberg
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Figure 5.1: Maryland Zip Code Tabulation Areas by Assignment to Treatment
and Control Groups in the main analysis
Notes: Rural controls include ZCTAs assigned by the HSCRC to the service areas of hospi-
tals that were eligible to participate in TPR but declined. Other non-urban include ZCTAs
assigned to non-participating hospitals outside of the Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs)
12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-
VA-WV). Urban without Baltimore City include the CBSAs 12580 and 47900 but exclude Bal-
timore City County. Baltimore City refers to the ZCTAs contained in Baltimore City County
(FIPS code 24510).
and Cooper 1998). Even though there is significant overlap between the Dart-
mouth Atlas HSAs and the PSAs/SSAs assigned using HSCRC’s methodology,
there are also some notable differences. These differences stem from the fact
that the Dartmouth methodology relies on patterns of hospital care seeking be-
havior for Medicare beneficiary claims and may not be applicable to the entire
population. The Dartmouth Atlas method therefore assigns a small number of
ZIP codes to different hospital areas compared to the HSCRC method.
In a third set of separate analyses, we assign ZCTAs to treatment and con-
trol groups simply based on county location. Under this method, each county
is classified as TPR or control based on the status of the hospitals located in
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it, and each ZCTA located in that county receives the same designation. This
method may provide more stability if care-seeking patterns change idiosyn-
cratically over time for some ZCTAs or if ZCTAs are misclassified based on the
relatively arbitrary cut-offs used by the HSCRC and Dartmouth Atlas classifi-
cations. However, this assignment method may have its own limitations if the
residents of certain ZCTAs (particularly those on a county border) seek hospital
care in hospitals outside the county.
5.3 Data
We assemble data from multiple sources to construct a panel of ZCTAs fol-
lowed for two years in the pre-intervention period and four years in the post-
intervention periods. The year of the intervention, 2010, is categorized as post-
intervention even though the TPR program was in effect starting in July that
year, because the contracts were finalized in December 2009. Therefore, the
hospitals knew they would face total revenue constraints in 2010. Separate
models in which data for 2010 is excluded as an implementation year do not
meaningfully change the results, so this year was kept to improve precision by
increasing the analytical sample size.
5.3.1 Discharge abstracts
We use data on both all inpatient hospitalizations and all visits to outpatient
departments reported by Maryland hospitals between 2008 and 2013 from the
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discharge abstract database maintained by the HSCRC. This database con-
tains patient-level information including demographic characteristics (i.e., age,
sex, race and ethnicity, etc.), expected payment sources, ZIP code of residence,
as well as encounter attributes such as source of admission, clinical diagnoses
recorded using International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clini-
cal Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes1, procedures performed recorded using Cur-
rent Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes, and charges by revenue center. The
HSCRC data contains complete records on patients covered by all payers (pri-
vate and public), thus representing a comprehensive source of clinical informa-
tion for Maryland patients.
5.3.2 ZCTA and county characteristics
We link the discharge abstract data for inpatient and outpatient utilization
with ZCTA-level information from the Claritas Demographic Reports, a private
vendor of geographic data products (Claritas, Inc. 2006). This vendor was the
same source of ZCTA-level demographic information that the HSCRC used in
the process of projecting the demand for hospital care while drafting the TPR
contracts with the participating hospitals. The data include ZCTA population
estimates and composition by age, sex, race, and ethnicity, as well as household
income, educational attainment, and rate of unemployment.
1ICD-9-CM was the official system of assigning codes to diagnoses and procedures associ-
ated with hospital utilization in the United States during the period of the study, and it was
replaced by the Tenth Revision, ICD-10-CM, in October 2015. It is based on the World Health
Organization’s Ninth Revision, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (ICD-9)
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We also link discharge abstract data for inpatient and outpatient utilization
with county-level information from multiple sources. These characteristics in-
clude rates of uninsurance from the US Census Bureau’s Small Area Health
Insurance Estimates (SAHIE), which are based on ACS data; Medicare Ad-
vantage penetration rates extracted from HRSA’s Area Health Resource File
(AHRF), as provided by CMS; rates of primary care physicians per capita,
specialists per capita, and the number of Federally Qualified Health Centers
(FQHCs) from the AHRF. We use these measures to control for the supply of
non-hospital providers operating in the study areas, which have been shown to
be a key driver for the provision of hospital care (Fisher and Wennberg 2003;
Wennberg, Fisher, et al. 2007).
Table 5.1 presents the distribution of the ZCTA- and county-level indicators
in the main treatment and control areas both before and after the implementa-
tion of the TPR reform. On average, ZCTAs in the TPR areas are less populated
(5,771 vs. 9,088 average population) and also display less population growth
over the course of the study. The average median household income is signif-
icantly lower in the TPR areas compared to the rural controls, and the TPR
population is also older, less likely to be employed, and less educated on av-
erage compared to the population in the rural control ZCTAs. But although
the TPR counties have more physicians per capita and more FQHCs compared
to rural control counties, the average number of primary care physicians is
similar.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of ZCTAs in the Intervention and Rural Control
Areas, before and after TPR Implementation
TPR Controls All
Before After Before After Total
Average population 5,771 5,779 9,088 9,453 7,029
(9,746) (9,856) (10,965) (10,923) (10,353)
Percent adult 74.8 77.4 71.5 74.7 75.2
(3.8) (3.2) (2.5) (2.7) (3.6)
Percent female 50.2 50.7 50.6 51.2 50.7
(2.8) (2.1) (1.1) (1.5) (2.0)
Median age 38.2 40.8 35.5 38.4 38.8
(3.9) (3.8) (3.0) (3.8) (4.1)
Percent non-white 13.0 15.0 18.5 27.3 19.1
(9.1) (8.4) (13.8) (21.2) (15.6)
Median household income (10K) 6.0 7.1 7.9 9.4 7.8
(1.6) (2.1) (1.2) (1.6) (2.1)
Percent unemployed 4.2 6.6 3.2 5.5 5.3
(2.0) (2.6) (1.4) (2.0) (2.5)
Percent at least college 20.5 22.6 29.3 32.0 26.2
(6.9) (7.5) (8.4) (8.3) (9.1)
Percent uninsured 12.5 10.9 10.3 9.3 10.6
(2.1) (2.1) (0.9) (1.2) (2.1)
Physicians per 1,000 pop. 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5
(0.9) (0.8) (0.4) (0.3) (0.7)
PCPs per 1,000 pop. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Number of FQHCs 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.6 0.9
(1.1) (1.1) (0.7) (0.8) (1.0)
Observations 228 456 124 248 1,056
Notes: All characteristics are weighted by ZCTA population. Before period consists of years
2008 and 2009, while after period refers to 2010-2013. ZCTAs assigned to intervention and
control groups based on HSCRC methodology.
Sources: The Claritas Demographic Reports, the US Census Bureau, and the Area Health
Resources File (AHRF).
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5.4 Dependent Variables
The main study outcomes are population-based measures of total and pre-
ventable hospital utilization, in both the inpatient and outpatient settings, as
reported by Maryland hospitals. Table 5.2 lists the various outcomes analyzed,
with those for inpatient utilization shown in the top panel and those for outpa-
tient utilization shown in the bottom panel.
For inpatient utilization, we first examine ZCTA-level models for total in-
patient admissions per 1,000 residents and total inpatient days per capita.
We then take several approaches to distinguish between preventable and non-
preventable admissions.
Potentially preventable inpatient utilization measures include intra-hospital,
all-cause 30-day readmissions, and admissions due to Ambulatory Care Sensi-
tive Conditions (ACSCs) as defined by AHRQ’s Prevention Quality Indicators
(PQIs), which are a validated and widely used indicator for indirectly assessing
access to and quality of outpatient care (Ansari et al. 2006; Bindman, Grum-
bach, et al. 1995). The ACSCs are categorized as acute and chronic. Acute con-
ditions include dehydration, bacterial pneumonia, and urinary tract infection.
Chronic conditions include diabetes short-term and long-term complications,
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), asthma, hypertension, heart
failure, angina without procedure, uncontrolled diabetes, and lower-extremity
amputation among patients with diabetes. Appendix A shows the specific ICD-
9-CM codes included in the definition of each ACSC. The National Quality Fo-
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Table 5.2: Main Inpatient and Outpatient Outcome Variables Used in the
Study
Variable Description
Inpatient admissions Total admissions to Maryland hospitals by residents
of a ZCTA in a given year
Inpatient days The total length of stay of all admissions by residents
of a ZCTA in a given year
Readmissions Intra-hospital, all-cause 30-day readmissions by resi-
dents of a ZCTA in a given year
Preventable admissions Admissions which satisfy the inclusion and exclusion
criteria for the numerator of PQI #90 as specified by
AHRQ Prevention Quality Indicators version 5.0
Chronic Admissions which satisfy the inclusion and exclusion
criteria for the numerator of PQI #92, version 5.0
Acute Admissions which satisfy the inclusion and exclusion
criteria for the numerator of PQI #91, version 5.0
Non-preventable
admissions
Admissions which cannot be characterized as pre-
ventable according to the AHRQ PQI algorithms
Non-deferrable
admissions
Admissions with a principal diagnosis of one of the 10
identified by Card et al. (2009) as having the same rate
in the weekdays as during the weekend
Potentially deferrable
admissions
Admissions not classified as non-deferrable
Admissions from the ED Hospitalizations where the patient was admitted from
the Emergency Department
Outpatient encounters Total outpatient day visits by residents of a ZCTA in a
given year
ED visits Visits to an outpatient department with a CPT Man-
agement and Evaluation code of 99281-99285
Non-emergent Medical care not needed within 12 hours (e.g., sore
throats)
Primary care treatable Medical care needed within 12 hours but safely treat-
able in a primary care setting (e.g., an ear infection)
Avoidable Urgent care needed but the patient could have avoided
the medical issue if they had received timely and effec-
tive outpatient care (e.g., an asthma attack)
Non-preventable Urgent care needed, not preventable (e.g., a cardiac
disrhythmia)
Behavioral ED visits related to alcohol, drugs, and psychiatric
conditions
Injury Injury-related diagnoses (e.g., a broken leg)
Unclassified No category assigned
Note: All outcomes are aggregated at the ZCTA-year level.
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rum (NQF) endorsed eleven of these conditions (AHRQ 2016).
We also examine the proportion of deliveries via Cesarean section (C-section).
In 2008, the most common reason for inpatient hospital stays in the US was
childbirth (Podulka et al. 2011). C-section deliveries are associated with worse
outcomes compared to vaginal deliveries, including neonatal mortality and
complications in subsequent deliveries (National Institutes of Health 2006).
Elective C-sections are also associated with longer maternal hospital stays and
a higher likelihood of readmission, and are more costly than vaginal deliveries
(Declercq et al. 2007). Analyzing the proportion of C-section deliveries thus
allows us to examine whether hospitals were more likely to use less intensive
care during deliveries post-implementation of TPR. We identify hospital deliv-
ery discharges using DRG codes of 767–768 and 774–775 (vaginal delivery) or
765–766 (C-section) (Correa et al. 2015).
For outpatient utilization, we first examine ZCTA-level models for total out-
patient encounters per 1,000 residents and total ED visits per 1,000 residents.
We identify ED visits as outpatient encounters with a Current Procedural Ter-
minology (CPT) Management and Evaluation code of 99281-99285, indicating
Emergency Department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient.
As with inpatient utilization, we then take several approaches to distinguish
between preventable and non-preventable ED utilization. Measures of poten-
tially preventable utilization included rates of ED visits categorized as avoid-
able/preventable or primary-care treatable based on the ICD-9-CM codes as
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described by Billings et al. (2000). The Billings algorithm2 was developed us-
ing health care claims in the State of New York. It assigns to each ED visit a
probability of falling into one of a mutually exclusive set of categories, based
on ICD-9-CM codes, according to the process shown in Figure 5.2. Besides the
potentially preventable and primary-care treatable categories, we also analyze
other categories considered non-preventable as a sensitivity check to the main
analyses (Table 5.2).
The second category of visits which are not amenable to non-hospital care
are those related to injuries. In the absence of any differential changes in tech-
nology or local interventions to reduce injuries, the underlying trends in the
population rates of injuries from different sources (e.g., household, workplace,
or traffic injuries) should be similar across different Maryland areas. We there-
fore expect minimal effects of the TPR global budget system on these types of
ED visits.
Finally, we present the results from analyses of a category of ED visits
which we term ”behavioral” and which includes visits related to alcohol, drugs,
and psychiatric conditions. Ex ante it is more difficult to draw a clear expecta-
tion for this category, but overall we have little reason to expect that the global
budget payments induced any incentive to decrease these types of visits.
2The algorithm used to assign ED visits to specific categories is available at http://
wagner.nyu.edu/faculty/billings/nyued-background
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Figure 5.2: Process of Classifying Emergency Department Visits
Source: Adapted from Billings et al. (2000).
.
5.5 Patient samples
Table 5.3 presents the characteristics of the patients with an admission to
Maryland hospitals for the pooled 2008-2013 sample. Maryland patients had
a total of 3.99 million admissions to Maryland hospitals over the study period,
with 843,041 of these by residents in the ZCTAs serviced by the TPR and rural
control hospitals. Patients in the rural sample had more comorbidities than
the sample as a whole, with 11.8 diagnoses coded on average compared to 11.1
in the full sample. Reflecting the population residing in these areas, patients
admitted from rural ZCTAs were more likely to be white (81.2 percent vs. 55.9
percent), older (36.5 percent vs. 33.0 percent aged 65 and older), and more
likely to have a readmission to the same hospital within 30 days. They were
also more likely to have Medicare or commercial insurance coverage, but less
likely to be Medicaid beneficiaries.
Table 5.4 presents the characteristics of the patients visiting the outpatient
departments of Maryland hospitals during 2008-2013, for the rural and full
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Table 5.3: Characteristics of Patients Residing in Maryland and Admitted to
Maryland Hospitals, 2008-2013
Rural Sample Full Sample















Commercial payer 36.7 34.0
Self-pay 3.6 4.8
No charge 0.4 0.6
Other payer 2.5 2.0
Type of admission
Preventable (PQI90) 11.4 11.1
Acute preventable (PQI91) 4.3 3.9
Chronic preventable (PQI92) 7.1 7.2
Admitted from ER 57.9 58.2
Readmission 16.0 12.1
Non-deferrable 3.7 3.5
Vaginal birth 6.0 6.3
Cesarean section 3.0 3.3
Intensity of care
Number of procedures 1.6 1.6
Average length of stay 4.0 4.2
Observations 843, 041 3, 990, 153
Notes: Categorical values present percentages of all admissions.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on discharge data from the HSCRC.
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sample. There were about 30 million total outpatient encounters for Maryland
residents during the study period, with over 7 million encounters from the ZC-
TAs in the rural sample. The same general patterns hold as for the inpatient
sample, with rural patients having on average more comorbidities and proce-
dures performed than the sample as a whole, as well as a higher likelihood of
being white (83.3 percent vs. 54.6 percent), older (24.7 percent vs. 21.7 percent
aged 65 and older), and of having an ED visit.
5.6 Regression Analyses
We conduct all analyses at the ZCTA-year level. Because the data on popu-
lation rates can be skewed for most utilization measures (and thus inappro-
priate for OLS), our preferred specification is a Poisson model. Specifically,
we estimate quasi difference-in-differences Poisson regression models with the
utilization count in the ZCTA-year Nit as the outcome measure and the popu-
lation estimate nit as the population at risk3:
Yit ∼ Poisson(λit, ω)
λit = nit × exp{γTit + βXit + δi + θt}
(5.1)
The main identifying assumption of this model is the conditional exogene-
ity of the program implementation. Since the program was voluntary, this as-
sumption seems too strong. To make conditional exogeneity more convincing,
we account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by including ZCTA-
3This is equivalent to controlling for log nit as a covariate and setting its coefficient to 1.
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Table 5.4: Characteristics of Patients Residing in Maryland an Outpatient Visit
to Maryland Hospitals, 2008-2013
Rural Sample Full Sample















Commercial payer 43.8 39.3
Self-pay 6.2 7.8
No charge 0.6 1.2
Other payer 4.3 3.8
Type of encounter
ED visit 41.4 39.9
Non-emergent 19.3 21.4







Number of procedures 5.1 4.8
Observations 7, 185, 415 30, 012, 114
Notes: Categorical values present percentages of all visits.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on discharge data from the HSCRC.
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level fixed effects, δi. We also control for sample-wide secular temporal shocks
using year fixed effects θt. Finally, we control for the time-varying potential
confounders at the ZCTA and county levels Xit. Clearly, one immediate con-
cern is whether these variables are proper covariates which comprehensively
account for differential outcome trends in the treatment and control groups.
While we cannot possibly capture all the unobserved time-varying covariates
that may account for bias in our model, we account for several types of vari-
ables which may influence hospital utilization while keeping our models par-
simonious, as described above. Still, another key distributional assumption
is that the covariates enter linearly into Equation 5.1. However, sample im-
balance means that the estimates may be sensitive to the specification of Xit,
which is a potential limitation of our study.
Our choice of the Poisson model in our preferred specification also relies on
its lower sensitivity to measurement error (for example, in the ZCTA yearly
population estimates) and accounts for the fact that utilization rates are never
negative. The parameter ω accounts for the fact that there is overdispersion
in the data, i.e. the variance is higher than the mean (see, for example, Zheng
et al. 2006). To model the overdispersion explicitly, in additional analyses we
estimate negative binomial models. The results of these analyses, not shown
here, are not qualitatively different from the Poisson regression results.
In additional analyses we estimate a set of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
models for the utilization rates per 1,000 residents in the ZCTA-year. Specif-
ically, in these analyses, we estimate linear difference-in-differences (DD) re-
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gression models, weighted by average ZCTA population estimates (using Stata’s
analytic weights option) and with population utilization rates Yit as dependent
variables:
Yit = γTit + βXit + δi + θt + εit (5.2)
where, consistent with a difference-in-differences analysis, Tit is an indicator
for the TPR treatment being in effect in the ZCTA i during time period t and γ
is the treatment coefficient of interest.
For PQI models, we use the adult population in each ZCTA as weight for
the linear models and as exposure for the Poisson models, since this is the
denominator specified by AHRQ for the indicators. Similarly, we use the female
adult population in each ZCTA as weight (and exposure, respectively) for the
C-section rate, as births are only defined for females in the sample.
In separate models, we instead use a main explanatory variable calculated
as the interaction between the treatment indicator and a variable represent-
ing the number of years post TPR implementation (set to zero for all pre-TPR
periods). The regression coefficient on this variable can be interpreted as the
additive effect of an additional year of TPR implementation, thus indicating
whether the effects ”accelerate” over time. In all our models, we obtain robust
standard error estimates which account for clustering at the ZCTA level.
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5.7 Quantile treatment effects
While mean regression techniques are useful in providing point estimates of
the impact of reform, there may be extensive heterogeneity in treatment effects
across the conditional distribution of the outcome. A priori the form of this
heterogeneity is ambiguous. For example, it is possible to see larger reductions
in utilization among areas with higher utilization rates, since there is more
to ”cut”. At the same time, if areas with larger populations tend to have less
fluctuating rates (simply because of a higher denominator), much of the impact
could be realized in the middle of the distribution as opposed to the tails.
We therefore estimate quantile regression models with fixed effects using
an estimator developed by Powell (2014), which is well-suited for panel data.
This estimator relies strictly on within-group variation for identification while
maintaining the nonseparable error property of cross-sectional quantile regres-
sion. This allows the resulting estimates to be interpreted in the same way as
the cross-sectional estimates. We estimate the quantile treatment effects us-
ing the Stata module qregpd, which uses an adaptive Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) optimization procedure. We perform 2,000 draws for each esti-
mation and drop 200 draws as a burn-in period, thus allowing the procedure to
converge to the desired distribution.
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Chapter 6
Impact on Inpatient Utilization
This chapter presents the estimated effects of the TPR reform on inpatient
utilization. We begin with the results for two overall utilization measures.
We then distinguish between services which are considered preventable versus
non-preventable in the next two sections, with an expectation that there will
be stronger effects for the former. We then distinguish between services which
are considered non-deferrable versus deferrable, with an expectation that there
will be stronger effects for the latter.
For each outcome, we first show a figure for the unadjusted utilization rates
in the intervention group and the four progressively larger control groups, and
we then show a table of TPR’s coefficient estimates from the different model
specifications. For the first outcome presented, total admission rates, we show
the model’s full set of estimates to illustrate the exact empirical specifica-
tions. For all of the subsequent outcomes, we omit the full set of estimates
and present instead just the coefficients of interest for the effects of TPR.
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In the summary table for each specific outcome, the different control groups
are shown in four different panels from top to bottom. The Poisson models for
utilization counts are shown as the left-side columns (1) through (4), while the
linear models for utilization rates per 1,000 residents are shown as the right-
side columns (5) through (8). Within both of those groups, the results from the
TPR indicator are shown first (e.g., columns (1) and (2)), and the results from
the number of years TPR has been in effect are shown second (e.g., columns (3)
and (4)). Finally, we first show the TPR coefficients from the models which ex-
clude time-varying controls (in the odd-numbered columns), and we then show
the TPR coefficients from the models which include the time-varying controls
(in the even-numbered columns), in order to examine the potential confound-
ing which stems from compositional differences in the ZCTA populations over
time.
6.1 Effects on total inpatient utilization
Figure 6.1 shows the unadjusted rates of inpatient admissions per 1,000 resi-
dents in the areas assigned to the intervention group (i.e., TPR reform) and to
the four control groups (i.e., rural areas only, no large urban areas, no inner
city Baltimore, and all of Maryland). These trends suggest that the baseline
rates in the TPR hospital service areas are higher those than the control areas
and, prior to the intervention, are generally following a descending trend that
is approximately parallel to the trends in the control areas. Beginning in 2010,
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admission rates in areas exposed to TPR visibly decrease more quickly than
those in rural control areas, partially closing the pre-intervention gap.
Table 6.1 shows the full set of regression coefficients for the eight different
model specifications with just the rural counties only as the control group. The
first panel of Table 6.2 then repeats the TPR regression coefficients in the top
line of Table 6.1, while the next three panels of Table 6.2 present the TPR
regression coefficients for the three other control groups.
Before moving on to the main effects of TPR on hospital inpatient utiliza-
tion, we note that most of the time-varying ZCTA-level characteristics serv-
ing as controls have effects in the expected direction, which suggests that
our model is generally well-specified to examine hospital utilization. Notably,
changes in inpatient admissions over time are positively associated with changes
in average age, negatively associated with changes in Medicare Advantage pen-
etration, negatively associated with changes in primary care physicians per
capita, and positively associated with changes in specialists per capita.
Confirming the visual trends presented in Figure 6.1, the effects of TPR re-
form on total admission rates from virtually all model specifications in Table
6.2 point to a small decrease, though statistically significant in just 12 of the
32 models presented. Two of the 32 models have an insignificant positive co-
efficient. For the preferred Poisson models using the only rural ZCTAs as a
control group, for instance, model (2) indicates that the TPR program led to a
statistically insignificant decrease of 1.77 percent compared to rural controls
after accounting for ZCTA and county characteristics. Model (4) indicates that
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each additional year of the TPR program led to a marginally statistically signif-
icant decrease of 0.80 percent. These effects are consistent with the estimates
from models (6) and (8) using linear regressions controlling for ZCTA charac-
teristics, which find a statistically insignificant decrease of 3.57 admissions per
1,000 residents from TPR or a decrease of 1.79 admissions per 1,000 residents
with each year of TPR implementation.
The results are generally consistent across the four different groups of con-
trol ZCTAs in indicating a small and imprecisely estimated reduction. When
suburban areas other than the ZCTAs outside urban CBSAs are included in
the comparison group (i.e., the second panel downward), the effects of the TPR





























Table 6.1: Full Estimates of the Effect of TPR on the Rates of Total Inpatient Admissions per 1,000 Residents
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (admissions per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR Reform in Effect −1.26 −1.77 −3.78 −3.57
(2.88) (2.81) (4.09) (3.87)
Years TPR Reform in Effect −0.60 −0.80 −1.61 −1.79∗
(0.75) (0.73) (1.09) (1.06)
Percent female 0.69 0.62 1.03∗∗ 0.89∗∗
(0.44) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44)
Median age 1.52∗∗ 1.48∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗
(0.67) (0.66) (0.96) (0.93)
Percent non-white 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.084
(0.23) (0.23) (0.33) (0.34)
Median household income (10K) −2.70∗ −2.89∗ −2.54 −3.00
(1.50) (1.48) (2.45) (2.41)
Percent unemployed 0.55 0.56 0.22 0.25
(0.50) (0.51) (0.88) (0.89)
Percent at least college −0.56 −0.56 −1.14 −1.14
(0.43) (0.42) (0.70) (0.70)
Percent uninsured −1.14 −1.16 −0.16 −0.31
(0.84) (0.87) (1.65) (1.62)
Medicare Advantage penetration −2.26∗∗∗ −2.27∗∗∗ −2.77∗∗∗ −2.76∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.63) (0.94) (0.90)
PCPs per 1,000 pop. −25.7 −21.4 −102.3∗∗∗ −89.8∗∗
(16.4) (18.0) (38.5) (36.5)
Specialists per 1,000 pop. 16.1∗∗ 17.7∗∗ 32.2∗∗∗ 36.4∗∗∗
(8.55) (8.42) (9.87) (9.64)
Number of FQHCs −2.61 −2.74 −2.94 −3.18
(2.03) (2.10) (3.14) (3.22)
Constant 129.1∗∗∗ 17.4 128.2∗∗∗ 25.2
(1.41) (42.2) (1.67) (40.4)
Observations 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models are
weighted by average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences.
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crease of only 0.87 admissions per 1,000 residents in model (6) or a statistically
insignificant decrease of 0.77 admissions per 1,000 per residents for each addi-
tional year in model (8). Models (2) and (4) for the Poisson regression have the
two (out of 32) positive signs noted above, although their magnitudes are very
close to zero.
When urban areas except Baltimore are included in the comparison group
(i.e., the third panel downward), the effects of the TPR reform are similar in
magnitude to those using the rural controls—-specifically, Poisson models (2)
and (4) suggest that TPR led to an insignificant decrease of 2.03 percent in
the admission rate overall, or a 1.18 percent decrease (p < 0.05) for each ad-
ditional year of the TRP program. The linear models indicate a statistically
insignificant decrease of 2.90 admissions per 1,000 residents in model (6) or a
marginally significant decrease of 1.73 admissions per 1,000 residents for each
additional year of TPR in model (8).
When the entire state is used as the comparison group (i.e., the fourth panel
downward), the effects of the TPR reform range are also similar in magnitude
to those using the rural controls. Poisson models (2) and (4) suggest that TPR
led to a decrease of 3.17 percent (p < 0.1) in the admission rate compared to
the state-wide trend, or a 1.41 percent decrease (p < 0.05) for each additional
year of the TPR program. In the linear models we estimate a statistically
insignificant reduction to 2.44 admissions per 1,000 residents in model (2) or,
similarly, an insignificant reduction of 1.56 admission per 1,000 residents for
each additional year of TPR in model (4).
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Our assessment is that there is a low degree of potential confounding stem-
ming from compositional differences in the ZCTA populations (both here for
this outcome and for the various subsequent outcomes). More explicitly, the re-
sults for TPR’s effects in the odd-numbered columns where these time-varying
ZCTA characteristics are excluded are generally relatively similar to the re-
sults for TPR’s effects in the even-numbered columns where these time-varying
ZCTA characteristics are included. In the tables that follow, we continue to
show results both excluding and including these time-varying ZCTA-level con-
trols; but in the text that follows, we continue to focus only on the results
including these time-varying controls.
The quantile regression results in Appendix Figure C.1 indicate that while
there is notable heterogeneity in the treatment effects across the distribution
of the ZCTA admission rate, the impact is negative for most values of the out-
come. According to these estimates, TPR has led to a decrease in the median
admission rate by almost 12 admissions per 1,000 residents. In contrast, at
quantile 40, the effect of the TPR reform on the admission rate is close to zero.
Overall however, the effect of the TPR reform on the distribution of the ZCTA
admission rate is negative, which gives us further confidence that the reduction
in rates does not occur mainly in areas with high or low utilization levels.
Figure 6.2 shows the unadjusted rates of inpatient days per 1,000 residents
in the TPR ZCTAs versus the four control group. The impact of the TPR pro-
gram is apparent graphically, as TPR’s inpatient days appear to have decreased





























Table 6.2: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Total Admissions, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −1.26 −1.77 −0.60 −0.80 −3.78 −3.57 −1.61 −1.79∗
(N=1206) (2.88) (2.81) (0.75) (0.73) (4.09) (3.87) (1.09) (1.06)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −0.15 0.50 −0.10 0.076 −2.38 −0.87 −1.02 −0.77
(N=1566) (2.34) (2.34) (0.63) (0.63) (3.40) (3.13) (0.95) (0.89)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −2.82∗ −2.03 −1.14∗∗ −1.18∗∗ −5.47∗∗ −2.90 −2.03∗∗∗ −1.73∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.54) (1.78) (0.47) (0.56) (2.54) (3.30) (0.77) (1.01)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −2.69∗ −3.17∗ −1.05∗∗ −1.41∗∗ −4.03 −2.44 −1.50∗ −1.56
(N=2760) (1.52) (1.70) (0.47) (0.55) (2.55) (3.14) (0.77) (0.98)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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tation, although there was an evident slowdown in the reduction between 2012
and 2013.
The DD estimate for the TPR program effect relative to other rural controls
is a 5.09 percent decrease (p<0.1) estimated via Poisson regression (model (2)
in the first panel), corroborated with a decrease of 29.6 inpatient days per 1,000
residents (p<0.05) via the linear regression model (6) in the first panel). Simi-
larly, the time-trend estimate for TPR’s effect over time (relative to other rural
controls) is a 1.90 percent decrease per year (p<0.01) via the Poisson model (4)
and a decrease of 12.2 inpatient days per 1,000 residents per additional year
(p<0.01) via the OLS model (8).
The treatment effect estimates from analogous models in the second, third,
and fourth panels using the alternative control groups generally display simi-
lar patterns, though they are somewhat smaller in magnitude (and sometimes
statistically insignificant). For instance, models (2) and (6) have decreases in
inpatient day rates in the range of 2.29-4.43 percent or 17.2-18.1 days per 1,000
residents, while models (4) and (8) have decreases in inpatient days per year
in the range of 0.65-1.71 percent per year or 7.05-8.14 days per 1,000 residents
per year.
The quantile treatment effects shown in Figure C.2 reveal some variation
in the program’s impact, particularly at the higher end of the distribution. For
example, estimated coefficient at the 75th percentile is almost −60 days per
1,000 residents. This suggests that there is a larger decrease in length of stay
at the margin from ZCTAs with higher inpatient day rates. Together with the
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results on total admission rates, this suggests that TPR reform decreases the
length of admissions at the higher end of the distribution.
6.2 Effects on preventable utilization
In this section we present the effects of the TPR reform on 30-day readmissions
and on preventable admissions as defined by the AHRQ PQIs. As noted above,
we expect the effects of TPR to be slightly more pronounced for the preventable
utilization measures than for the non-preventable utilization measures (shown
in the next section) if the monitoring of PQIs stipulated in the TPR contracts
had an impact on hospitals.
Figure 6.3 shows unadjusted rates for 30-day readmissions and indicates
that, similar to overall admission rates, the TPR reform areas have higher
baseline levels of readmission rates, and the trends in 30-day readmissions in
the TPR hospital areas began to decrease significantly in 2011, after a rela-
tively flat trajectory between 2008 and 2010. Readmission rates in the rural
control areas also decreased after the reform but this decrease followed a large
increase in pre-reform years. Readmission rates in the larger control areas also
decreased after the reform but these decreases were smaller in magnitude.
Table 6.4 indicates that the reform had a statistically insignificant effect
on readmissions for TPR hospitals compared to the rural controls (models (2),
(4), (6), and (8) in the first panel), but led to several statistically significant de-
creases in readmissions compared to the larger sets of controls. This suggests
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Table 6.3: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Total Inpatient Days, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −3.93 −5.09∗ −1.39∗∗ −1.90∗∗∗ −24.4∗ −29.6∗∗ −8.98∗∗ −12.2∗∗∗
(N=1206) (2.64) (2.72) (0.65) (0.65) (14.7) (14.6) (3.76) (3.69)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −1.23 −2.29 −0.29 −0.65 −12.9 −17.5 −4.69 −7.05∗
(N=1566) (2.24) (2.31) (0.61) (0.60) (13.0) (12.4) (3.78) (3.62)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −2.62∗ −3.07∗ −1.00∗∗ −1.41∗∗∗ −17.0∗ −17.2 −6.38∗∗ −8.08∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.37) (1.65) (0.41) (0.47) (9.17) (12.1) (2.79) (3.57)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −2.12 −4.43∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗ −1.71∗∗∗ −10.2 −18.1 −4.26 −8.14∗∗
(N=2760) (1.35) (1.48) (0.40) (0.44) (9.30) (11.3) (2.82) (3.42)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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that other factors may have influenced the trends in readmissions in urban
areas during the study period.
For the PQIs, we focus on the effects of three composite indicators (i.e., an
overall composite for all ACSCs, a composite for acute ACSCs, and a composite
for chronic ACSCs) and show a full set of effects for each individual ambulatory
care sensitive condition in Appendix B.
Figure 6.4 presents the trends in the unadjusted PQI #90 overall compos-
ite, which includes all ACSCs. The figure shows relatively flat trends in total
preventable admissions in the pre-reform period, followed by a decrease be-
tween 2010 and 2012 for all control groups and a leveling of the rates in 2013.
The unadjusted rates of preventable admissions decreased more abruptly in
the treatment areas, from an average of about 22 admissions per 1,000 resi-
dents in 2008 to approximately 16 admissions per 1,000 residents in 2013. In
contrast, in the rural control areas it decreased from about 18.0 to 14.0 admis-
sions per 1,000 residents during the same period. Despite this decrease, the
indicator for TPR hospitals still had the highest level in the state, which is
most likely explained by the higher rates of risk factors in the reform areas.
Table 6.5 presents estimates of TPR’s effect on total preventable admissions
from the difference-in-differences models estimated with the four different con-
trol groups. Compared to rural controls shown in the first panel, TPR reduced
preventable hospitalization rates by a statistically insignificant 1.16 percent
in model (2) or 0.91 percent per year of TPR implementation in model (4). As
with the effect on total admissions, these estimates are bounded by the esti-
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Table 6.4: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of 30-day Readmissions, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 2.02 2.34 1.20 0.46 −0.31 0.0027 −0.11 −0.40
(N=1206) (5.75) (6.74) (2.15) (2.44) (1.19) (1.34) (0.41) (0.51)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −10.8∗ −7.95∗ −4.18∗ −4.64∗∗ −2.90∗∗ −2.47∗∗ −1.07∗∗ −1.30∗∗∗
(N=1566) (5.59) (4.31) (2.27) (1.91) (1.22) (1.07) (0.43) (0.42)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −7.44∗ −9.82∗∗ −3.10∗∗ −3.31∗∗ −2.79∗∗∗ −2.10∗∗ −1.05∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (3.77) (4.10) (1.49) (1.59) (0.88) (0.99) (0.30) (0.35)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −6.10 −5.43 −2.63∗ −2.37 −2.39∗∗∗ −1.12 −0.91∗∗∗ −0.63∗
(N=2760) (3.64) (4.59) (1.43) (1.72) (0.87) (1.00) (0.30) (0.36)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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mates from the expanded control groups.
The linear model estimates are largely consistent with these effects. Model
(6) points to an insignificantly small reduction among rural areas of 1.09 ad-
missions per 1,000 residents (first panel), and a slightly larger reduction in
preventable admissions compared to the larger Maryland control groups, rang-
ing between 1.33 admissions per 1,000 residents (fourth panel) and 1.60 ad-
missions per 1,000 residents (third panel). Moreover, the effect was sustained
across the outcome distribution, as shown in Figure C.4, with an even higher
effect for higher quantiles.
As noted above, these AHRQ Prevention Quality Indicators allow us to ex-
plore the composition of preventable admissions by the type of ambulatory care
sensitive condition present as the main diagnosis. We first present rates of pre-
ventable admissions classified as chronic and then present rates classified as
acute.
Figure 6.5 shows a sharper decrease in preventable admissions categorized
as chronic for the TPR reform group relative to the control groups. Specifically,
the reduction is from a higher level of about 14.0 admissions per 1,000 adults
in 2008 to about 9.0 in 2013, while the rate in the rural control group decreases
from 11.5 to approximately 8.5 over the same period. This leads to a lower rate
in the reform areas than the overall Maryland average in 2013, suggesting that
the reform was successful in reducing chronic ACSC admissions beyond trends
in the control groups.
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Figure 6.4: Trends in Overall Preventable Admission Rates for the Treatment
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Table 6.5: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Overall Preventable Admissions, with Various Sample
Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −1.58 −1.16 −1.06 −0.91 −1.54 −1.09 −0.60∗∗ −0.56∗
(N=1206) (4.00) (4.49) (1.28) (1.39) (0.96) (0.90) (0.30) (0.30)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −1.22 0.55 −0.81 −0.35 −1.26 −0.67 −0.49∗ −0.41
(N=1566) (3.68) (4.05) (1.22) (1.30) (0.91) (0.87) (0.29) (0.29)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −4.38 −6.45∗∗ −2.01∗ −2.91∗∗ −1.82∗∗ −1.60∗ −0.70∗∗ −0.71∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (2.98) (2.92) (1.10) (1.11) (0.86) (0.83) (0.28) (0.28)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −4.76 −7.94∗∗∗ −2.08∗ −3.33∗∗∗ −1.47∗ −1.33 −0.58∗∗ −0.66∗∗
(N=2760) (2.95) (2.89) (1.10) (1.15) (0.85) (0.86) (0.28) (0.30)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure 6.5: Trends in Preventable Admission Rates due to Chronic Ambulatory
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Table 6.6 indeed indicates a small and imprecisely estimated negative ef-
fect of the TPR reform on chronic ACSC admissions. The Poisson estimates in
model (2) indicate an insignificant decrease of 5.53 percent when compared to
rural controls and a highly significant effect of between 8.37 percent and 10.50
percent when compared to the more expansive control groups in the state. The
Poisson estimates in model (4) indicate a similar pattern. Model (6) using the
rural controls in the first panel implies a reduction of 1.17 (p < 0.1) chronic
ACSC admissions per 1,000 residents due to TPR, with a range between 0.61
in the second panel to 1.07 in the third panel. Model (8) using the rural controls
in the first panel implies a reduction of 0.51 (p < 0.05) chronic ACSC admissions





























Table 6.6: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Preventable Admissions due to Chronic Ambulatory Care
Sensitive Conditions, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −7.49∗ −5.53 −2.90∗∗ −2.34 −1.58∗∗ −1.17∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗
(N=1206) (4.13) (4.50) (1.46) (1.52) (0.65) (0.62) (0.21) (0.21)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −4.94 −2.41 −1.80 −1.12 −1.12∗ −0.61 −0.39∗ −0.31
(N=1566) (3.82) (3.78) (1.35) (1.30) (0.62) (0.54) (0.20) (0.19)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −8.66∗∗∗ −8.37∗∗∗ −3.50∗∗∗ −3.78∗∗∗ −1.55∗∗∗ −1.07∗ −0.58∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (3.05) (2.94) (1.18) (1.09) (0.60) (0.58) (0.20) (0.20)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −9.20∗∗∗ −10.5∗∗∗ −3.71∗∗∗ −4.47∗∗∗ −1.29∗∗ −0.89 −0.49∗∗ −0.47∗∗
(N=2760) (3.04) (2.87) (1.19) (1.15) (0.59) (0.58) (0.20) (0.20)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Although the effect on the chronic composite preventable admissions is con-
sistently negative across specifications, it stems mainly from several specific
conditions where the impact is particularly pronounced. Appendix B points
to a 10.8 percent reduction of in the rate of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD) or asthma among older adults (PQI #05) (Table B.4). This
represents a decrease of 0.7 admissions per 1,000 residents (p<0.05) in the ad-
mission rate according to the linear model. Admissions for heart failure (PQI
#08) also decreased by about 0.3 admissions per 1,000 residents (Table B.6),
although the effect is not statistically significant.
Figure 6.6 shows the trends in the rates of preventable admissions classi-
fied as acute (PQI #91). The TPR intervention group has the highest rates
throughout the study period at a baseline of just over 8.0 admissions per 1,000
residents. The rates are fairly constant pre-reform and begin to decrease sim-
ilarly overall in all groups in the post-reform period, with a slight reversal
towards an increase from 2012 to 2013.
Table 6.7 suggests that overall, the TPR reform did not affect the rates of
acute ACSCs beyond the trends already existing in the other control groups
in the state. The Poisson models (2) and (4) provide estimates that are all
insignificant and switch signs from positive to negative across the different
samples. A similar pattern emerges from the the first through fourth panels
for linear models (6) and (8), the estimated effect of the TPR intervention is
mostly statistically insignificant and small.
Figure C.6 presents the quantile treatment effects, which are small but pos-
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itive in the middle of the outcome distribution but hover around zero at the
tails.
6.3 Effects on non-preventable utilization
The rates of admissions which are not categorized as preventable by the AHRQ
methodology are shown in Figure 6.7. These admissions represent a much
higher share of total admissions than those included in the PQIs and thus are
important to examine on their own. Overall the trends in this category are
decreasing throughout the study period. There is a slightly steeper decrease in
the TPR group, which starts from a higher level pre-reform level and converges
to levels similar to state-wide rates.
Table 6.8 indicates that while there is also a reduction in non-preventable
admissions, these effects are not consistently statistically significant. However,
because these admissions represent a higher proportion of the total admissions
compared to preventable admissions, the reduction of 2.63 admissions per res-
idents (1.66 percent reduction from the Poisson model) is larger in absolute
terms than the effect on PQI #92 shown in Table 6.6 and may be significant at
the population level despite being imprecisely estimated.
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Figure 6.6: Trends in Acute Preventable Admission Rates for the Treatment
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Table 6.7: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Preventable Admissions due to Acute Ambulatory Care
Sensitive Conditions, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 9.00∗ 6.17 1.90 1.22 0.038 0.074 −0.044 −0.044
(N=1206) (4.94) (5.60) (1.38) (1.49) (0.37) (0.37) (0.11) (0.11)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 4.81 4.59 0.52 0.40 −0.14 −0.059 −0.11 −0.099
(N=1566) (4.65) (5.52) (1.41) (1.57) (0.36) (0.40) (0.11) (0.12)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 2.88 −3.57 0.35 −1.69 −0.27 −0.53 −0.12 −0.22∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (3.76) (4.03) (1.25) (1.41) (0.32) (0.34) (0.10) (0.11)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 2.84 −3.93 0.53 −1.59 −0.18 −0.44 −0.086 −0.19
(N=2760) (3.67) (3.91) (1.23) (1.43) (0.32) (0.35) (0.10) (0.11)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Table 6.8: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Non-Preventable Admissions, with Various Sample Restric-
tions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −1.00 −1.66 −0.48 −0.73 −2.62 −2.63 −1.16 −1.34
(N=1206) (2.85) (2.71) (0.72) (0.68) (3.56) (3.32) (0.93) (0.89)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 0.11 0.60 0.021 0.17 −1.50 −0.40 −0.67 −0.47
(N=1566) (2.29) (2.24) (0.60) (0.58) (2.91) (2.65) (0.79) (0.73)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −2.61∗ −1.44 −1.02∗∗ −0.94∗ −4.29∗∗ −1.74 −1.57∗∗ −1.21
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.48) (1.74) (0.43) (0.51) (2.09) (2.84) (0.61) (0.86)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −2.45∗ −2.54 −0.92∗∗ −1.15∗∗ −3.09 −1.48 −1.11∗ −1.08
(N=2760) (1.45) (1.66) (0.42) (0.50) (2.09) (2.66) (0.61) (0.82)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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6.4 Effects on non-deferrable admissions
In this section we present the effects on two categories of admissions for which
we expect little change as a response to financial incentives, given current clin-
ical guidelines and regulations. Insignificant effects would increase our confi-
dence that the effects we do observe for hospital utilization are not an artifact
of confounders such as transient shocks in utilization, unobservable migration
patterns, or errors in population estimates and projections.
First we examine the category of admissions considered non-deferrable, which
includes admissions with one of the top ten diagnoses identified by Card et al.
(2009). Figure 6.8 shows that the rates of non-deferrable admissions in the TPR
intervention and various control groups remain relatively parallel throughout
the study, with the TPR-exposed group having again the highest rates in the
state.
The regression results in Table 6.9’s models (2) and (4) confirm that there
has been virtually no change in the rates of non-deferrable admissions in the
TPR regions compared to controls. If anything, the DD estimates of the TPR
reform effects are slightly positive, which is not what we would expect if TPR
had led to reductions in inpatient utilization across the board. The correspond-
ing Poisson regression results in models (6) and (8) also indicate a small in-
crease, but statistically insignificant in the rural sample and compared to over-
all Maryland trends.
This finding suggests that TPR hospitals are not skimping on care for pa-
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tients who are unequivocally in need of acute treatment. Overall, we do see
a slight decrease in the rates of these types of admissions in both treatment
and control areas over time. This merits some explanation. While patients
presenting with these diagnoses may not be turned away by hospitals, their
rates may decrease in the population over a long period of time. Thus, some of
these conditions may still be preventable in the long run, but their rates are
not considered easily manipulable by hospitals in the short term. However, to
be more confident that this was not the target of hospitals, we also look at what
we term potentially deferrable admissions, which are simply those admissions
which have not already been categorized as non-deferrable. As noted above,
we expect that TPR will have a negative effect on these deferrable admissions
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which will be larger in magnitude than those seen for the non-deferrable ad-
missions.
Figure 6.9 shows the trends in the rates of potentially deferrable admissions
in the treatment and the four different control groups. The figure indicates
that the rates in this category of admissions decreased more in the TPR group
compared to the control groups, particularly in 2011 and 2013. The regression
effects presented in Table 6.10 for admissions in this category confirms that
the TPR reform led to a reduction in potentially deferrable rates of 2.10 per-
cent compared to the rural control group. This effect is larger than the effect
on non-deferrable admissions, and relatively sizable, although not statistically
significant. Similarly, the linear effect estimate reflects a decrease of 3.82 ad-
missions per 1,000 residents in this category.
The second category of acute admissions we examine is less specific and in-
cludes all admissions from the ED. These patients usually have higher severity
and thus require immediate admission, decreasing the likelihood that hospi-
tals would deny them care due to financial incentives. This category also has
a high overlap with the non-deferrable category but is more expansive. The
rates presented in Figure 6.10 show similar trends to those in non-deferrable
admissions, with a slow decrease over time in all areas. ZCTAs exposed to
the TPR reform have the highest rates in Maryland both before and after the
intervention.
Table 6.11 shows the regression estimates for the models with admissions





























Table 6.9: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Non-Deferrable Admissions, with Various Sample Restric-
tions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 4.12 6.46 1.00 1.73 0.12 0.25 0.015 0.041
(N=1206) (3.64) (4.09) (1.11) (1.07) (0.17) (0.17) (0.052) (0.052)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 6.04∗ 9.75∗∗∗ 1.83∗ 2.82∗∗∗ 0.22 0.41∗∗∗ 0.056 0.099∗∗
(N=1566) (3.22) (3.53) (0.99) (0.95) (0.15) (0.16) (0.048) (0.047)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 0.30 5.74∗∗ −0.18 0.99 −0.030 0.31 −0.023 0.049
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (2.48) (2.98) (0.78) (0.80) (0.13) (0.19) (0.041) (0.058)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −0.94 2.17 −0.49 0.097 −0.050 0.18 −0.028 0.017
(N=2760) (2.42) (2.65) (0.77) (0.77) (0.13) (0.17) (0.041) (0.053)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure 6.9: Trends in Potentially Deferrable Admission Rates for the Treat-
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Table 6.10: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Potentially Deferrable Admissions, with Various Sample
Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −1.46 −2.10 −0.67 −0.91 −3.89 −3.82 −1.62 −1.83∗
(N=1206) (2.91) (2.84) (0.76) (0.74) (3.98) (3.80) (1.06) (1.04)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −0.38 0.14 −0.18 −0.035 −2.59 −1.28 −1.08 −0.87
(N=1566) (2.36) (2.37) (0.64) (0.64) (3.31) (3.07) (0.92) (0.87)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −2.95∗ −2.32 −1.18∗∗ −1.26∗∗ −5.44∗∗ −3.21 −2.01∗∗∗ −1.78∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.56) (1.79) (0.48) (0.56) (2.47) (3.16) (0.74) (0.97)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −2.76∗ −3.36∗ −1.07∗∗ −1.47∗∗∗ −3.98 −2.62 −1.47∗∗ −1.58∗
(N=2760) (1.54) (1.73) (0.48) (0.56) (2.48) (3.03) (0.74) (0.95)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
130
CHAPTER 6. IMPACT ON INPATIENT UTILIZATION
















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Years
TPR Reform Rural Controls Only
No Large Urban Areas No Inner City Baltimore
All Maryland Controls
with the signs alternating between positive and negative effects. For instance,
the linear DD estimate is −0.19 and the time-trend estimate is 0.94 for the
rural sample, showing virtually no treatment effect of the TPR reform on ad-
missions from the ED.
6.5 Effects on C-section births
The trends in the percentage of total births by C-section is shown in 6.11.
Overall the rates are increasing in all study groups, although there is more
noise in the data the smaller the group. The TPR reform group generally has





























Table 6.11: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Admissions from the ED, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 0.27 0.94 −0.12 0.17 −1.28 −0.19 −0.70 −0.44
(N=1206) (3.59) (3.98) (0.94) (0.99) (2.64) (2.88) (0.74) (0.77)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 3.39 7.00∗ 0.46 1.39 0.74 3.75 −0.34 0.36
(N=1566) (3.30) (3.77) (0.82) (0.86) (2.37) (2.47) (0.65) (0.65)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −0.80 1.30 −0.67 −0.49 −1.79 0.60 −0.92∗ −0.58
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.86) (2.29) (0.61) (0.71) (1.65) (2.19) (0.54) (0.69)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −0.26 −0.90 −0.51 −0.96 −0.49 1.00 −0.51 −0.46
(N=2760) (1.83) (2.11) (0.61) (0.69) (1.67) (2.08) (0.55) (0.68)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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2008 and 2012, it decreases sharply in 2013 back to its 2008 level. Overall,
there is little discernible difference in the unadjusted trends when comparing
the reform group with the control groups.
Table 6.12 presents the effects of TPR reform on the proportion of C-sections.
Overall, the effects of the TPR reform are small and statistically insignificant.
The Poisson estimate in model (2) in the first panel indicates an increase of
6.43 percent in the TPR group compared to the rural controls. The second
panel suggests a similar increase of 7.00 percent compared to the larger con-
trol areas that exclude urban CBSAs. The effect decreases even more com-
pared to the larger Maryland control groups (3.18 and 2.48 percentage points
in the third and fourth panels, respectively), suggesting a no impact overall.
The time-trend TPR effects in model (4) are also small but inconsistent in sign
across the different panels. These results are supported by the linear estimates
in models (6) and (8).
6.6 Summary and sensitivity analyses
Table 6.13 presents a summary of the coefficients and standard errors from
the analyses using models with time-varying ZCTA controls and the sample
with only rural ZCTAs for the comparison. For overall hospitalizations, we
find a small and statistically insignificant reduction of TPR of 1.77 percent in
the admission rate and a similarly insignificant effect of TPR of 0.80 percent
reduction in the rate for each year that TPR was in effect. However, the effects
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Table 6.12: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on C-section Rates, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 14.4∗ 6.43 3.56∗ 1.97 0.058 0.84 0.0087 0.44∗
(N=1138) (8.86) (9.37) (1.97) (2.36) (0.75) (0.99) (0.20) (0.25)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 6.06 7.00 1.21 1.63 0.042 0.89 −0.0014 0.36∗
(N=1477) (6.72) (6.76) (1.76) (1.84) (0.68) (0.78) (0.18) (0.21)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 4.26 3.18 1.49 1.14 −0.38 0.21 −0.20 −0.048
BALTIMORE (N=2507) (5.13) (6.05) (1.50) (1.75) (0.55) (0.66) (0.15) (0.17)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 3.89 2.48 1.35 1.08 −0.37 0.15 −0.21 −0.062
(N=2629) (5.05) (5.77) (1.48) (1.70) (0.54) (0.60) (0.15) (0.16)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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on inpatient days are highly statistically significant, and point to a 5.09 percent
reduction compared to the rural controls.
Contrary to our expectations, we do not observe larger relative reductions
in preventable hospitalizations (relative to non-preventable hospitalizations).
However, there are small reductions in deferrable hospitalizations, while the
rates of non-deferrable hospitalizations increased slightly more in the TPR ar-
eas, although the effects are imprecisely estimated. Most of the small reduction
in preventable hospitalizations stems from a decrease in chronic conditions, of
5.53 percent or a marginally statistically significant 1.14 admissions per 1,000
residents. These estimates are statistically significant in the linear model but
lose significance in the Poisson model. This model dependence suggests that
the linear model results might be influenced by the skewed distribution of the
data. An alternative explanation is that the data is measured with error, which
has worse effects on the Poisson model compared to the linear model. Overall,
the effect is also imprecisely estimated but does point towards a modest effect
of the TPR reform on chronic preventable admissions. We observe a smaller
relative decrease in non-preventable admission rates. However, these admis-
sions form a larger proportion of total admissions and therefore lead to a larger
(though statistically insignificant) absolute effect overall.
We also find no reductions in the rates of non-deferrable admissions. In fact,
this type of admissions shows a small increase compared to the control groups,
although the effects are not statistically significant. In contrast, potentially
deferrable admissions show a small reduction, though again not statistically
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significant. Overall these results are in line with our expectations and suggest
that hospitals decreased admissions that are not as acute while not reducing
inpatient access to high-acuity cases. This is corroborated with the fact that
we also find no effects of TPR on admissions from the ED.
Finally, we find no effect of the TPR reform on C-section rates as a measure
of discretionary and overutilized services. Although the linear and Poisson
models using rural areas as controls show an increase, it is likely that these
effects are imprecisely estimated due to the small sample size.
As described in the Methods chapter, we conduct several sets of additional
sensitivity analyses. Specifically, we first test whether our results are robust to
excluding Western Maryland Regional Medical Center’s merger. We then test
whether our results are robust to using the Dartmouth Atlas data to assign
hospitals to ZCTAs rather than what HSCRC actually did.
Table 6.14 presents the coefficients from regression models which exclude
the ZCTAs assigned to the hospital service area of Western Maryland Regional
Medical Center (WMRMC) in Cumberland, which opened in 2009 as a merger
of Memorial Hospital (Cumberland) and Sacred Heart Hospital (Cumberland),
both of which subsequently closed. The qualitative results do not change dra-
matically by excluding these ZCTAs, although the effects on total and pre-
ventable utilization are smaller. The effect on inpatient days remains statisti-
cally significant, whereas the effect on chronic preventable admissions, while
still negative, loses statistical significance.
We also present summaries of the estimated effects from analyses which
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Table 6.13: Summary of Estimated TPR Effects on Inpatient Outcomes—ZCTA
Assignment Based on HSCRC Hospital Service Areas
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Hospitalizations
Rural controls -1.77 -0.80 -3.57 -1.79*
(2.81) (0.73) (3.87) (1.06)
All Maryland -3.17* -1.41** -2.44 -1.56
(1.70) (0.55) (3.14) (0.98)
Inpatient days
Rural controls -5.09* -1.90*** -29.6** -12.2***
(2.72) (0.65) (14.6) (3.69)
All Maryland -4.43*** -1.71*** -18.1 -8.14**
(1.48) (0.44) (11.3) (3.42)
30-day readmissions
Rural controls 2.34 0.46 0.0027 -0.40
(6.74) (2.44) (1.34) (0.51)
All Maryland -5.43 -2.37 -1.12 -0.63*
(4.59) (1.72) (1.00) (0.36)
Preventable admissions
Rural controls -1.16 -0.91 -1.05 -0.56*
(4.49) (1.39) (0.89) (0.30)
All Maryland -7.94*** -3.33*** -1.30 -0.66**
(2.89) (1.15) (0.85) (0.29)
Chronic preventable
Rural controls -5.53 -2.34 -1.14* -0.51**
(4.50) (1.52) (0.61) (0.21)
All Maryland -10.5*** -4.47*** -0.86 -0.46**
(2.87) (1.15) (0.57) (0.20)
Acute preventable
Rural controls 6.17 1.22 0.091 -0.045
(5.60) (1.49) (0.37) (0.11)
All Maryland -3.93 -1.59 -0.44 -0.19*
(3.91) (1.43) (0.35) (0.11)
Non-preventable admissions
Rural controls -1.66 -0.73 -2.63 -1.34
(2.71) (0.68) (3.32) (0.89)
All Maryland -2.54 -1.15** -1.48 -1.08
(1.66) (0.50) (2.66) (0.82)
Non-deferrable admissions
Rural controls 6.46 1.73 0.25 0.041
(4.09) (1.07) (0.17) (0.052)
All Maryland 2.17 0.097 0.18 0.017
(2.65) (0.77) (0.17) (0.053)
Deferrable admissions
Rural controls -2.10 -0.91 -3.82 -1.83*
(2.84) (0.74) (3.80) (1.04)
All Maryland -3.36* -1.47*** -2.62 -1.58*
(1.73) (0.56) (3.03) (0.95)
Admissions via ED
Rural controls 0.94 0.17 -0.19 -0.44
(3.98) (0.99) (2.88) (0.77)
All Maryland -0.90 -0.96 1.00 -0.46
(2.11) (0.69) (2.08) (0.68)
Percent of births by C-section
Rural controls 6.43 1.97 0.84 0.44*
(9.37) (2.36) (0.99) (0.25)
All Maryland 2.48 1.08 0.15 -0.062
(5.77) (1.70) (0.60) (0.16)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, and time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level. OLS
models are weighted by average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence
rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of TPR as the coefficient on the interaction
between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for years 2010-2013, 0
otherwise). Models (2) and (4) report the effect of an additional year of TPR implementation.
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rely on different sample assignments for the treatment vs. control ZCTAs.
Table 6.15 shows results from analyses with ZCTAs assigned to Hospital Ser-
vice Areas using Dartmouth Atlas crosslink files and Table 6.16 shows results
of analyses with ZCTAs assigned to Hospital Service Areas using the county
where they are located. Again, the conclusions of our analysis do not change
qualitatively.
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Table 6.14: Summary of Estimated TPR Effects on Inpatient Outcomes Com-
pared to Rural Controls and All of Maryland, Excluding ZCTAs Served by
Western Maryland Regional Medical Center
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Hospitalizations
Rural controls -0.62 -0.34 -2.03 -1.18
(2.73) (0.69) (3.81) (1.06)
All Maryland -2.43 -1.19** -1.25 -1.18
(1.77) (0.58) (3.23) (1.02)
Inpatient days
Rural controls -4.37 -1.52** -25.3* -9.97***
(2.73) (0.64) (14.8) (3.74)
All Maryland -3.86** -1.46*** -13.3 -6.18*
(1.57) (0.46) (11.6) (3.47)
30-day readmissions
Rural controls 3.59 0.39 0.23 -0.37
(6.98) (2.53) (1.39) (0.56)
All Maryland -3.83 -1.93 -0.65 -0.49
(5.04) (1.90) (1.05) (0.38)
Preventable admissions
Rural controls 1.90 0.54 -0.28 -0.20
(4.15) (1.17) (0.78) (0.25)
All Maryland -4.77* -2.19** -0.58 -0.41
(2.80) (1.08) (0.77) (0.27)
Chronic preventable
Rural controls -2.57 -0.64 -0.62 -0.24
(4.11) (1.26) (0.52) (0.17)
All Maryland -6.85** -2.94*** -0.31 -0.26
(2.79) (1.00) (0.50) (0.17)
Acute preventable
Rural controls 9.24* 2.22 0.33 0.042
(5.51) (1.41) (0.36) (0.10)
All Maryland -1.54 -1.08 -0.27 -0.15
(4.08) (1.50) (0.35) (0.12)
Non-preventable admissions
Rural controls -0.78 -0.42 -1.68 -1.01
(2.69) (0.66) (3.33) (0.90)
All Maryland -2.16 -1.07** -0.88 -0.90
(1.75) (0.54) (2.81) (0.87)
Non-deferrable admissions
Rural controls 7.77* 2.53** 0.31* 0.086
(4.34) (1.09) (0.18) (0.052)
All Maryland 3.17 0.62 0.25 0.049
(2.87) (0.81) (0.18) (0.055)
Deferrable admissions
Rural controls -0.94 -0.46 -2.34 -1.27
(2.77) (0.70) (3.74) (1.04)
All Maryland -2.63 -1.26** -1.50 -1.23
(1.80) (0.59) (3.12) (0.98)
Admissions via ED
Rural controls 2.36 0.73 0.84 -0.0016
(3.89) (0.95) (2.81) (0.77)
All Maryland 0.24 -0.62 2.00 -0.13
(2.17) (0.72) (2.12) (0.70)
Percent of births by C-section
Rural controls 7.29 1.75 0.90 0.51*
(9.79) (2.54) (1.02) (0.26)
All Maryland 0.88 0.37 -0.090 -0.12
(5.83) (1.75) (0.62) (0.17)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, and time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level. OLS
models are weighted by average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence
rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of TPR as the coefficient on the interaction
between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for years 2010-2013, 0
otherwise). Models (2) and (4) report the effect of an additional year of TPR implementation.
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Table 6.15: Summary of Estimated TPR effects on Inpatient Outcomes Com-
pared to Rural Controls and All of Maryland—Dartmouth Atlas Assignment
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Hospitalizations
Rural controls -4.78* -1.50** -8.22** -3.00***
(2.71) (0.71) (3.83) (1.09)
All Maryland -2.01 -0.95 -1.15 -1.03
(1.77) (0.58) (3.21) (1.02)
Inpatient days
Rural controls -7.78*** -2.47*** -44.9*** -15.7***
(2.71) (0.68) (15.3) (4.10)
All Maryland -3.60** -1.32*** -14.3 -6.33*
(1.54) (0.46) (11.6) (3.52)
30-day readmissions
Rural controls 7.86* 1.25 0.39 -0.49
(4.19) (1.58) (0.76) (0.38)
All Maryland -3.40 -1.50 -0.89 -0.52
(4.83) (1.80) (1.05) (0.38)
Preventable admissions
Rural controls -3.92 -1.83 -1.77* -0.79***
(4.49) (1.34) (0.90) (0.30)
All Maryland -6.02* -2.69** -0.96 -0.55*
(3.10) (1.23) (0.93) (0.32)
Chronic preventable
Rural controls -8.36* -3.45** -1.67*** -0.70***
(4.53) (1.51) (0.60) (0.21)
All Maryland -8.60*** -3.94*** -0.67 -0.41*
(3.05) (1.23) (0.62) (0.22)
Acute preventable
Rural controls 3.64 0.66 -0.10 -0.091
(5.73) (1.49) (0.40) (0.12)
All Maryland -1.86 -0.76 -0.30 -0.14
(4.14) (1.50) (0.38) (0.12)
Non-preventable admissions
Rural controls -4.68* -1.40** -6.73** -2.37**
(2.63) (0.66) (3.28) (0.92)
All Maryland -1.45 -0.72 -0.39 -0.62
(1.72) (0.52) (2.69) (0.83)
Non-deferrable admissions
Rural controls 2.95 0.70 0.069 -0.014
(4.48) (1.19) (0.19) (0.056)
All Maryland 2.70 0.37 0.18 0.023
(2.76) (0.80) (0.17) (0.054)
Deferrable admissions
Rural controls -5.08* -1.60** -8.29** -2.99***
(2.74) (0.72) (3.75) (1.07)
All Maryland -2.19 -1.01* -1.32 -1.05
(1.80) (0.58) (3.10) (0.98)
Admissions via ED
Rural controls -4.28 -0.98 -4.22 -1.41*
(3.48) (0.91) (2.64) (0.74)
All Maryland 0.021 -0.54 1.61 -0.17
(2.17) (0.72) (2.13) (0.71)
Percent of births by C-section
Rural controls 10.5 3.01 1.00 0.44
(10.3) (2.62) (1.13) (0.29)
All Maryland 5.42 1.95 0.48 0.049
(6.15) (1.77) (0.63) (0.17)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, and time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level. OLS
models are weighted by average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence
rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of TPR as the coefficient on the interaction
between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for years 2010-2013, 0
otherwise). Models (2) and (4) report the effect of an additional year of TPR implementation.
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Table 6.16: Summary of Estimated TPR Effects on Inpatient Outcomes Com-
pared to Rural Controls and to All of Maryland—County-BasedAssignment
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Hospitalizations
Rural controls -3.26 -0.95 -0.47 0.084
(2.85) (0.76) (7.93) (2.68)
All Maryland -3.55** -1.46** -1.51 -1.19
(1.74) (0.57) (3.11) (0.97)
Inpatient days
Rural controls -6.34** -1.96*** -15.9 -4.58
(2.73) (0.69) (30.4) (9.88)
All Maryland -5.21*** -1.89*** -17.5 -7.45**
(1.47) (0.45) (11.2) (3.33)
30-day readmissions
Rural controls 9.58** 2.86 3.46 0.69
(4.44) (1.77) (2.68) (0.94)
All Maryland -3.18 -1.44 -0.50 -0.40
(4.69) (1.73) (0.99) (0.36)
Preventable admissions
Rural controls -1.20 -0.68 -0.41 -0.31
(4.79) (1.46) (1.58) (0.43)
All Maryland -8.95*** -3.58*** -1.00 -0.55*
(2.98) (1.21) (0.89) (0.30)
Chronic preventable
Rural controls -5.42 -2.04 -0.56 -0.27
(4.88) (1.60) (1.22) (0.35)
All Maryland -11.7*** -4.86*** -0.73 -0.41**
(2.96) (1.21) (0.62) (0.20)
Acute preventable
Rural controls 5.57 1.25 0.15 -0.039
(5.86) (1.50) (0.47) (0.12)
All Maryland -4.61 -1.64 -0.27 -0.14
(4.03) (1.49) (0.35) (0.12)
Non-preventable admissions
Rural controls -3.32 -0.92 -0.097 0.31
(2.72) (0.71) (6.92) (2.38)
All Maryland -2.84* -1.18** -0.63 -0.75
(1.69) (0.52) (2.62) (0.80)
Non-deferrable admissions
Rural controls 6.09 2.02* 0.65 0.21
(4.41) (1.13) (0.52) (0.18)
All Maryland 2.84 0.36 0.25 0.047
(2.75) (0.79) (0.17) (0.052)
Deferrable admissions
Rural controls -3.62 -1.07 -1.12 -0.13
(2.88) (0.78) (7.48) (2.51)
All Maryland -3.78** -1.53*** -1.76 -1.23
(1.76) (0.58) (3.01) (0.93)
Admissions via ED
Rural controls -1.06 0.10 1.92 0.87
(3.77) (1.01) (5.41) (1.79)
All Maryland -1.76 -1.12 0.91 -0.38
(2.13) (0.72) (2.12) (0.69)
Percent of births by C-section
Rural controls 15.3 4.83 0.86 0.39
(13.3) (3.54) (1.07) (0.26)
All Maryland 5.19 2.65 0.13 -0.015
(6.56) (1.94) (0.62) (0.17)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, and time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level. OLS
models are weighted by average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence
rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of TPR as the coefficient on the interaction
between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for years 2010-2013, 0
otherwise). Models (2) and (4) report the effect of an additional year of TPR implementation.
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Chapter 7
Impact on Outpatient Utilization
This chapter presents the estimated effects of the TPR reform on outpatient
utilization. As in the previous chapter with our results for inpatient utilization,
we begin with the results for two overall outpatient utilization measures. We
then distinguish between outpatient services which are considered preventable
versus non-preventable in the next two sections, with an expectation that there
will be more pronounced effects for the former category.
As before, we first show for each outcome a figure for the unadjusted utiliza-
tion rates in the intervention group and the four progressively larger control
groups, as graphical evidence of the potential different trends in the outcome
measures across study groups. We then show a table of TPR effect estimates
from the different model specifications. For all outpatient outcomes we omit
the full set of estimates and present instead just the coefficients of interest for
the effects of TPR.
Also as before, the different control groups are shown in four different pan-
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els in the summary table for each specific outcome. The Poisson models for
utilization counts are shown as the left-side columns, while the linear mod-
els for utilization rates are shown as the right-side columns. Within both of
those groups, the results from the TPR reform indicator are shown first, and
the results from the number of years TPR has been in effect are shown sec-
ond. Finally, we first show the TPR coefficients from the models which exclude
time-varying controls, and we then show the TPR coefficients from the mod-
els which include the time-varying controls. However, in the text we focus on
summarizing only the results from the fully controlled models.
7.1 Effects on total outpatient utilization
First, we analyze the effect of TPR on total outpatient encounters. This mea-
sure includes outpatient clinic visits, emergency department visits, as well as
day visits for ambulatory surgeries and other services provided in outpatient
facilities. Figure 7.1 shows the population rates of outpatient encounters in the
treatment and control groups over the 2008-2013 period. Outpatient utilization
rates in the treatment group are the highest in the state in the pre-intervention
period, but begin to decrease slightly post-intervention. In contrast, outpatient
encounter rates in the control groups increase slowly throughout the entire pe-
riod, and by 2013 the rates in the TPR group end up at a slightly lower level
than the state-wide rates.
Table 7.1 presents regression results confirming that the TPR reform led to
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a reduction in outpatient visits after adjusting for potential confounders. The
average treatment effect estimates from the Poisson model range between a
statistically insignificant 3.58 percent reduction in the second panel and a 9.05
percent reduction in the fourth panel (significant at the 0.01 level). The es-
timate of the program’s effect compared to rural controls is bounded by these
values, indicating a highly statistically significant 8.19 percent reduction. Sim-
ilarly, the effect of each additional TPR year is statistically significant at the
0.01 level using each of the four different control groups and suggests a de-
crease of between 2.01 percent and 3.63 percent per year.
The linear model estimates in the right side of the table are largely consis-
tent with the linear model estimates. In model (6), the estimate of the TPR
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effect ranges between −54.6 visits per 1,000 residents (compared to the con-
trol areas excluding urban CBSAs) and −103.8 (compared to all of Maryland).
The effect of TPR estimated using the rural areas only is a mid-point in this
range, at −86.9 visits per 1,000 residents (p<0.01). Each additional year post-
intervention led to a reduction of between 24.3 and 39.7 admissions per 1,000
residents (model (4), fourth and first panels, respectively), suggesting that the
reform effects accumulate over time.
The quantile treatment effects shown in figure C.11 indicate that most of
the impact has taken place in the upper end of the distribution, suggesting
that the areas with the highest rates of outpatient encounter are responsible
for the highest decreases.
Figure 7.2 shows the unadjusted population rates of ED visits in the treat-
ment and control groups. The figure indicates that the TPR group has the
highest rates of ED visits, similarly to other utilization rates presented thus
far. Moreover, ED visit rates increase in the TPR areas from about 340 to
about 375 visits per 1,000 residents. In contrast, the rates of ED visits have
increased just slightly in all other control groups, although there is a decrease
in 2013 after a peak in 2012 across all groups.
The regression results in Table 7.2 suggest that the TPR areas experienced
a slight increase in ED visits compared to the control groups, but this effect is
not consistent across the the different study samples. Compared to the rural
controls only, we observe statistically insignificant reductions of 0.017 percent

























Table 7.1: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Outpatient Encounters, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −8.75∗∗ −8.19∗∗∗ −3.02∗∗∗ −3.63∗∗∗ −76.3∗∗ −86.9∗∗∗ −26.5∗∗∗ −39.7∗∗∗
(N=1206) (3.72) (2.88) (0.99) (0.70) (37.1) (30.7) (9.57) (8.00)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −5.50 −3.58 −2.07∗∗ −2.01∗∗∗ −58.4 −54.6∗ −22.9∗∗ −30.3∗∗∗
(N=1566) (3.71) (2.77) (0.97) (0.69) (36.9) (29.7) (9.56) (7.88)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −6.88∗ −6.25∗∗ −2.60∗∗∗ −2.62∗∗∗ −55.3 −57.8∗ −20.5∗∗ −24.3∗∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (3.42) (2.95) (0.91) (0.70) (34.5) (33.5) (8.87) (8.05)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −8.35∗∗ −9.05∗∗∗ −3.05∗∗∗ −3.33∗∗∗ −76.0∗∗ −103.8∗∗∗ −27.5∗∗∗ −34.9∗∗∗
(N=2760) (3.36) (2.95) (0.90) (0.76) (34.9) (33.7) (9.00) (8.44)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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(6). However, using the more expansive control groups, as shown in the lower
three panels, we observe increases in ED visits from the Poisson model ranging
between an insignificant 2.54 percent and statistically significant 4.81 percent,
corresponding to increases in ED visits from the OLS model ranging between
an insignificant 2.74 and a significant 17.70 visits per 1,000 residents.
7.2 Effects on preventable ED utilization
The results in the previous section for the effect of TPR on overall ED usage in
Maryland are inconclusive. In this section we present analyses for the subset

























Table 7.2: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of ED Visits, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 3.68∗ −0.017 1.03∗ 0.011 13.3∗ −3.70 3.36 −1.62
(N=1206) (2.18) (2.01) (0.57) (0.54) (7.35) (9.41) (2.31) (3.04)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 4.17∗∗ 2.54 1.17∗∗ 0.68 11.5∗ 2.74 2.36 −0.43
(N=1566) (1.88) (1.83) (0.50) (0.50) (6.79) (7.39) (2.20) (2.50)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 6.13∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 23.1∗∗∗ 17.7∗∗ 6.46∗∗∗ 4.78∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.70) (1.92) (0.50) (0.47) (5.42) (7.88) (1.77) (2.33)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 4.47∗∗∗ 3.17∗ 1.14∗∗ 1.03∗∗ 16.4∗∗∗ 6.60 4.15∗∗ 2.41
(N=2760) (1.68) (1.74) (0.49) (0.45) (5.76) (7.24) (1.85) (2.16)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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duces hospitals to curb expensive services as desired by Maryland policy mak-
ers. As described earlier in Chapter 5, these preventable ED visits include
non-emergent ED visits, emergent but primary care treatable ED visits, and
emergent but avoidable ED visits.
We first focus on conditions classified as non-emergent; i.e. those for which
medical care is not needed within 12 hours. Examples in this category include
conditions such as sore throat and sunburn. Figure 7.3 shows the unadjusted
trends in non-emergent ED visits in the treatment and control groups during
2008-2013 and indicates growth in the rates across all groups, but a slight
relative increase in the TPR group compared to control groups. The rate in the
TPR group is about 63 visits per 1,000 residents at baseline, but increases to
72 visits per 1,000 residents.
Table 7.3 shows the regression coefficients for non-emergent ED visits. Over-
all, the results generally indicate a small increase resulting from the TPR re-
form, but relatively few of the results controlling for time-varying measures
are statistically significant.
The second category of preventable utilization consists of ED visits which
are considered emergent but primary care treatable; that is, conditions that
require medical care within twelve hours but are safely treatable in a primary
care setting. Examples in this category include ear infections or asymptomatic
varicose veins. Figure 7.4 shows the unadjusted rates in this primary care
treatable category of ED visits between 2008 and 2013. These rates have in-
creased for all groups, but the increase appears higher in the TPR reform group
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Table 7.3: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Non-Emergent ED visits, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 6.30∗∗ 1.72 1.62∗∗ 0.14 3.86∗∗ −0.23 0.93∗ −0.40
(N=1206) (2.88) (2.78) (0.80) (0.79) (1.71) (2.21) (0.55) (0.73)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 5.93∗∗ 4.33∗ 1.24∗ 0.55 3.03∗ 1.09 0.39 −0.38
(N=1566) (2.58) (2.52) (0.75) (0.76) (1.65) (1.75) (0.56) (0.63)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 6.14∗∗∗ 5.35∗∗ 1.24∗ 0.92 4.16∗∗∗ 3.58∗ 0.92∗ 0.62
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (2.39) (2.67) (0.74) (0.75) (1.40) (2.00) (0.48) (0.63)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 3.79∗ 3.81 0.66 0.75 2.07 1.06 0.24 0.095
(N=2760) (2.34) (2.50) (0.72) (0.71) (1.50) (1.90) (0.50) (0.61)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure 7.4: Trends in Rates of Primary Care Treatable ED Visits for the Treat-
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relative to all other control groups.
Table 7.4 shows the DD effect estimates for primary care treatable ED vis-
its. The results indicate an increase due to the TPR program relative to the
more expansive control groups (third and fourth panels from top to bottom),
but a modest effect (and even a potential decrease) compared to the rural con-
trol areas (first and second panels). The effect estimates range between an
increase of between 1.26 (first panel) and 5.61 percent (third panel) in Poisson
model (6) and between −0.71 and 3.78 visits per 1,000 residents in model (2)
for the TPR group relative to the control groups. The effects estimated from
models (4) and (8) with a yearly reform variable generally follow the same pat-
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terns, with a smaller and statistically insignificant effect when compared to a
smaller rural control and a larger, significant effect when compared to the more
expansive control groups.
The third category of preventable ED visits are those that are considered
emergent and require ED care (as opposed to immediate care in a primary care
setting), but these patients could have avoided the medical issue if they had
received timely and effective outpatient care (e.g., an asthma attack or diabetes
with ketoacidosis). Figure 7.5 shows the trends in this category of avoidable
ED visits among the intervention and control groups during the study period.
Similar to the non-emergent ED visits, the rates in this category increase in the
TPR ZCTAs compared to a relatively flat trend in the four control groups. After
starting in the middle at about 18.3 avoidable ED visits per 1,000 residents in
2008, the rate increases to 20.5 visits per 1,000 residents in 2013.
Table 7.5 shows the DD effect estimates for avoidable ED visits. All the coef-
ficients are positive, and statistically significant for all samples except the top
panel restricted to the rural-only control group. The Poisson model estimates
show an insignificant increase of 3.25 percent using the rural control group
(model (2)), but significantly positive estimates in the second through fourth
panels using more expansive control areas in the state, ranging between 7.33
and 9.71 percent. Model (4) reinforces the finding that TPR led to an increase
in avoidable ED visits, with estimates ranging from 1.31 to 2.93 percent for
each year the TPR reform was in effect. The linear models show similar pat-

























Table 7.4: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Primary Care Treatable ED Visits, with Various Sample
Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 5.05∗ 1.26 1.53∗ 0.50 3.42∗ −0.71 1.01∗ −0.19
(N=1206) (2.93) (2.65) (0.81) (0.73) (1.78) (2.15) (0.55) (0.70)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 5.00∗∗ 3.21 1.51∗∗ 1.03 2.58 −0.0034 0.60 −0.19
(N=1566) (2.53) (2.22) (0.70) (0.63) (1.67) (1.74) (0.53) (0.59)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 7.78∗∗∗ 5.61∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 5.64∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (2.23) (2.37) (0.65) (0.60) (1.28) (1.75) (0.40) (0.51)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 6.35∗∗∗ 4.43∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗ 1.85 1.25∗∗∗ 0.79
(N=2760) (2.15) (2.17) (0.63) (0.57) (1.32) (1.63) (0.41) (0.48)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
156
CHAPTER 7. OUTPATIENT UTILIZATION
















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Years
TPR Reform Rural Controls Only
No Large Urban Areas No Inner City Baltimore
All Maryland Controls
ED visits by between 1.11 and 1.81 ED visits per 1,000 residents (model (6),
second and third panels respectively, p<0.01). Similarly, the effect of an ad-
ditional year of the program is between 0.29 and 0.54 avoidable ED visits per
1,000 residents (model (8), p<0.10 and p<0.01, respectively), while compared
to the rural controls this effect is a statistically insignificant increase of 0.10
avoidable ED visits per 1,000 residents.
7.3 Effects on non-preventable ED utilization
In this section we focus on the category of ED visits which are not amenable

























Table 7.5: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Avoidable ED Visits, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 6.48∗∗∗ 3.25 1.95∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 0.26 0.33∗∗ 0.10
(N=1206) (2.50) (2.28) (0.71) (0.64) (0.44) (0.56) (0.14) (0.18)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 9.88∗∗∗ 7.33∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.29∗
(N=1566) (2.30) (2.28) (0.63) (0.62) (0.45) (0.50) (0.14) (0.15)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 10.7∗∗∗ 9.71∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.78) (2.13) (0.53) (0.55) (0.32) (0.46) (0.10) (0.13)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 8.92∗∗∗ 7.40∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(N=2760) (1.69) (1.96) (0.50) (0.54) (0.33) (0.43) (0.10) (0.13)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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tings. As described earlier in Chapter 5, these non-preventable ED visits in-
clude emergent non-preventable ED visits, injury-related ED visits, and behav-
ioral ED visits. As noted earlier, if the TPR program impacted care through the
mechanisms envisioned by Maryland policy makers, then we expect a smaller
effect in these categories compared to the preventable types of ED visits exam-
ined in the prior section.
Unadjusted rates of emergent non-preventable ED visits, which include
conditions such as cardiac disrhythmias or meningitis, are shown in Figure
7.6. These non-preventable ED rates increase in all the treatment and control
groups between 2008 and 2013, but a slightly larger increase occurs in the TPR
treatment group from about 35 to more than 45 non-preventable ED visits per
1,000 residents. For the control group excluding large urban areas, in contrast,
the non-preventable ED rate starts out equal to that in the treatment group in
2008 but increases to 43 ED visits per 1,000 residents in 2013.
The regression results shown in Table 7.6 indicate that relative to the Mary-
land control groups, the TPR reform leads to an increase in non-preventable ED
visits, but the magnitude of this effect is small and not consistently significant
statistically. The strongest effects are evident relative to the areas that exclude
Baltimore City County (third panel), which indicate a 6.19 percent increase in
Poisson model (2) and an increase of 2.66 non-preventable ED visits per 1,000
residents (p<0.01) in OLS model (6). Overall, we find that the TPR program is
associated with a modest uptick in non-preventable ED visits.
Figure 7.7 shows the unadjusted rates of injury-related ED visits during
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Figure 7.6: Trends in Rates of Non-Preventable ED Visits for the Treatment
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Table 7.6: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Non-Preventable ED Visits, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 5.89∗∗ 3.03 1.76∗∗ 0.92 2.82∗∗∗ 1.18 0.85∗∗∗ 0.38
(N=1206) (2.66) (2.82) (0.73) (0.66) (0.96) (1.08) (0.29) (0.30)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 6.05∗∗∗ 4.54∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗ 2.11∗∗ 1.15 0.57∗∗ 0.26
(N=1566) (2.20) (2.13) (0.61) (0.54) (0.85) (0.80) (0.28) (0.26)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 8.32∗∗∗ 6.19∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.89) (2.03) (0.55) (0.49) (0.66) (0.90) (0.22) (0.27)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 6.92∗∗∗ 3.98∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗ 0.92 0.81∗∗∗ 0.35
(N=2760) (1.84) (1.83) (0.54) (0.48) (0.70) (0.82) (0.23) (0.25)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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the study period for the treatment and control groups. These rates mostly
experienced modest decreases over the study period, which are similar for the
treatment and control groups, supporting the ex ante expectation that the TPR
reform should have no effect on injury-related ED visits.
Table 7.7 shows the regression results for injury-related ED visits. As ex-
pected, the estimates are small and mostly statistically insignificant, and do
not point consistently towards either an increase or a decrease. For example,
four of the eight estimates in models (2) and (6) are negative (first and second
panel) and the other four are positive (third and fourth panel), and only one
estimate is marginally significant. The estimated effect of the TPR reform is
between −1.01 and 3.73 percent from the Poisson model and between −2.49
and 3.10 injury-related visits per 1,000 residents from the OLS model. A sim-
ilar pattern of mostly insignificant positive and negative estimates essentially
centered on zero is also evident in models (4) and (8).
Unadjusted rates of behavioral ED visits, which include visits related to
alcohol, drugs, and psychiatric conditions, are shown in Figure 7.8 for the
treatment and control groups during 2008-2013. The trends look remarkably
parallel with a steady increase from 2008 to 2012 and a leveling off in 2013,
suggesting little effect caused by the TPR program.
Regression results for behavioral ED visits are shown in Table 7.8 and sup-
port the patterns observed in Figure 7.8, as all of the effect estimates are statis-
tically insignificant, most are small in magnitude, and alternate in sign. This
indicates that the TPR reform had no effect on behavioral ED visits.
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Table 7.7: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Injury-Related ED Visits, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 4.30∗ −1.01 1.17∗ −0.079 2.46 −2.49 0.34 −1.00
(N=1206) (2.47) (2.32) (0.68) (0.67) (2.38) (2.80) (0.75) (0.88)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 2.69 −0.087 0.93 0.38 1.37 −1.77 0.21 −0.55
(N=1566) (2.15) (2.10) (0.61) (0.61) (2.23) (2.38) (0.70) (0.75)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 4.37∗∗ 3.73∗ 1.20∗∗ 1.16∗∗ 2.94 3.10 0.59 0.59
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (1.95) (2.03) (0.60) (0.54) (1.83) (2.29) (0.60) (0.68)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 2.63 2.47 0.66 0.97∗ 1.95 1.48 0.30 0.32
(N=2760) (1.90) (1.92) (0.58) (0.52) (1.84) (2.11) (0.59) (0.63)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Table 7.8: Estimates of the Effects of TPR on the Rates of Behavioral ED Visits, with Various Sample Restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −2.90 0.14 −0.47 0.0081 −0.13 −0.10 −0.025 −0.065
(N=1206) (3.69) (3.63) (1.06) (1.00) (0.56) (0.75) (0.19) (0.24)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −0.95 3.08 0.11 0.95 −0.00071 0.41 0.013 0.093
(N=1566) (3.31) (3.32) (0.96) (0.94) (0.52) (0.60) (0.17) (0.19)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 1.05 1.07 0.42 0.32 0.54 0.29 0.18 0.100
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (2.70) (2.85) (0.83) (0.88) (0.42) (0.50) (0.14) (0.16)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −1.06 −2.69 −0.26 −0.45 −0.044 −0.89 −0.012 −0.15
(N=2760) (2.79) (2.76) (0.86) (0.92) (0.46) (0.55) (0.15) (0.17)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZCTA and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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7.4 Summary and sensitivity analyses
Table 7.9 presents a summary of the estimated effects and standard errors from
analyses of outpatient utilization comparing the TPR group to the group of
rural control ZCTAs and to the full Maryland controls. As with our summary of
results for inpatient utilization, we show these results for the former group as
these rural areas are most similar to the TPR hospital service areas. We show
results for the latter group as a comparison to the overall utilization trends in
Maryland.
As shown above, we find a statistically significant reduction of 8.19 percent
in outpatient encounters due to the TPR reform, while the linear model indi-
cates a reduction of 86.9 outpatient encounters per 1,000 residents (p<0.01).
These effects are similar to those estimated from comparisons with the ex-
panded control groups.
For ED visits, the results are less conclusive. While the effects in the re-
stricted rural sample are indicative of a slight and statistically insignificant
reduction, the coefficients change signs and increase in magnitude when the
TPR groups is compared to the more expansive controls in Maryland, indicat-
ing an increase. For preventable ED visits, including non-emergent, primary
care treatable, and avoidable ED visits, the estimated effects are small in mag-
nitude and statistically insignificant in the rural-only sample. However, as
with total ED visits, they indicate a significant increase in the TPR group com-
pared to the larger Maryland controls. This sample dependence suggests that
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other unmeasured factors may be affecting these indicators in other areas of
Maryland or that the results are vulnerable to limitations in the Billings al-
gorithm. Nevertheless, for non-preventable, injury-related, and behavioral ED
visits, we find the expected results of no effect of the TPR reform.
As in the previous chapter, we also show the results of several analyses
which rely on different sample assignment methodologies for the treatment
and control ZCTAs. Table 7.11 shows results from the analyses for outpatient
utilization with ZCTAs instead assigned to Hospital Service Areas using Dart-
mouth Atlas crosslink files and Table 7.12 shows analogous results of analyses
with ZCTAs assigned to Hospital Service Areas using the county where they
are located. Again, the conclusions of our analysis do not change qualitatively.
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Table 7.9: Summary of Estimated TPR Effects on Outpatient Outcomes—
ZCTA Assignment Based on HSCRC Hospital Service Areas
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Outpatient visits
Rural controls -8.19*** -3.63*** -86.9*** -39.7***
(2.88) (0.70) (30.7) (8.00)
All Maryland -9.05*** -3.33*** -103.8*** -34.9***
(2.95) (0.76) (33.7) (8.44)
ED visits
Rural controls -0.017 0.011 -3.70 -1.62
(2.01) (0.54) (9.41) (3.04)
All Maryland 3.17* 1.03** 6.60 2.41
(1.74) (0.45) (7.24) (2.16)
Non-emergent ED visits
Rural controls 1.72 0.14 -0.23 -0.40
(2.78) (0.79) (2.21) (0.73)
All Maryland 3.81 0.75 1.06 0.095
(2.50) (0.71) (1.90) (0.61)
PC treatable ED visits
Rural controls 1.26 0.50 -0.71 -0.19
(2.65) (0.73) (2.15) (0.70)
All Maryland 4.43** 1.60*** 1.85 0.79
(2.17) (0.57) (1.63) (0.48)
Avoidable ED visits
Rural controls 3.25 1.31** 0.26 0.10
(2.28) (0.64) (0.56) (0.18)
All Maryland 7.40*** 2.55*** 1.20*** 0.40***
(1.96) (0.54) (0.43) (0.13)
Non-preventable ED visits
Rural controls 3.03 0.92 1.18 0.38
(2.82) (0.66) (1.08) (0.30)
All Maryland 3.98** 1.07** 0.92 0.35
(1.83) (0.48) (0.82) (0.25)
Injury-related ED visits
Rural controls -1.01 -0.079 -2.49 -1.00
(2.32) (0.67) (2.80) (0.88)
All Maryland 2.47 0.97* 1.48 0.32
(1.92) (0.52) (2.11) (0.63)
Behavioral ED visits
Rural controls 0.14 0.0081 -0.10 -0.065
(3.63) (1.00) (0.75) (0.24)
All Maryland -2.69 -0.45 -0.89 -0.15
(2.76) (0.92) (0.55) (0.17)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, as well as time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level.
OLS models are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent inci-
dence rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient
on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (2) and (4) report the effect of an additional year of TPR
reform implementation.
169
CHAPTER 7. OUTPATIENT UTILIZATION
Table 7.10: Summary of Estimated TPR Effects on Outpatient Outcomes Com-
pared to Rural Controls and All of Maryland, Excluding ZCTAs Served by
Western Maryland Regional Medical Center
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Outpatient visits
Rural controls -4.56* -2.53*** -47.0* -27.7***
(2.63) (0.64) (24.4) (7.34)
All Maryland -4.19* -2.07*** -57.6** -23.8***
(2.15) (0.59) (23.0) (6.67)
ED visits
Rural controls 0.83 0.42 -0.81 -0.36
(2.12) (0.58) (9.74) (3.26)
All Maryland 4.22** 1.31*** 9.76 3.29
(1.79) (0.47) (7.40) (2.29)
Non-emergent ED visits
Rural controls 3.33 0.85 0.92 0.091
(2.92) (0.84) (2.27) (0.78)
All Maryland 6.07** 1.34* 2.44 0.46
(2.51) (0.77) (1.89) (0.65)
PC treatable ED visits
Rural controls 1.63 0.93 -0.50 0.078
(2.72) (0.79) (2.22) (0.76)
All Maryland 5.61** 2.09*** 2.52 1.09**
(2.32) (0.62) (1.65) (0.50)
Avoidable ED visits
Rural controls 4.15* 1.81*** 0.41 0.18
(2.37) (0.70) (0.58) (0.20)
All Maryland 8.38*** 2.88*** 1.35*** 0.45***
(2.04) (0.60) (0.44) (0.13)
Non-preventable ED visits
Rural controls 3.38 0.89 1.29 0.33
(2.93) (0.69) (1.09) (0.31)
All Maryland 4.03** 0.93* 0.93 0.28
(1.97) (0.48) (0.86) (0.26)
Injury-related ED visits
Rural controls -0.34 0.34 -1.78 -0.58
(2.39) (0.69) (2.89) (0.93)
All Maryland 3.33* 1.22** 2.20 0.57
(2.00) (0.54) (2.19) (0.66)
Behavioral ED visits
Rural controls 1.56 0.44 0.092 -0.010
(3.67) (1.03) (0.76) (0.25)
All Maryland -1.81 -0.30 -0.74 -0.13
(2.91) (0.99) (0.59) (0.18)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, as well as time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level.
OLS models are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent inci-
dence rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient
on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (2) and (4) report the effect of an additional year of TPR
reform implementation.
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Table 7.11: Summary of Estimated TPR Effects on Outpatient Outcomes Com-
pared to Rural Controls and All of Maryland—Dartmouth Atlas Assignment
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Outpatient visits
Rural controls -10.5*** -4.31*** -103.0*** -44.0***
(3.10) (0.72) (35.2) (9.17)
All Maryland -9.48*** -3.39*** -109.4*** -36.1***
(3.12) (0.81) (36.2) (8.98)
ED visits
Rural controls -0.54 -0.20 -3.50 -1.96
(2.17) (0.59) (11.6) (3.88)
All Maryland 3.70** 1.19** 9.21 3.11
(1.83) (0.47) (7.26) (2.20)
Non-emergent ED visits
Rural controls 0.066 -0.24 -0.74 -0.54
(2.86) (0.85) (2.65) (0.90)
All Maryland 4.24* 0.88 1.45 0.22
(2.63) (0.75) (1.93) (0.62)
PC treatable ED visits
Rural controls 0.35 0.16 -0.71 -0.27
(2.58) (0.72) (2.47) (0.85)
All Maryland 4.87** 1.70*** 2.41 0.92*
(2.30) (0.60) (1.67) (0.50)
Avoidable ED visits
Rural controls 2.65 1.08 0.17 0.056
(2.38) (0.70) (0.66) (0.23)
All Maryland 8.19*** 2.73*** 1.41*** 0.45***
(2.04) (0.57) (0.43) (0.13)
Non-preventable ED visits
Rural controls 3.86 1.08 2.05* 0.59*
(3.34) (0.76) (1.20) (0.34)
All Maryland 4.42** 1.21** 1.23 0.43
(1.96) (0.50) (0.83) (0.26)
Injury-related ED visits
Rural controls -1.00 -0.32 -2.74 -1.36
(2.19) (0.64) (3.23) (1.06)
All Maryland 3.74* 1.37** 2.69 0.69
(2.03) (0.54) (2.17) (0.65)
Behavioral ED visits
Rural controls -0.97 -0.17 -0.25 -0.10
(4.26) (1.19) (0.93) (0.30)
All Maryland -3.05 -0.52 -0.89 -0.16
(2.85) (0.96) (0.58) (0.18)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, as well as time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level.
OLS models are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent inci-
dence rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient
on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (2) and (4) report the effect of an additional year of TPR
reform implementation.
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Table 7.12: Summary of Estimated TPR Effects on Outpatient Outcomes Com-
pared to Rural Controls and All of Maryland—County-Based Assignment
Poisson Weighted OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPR TPR Years TPR TPR Years
Outpatient visits
Rural controls -7.95*** -3.48*** -49.5 -25.4
(2.85) (0.69) (52.1) (17.1)
All Maryland -9.58*** -3.46*** -101.3*** -33.2***
(3.17) (0.82) (36.5) (9.01)
ED visits
Rural controls 1.26 0.48 10.4 4.55
(2.26) (0.62) (19.2) (6.76)
All Maryland 0.98 0.42 2.22 1.51
(1.62) (0.43) (7.02) (2.05)
Non-emergent ED visits
Rural controls 2.44 0.49 3.38 1.22
(2.95) (0.84) (5.21) (1.87)
All Maryland 1.45 0.10 0.093 -0.084
(2.41) (0.71) (1.87) (0.60)
PC treatable ED visits
Rural controls 3.56 1.23 2.77 1.17
(2.83) (0.76) (3.87) (1.32)
All Maryland 1.95 0.93* 0.83 0.57
(2.02) (0.56) (1.61) (0.47)
Avoidable ED visits
Rural controls 4.31* 1.54** 0.81 0.35
(2.49) (0.66) (0.98) (0.34)
All Maryland 4.00** 1.55*** 0.65 0.26**
(1.81) (0.49) (0.43) (0.12)
Non-preventable ED visits
Rural controls 3.59 1.33* 2.59 1.04
(3.10) (0.72) (2.01) (0.66)
All Maryland 3.08* 0.92* 1.03 0.45*
(1.84) (0.49) (0.82) (0.25)
Injury-related ED visits
Rural controls 1.00 0.49 1.16 0.53
(2.41) (0.72) (4.77) (1.71)
All Maryland -0.84 -0.047 -0.97 -0.35
(1.78) (0.51) (2.06) (0.60)
Behavioral ED visits
Rural controls 2.98 1.00 0.82 0.23
(4.02) (1.13) (1.12) (0.35)
All Maryland -1.47 -0.0074 -0.67 -0.064
(2.84) (0.93) (0.55) (0.17)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for
ZCTA and year fixed effects, as well as time-varying controls at the ZCTA and county level.
OLS models are weighted for average ZCTA population. Poisson models report percent inci-
dence rate differences. Models (1) and (3) report the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient
on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for






This dissertation examines the impact of global budgets on hospital utilization
in rural areas in Maryland. A better understanding of the effects of this reform
on different types of inpatient and outpatient utilization sheds light on the
benefits and limitations of this payment system for promoting efficiency and
quality in the US and internationally. In particular, we are able to estimate
the effects of Maryland’s global budget program over a longer period of four
years after its inception, bringing evidence for the newer statewide expansion.
The potential effectiveness of using global budgets to realign incentives for
hospitals is drawing the attention of both policymakers and researchers. For
the first time in several decades, the concept is again getting traction more
broadly in the United States. The waiver received by the State of Maryland
from CMS has global budget payments as its central tool for containing per-
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capita health care spending. Moreover, Pennsylvania has recently signed an
agreement with CMS laying the foundation for similar systems, at least for
rural hospitals. This signals that policymakers may believe that, given the
fragmented nature of health care in the US, fully integrated delivery systems
like ACOs may not always be feasible, at least in the short term. In contrast,
hospital global budgets may be a more gradual first step in moving from FFS
payment to population-based reimbursement.
However, several unanswered questions have likely made decision-makers
reluctant to embrace global budgets more widely: Can global budgets actu-
ally reduce total inpatient and outpatient utilization? What are the effects of
global budgets on preventable versus non-preventable services? What are the
effects of global budgets on more discretionary, deferrable services versus more
essential, non-deferrable services?
This dissertation provides empirical evidence from Maryland’s 2010 TPR
reform for rural hospitals in an attempt to address these three questions. This
concluding chapter first summarizes these empirical findings and discusses the
limitations of our analyses. It then discusses the research and policy implica-
tions of this study and suggests future directions for research.
8.1 Discussion of the empirical findings
Our empirical findings are that global budgets lead to a small decrease in total
outpatient use. For inpatient care, the reduction in overall admissions is small,
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about 3 admissions per 1,000 residents, and generally statistically insignificant
across our different specifications. The magnitude of this effect is smaller than
that of other studies. For example, the evaluation of the Rochester experiment
in the 1980s found a decrease of about 4 admissions per 1,000 residents, from
a similar baseline as in our case (Block et al. 1987).
We find similarly small and imprecisely estimated reductions in chronic pre-
ventable admissions and deferrable admissions. Specifically, we find that TPR
led to a small but significant reduction in chronic preventable hospitalizations
of about 1 admission per 1,000 residents, or about 5 percent on average over
the course of the intervention. The magnitude of this effect seems sensible.
One study examining the effect of Medicaid managed care on rates in ACSCs
estimated a reduction of about 3 preventable admissions per 1,000 residents
(Bindman, Chattopadhyay, et al. 2005). Given that managed care relies on
capitation and more aggressive care management techniques across the care
continuum, a relatively smaller effect is expected for a more limited interven-
tion like TPR. Moreover, while it is encouraging to see that there was a decrease
driven by conditions with a high morbidity and cost burden on the health sys-
tem (i.e., asthma, diabetes, and heart failure), it is possible that these effects
were driven by changes in medical coding or regression to the mean, as improv-
ing quality to curb acute episodes of chronic conditions is a lengthy process.
We find no effect of TPR on 30-day readmissions, although all-cause read-
missions have been shown to have considerable limitations as quality metrics,
including a strong pattern of regression to the mean (Press et al. 2013). That
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said, we discuss some potential methodological limitations with our analyses
of Maryland data for readmissions in the section below.
For outpatient hospital care, the reduction in total encounters is signifi-
cant and robust to different model specifications. Overall, we find a decrease
of about 87 encounters per 1,000 residents, but more conservative estimates
in alternatively specified models are closer to 50 encounters per 1,000 resi-
dents. Given the high baseline rate in the TPR hospital service areas of over
900 encounters per 1,000 residents, and the highly discretionary nature of a
large portion of outpatient visits, the magnitude of this effect seems quite rea-
sonable. This finding suggests that even if there had been some substitution
of outpatient visits for inpatient admissions, this effect was dominated by the
overall reduction in outpatient use.
Our results with respect to ED visits tend to show more dependency on
model specifications and sample restrictions. Overall, the estimates indicate
little to no effect on ED use. Although some of our models indicate a slight
increase in total ED visit rates, the results are generally not statistically sig-
nificant. That said, there is a pattern of results consistent with increased uti-
lization for non-emergent, preventable, and non-preventable ED visits. In con-
trast, injury-related and behavioral ED visits show no effect, increasing our
confidence in the validity of our results and suggesting that global budgets did
not induce hospitals to shirk on appropriate emergency care.
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8.2 Research limitations
Our study is not without notable limitations. The most important limitations
relate to the following five issues: data availability, measure validity, control
group selection, unobserved hospital behavior, and confounding by other con-
current policy changes. We discuss these five in turn below.
First, with respect to data availability, we only use data on Maryland res-
idents admitted to Maryland hospitals. One implicit assumption is that the
patterns of seeking hospital care at out-of-state hospitals have remained con-
stant or at least evolved similarly over the course of the study for the individ-
uals living in the treatment and control areas. This assumption is not testable
in the absence of discharge data from neighboring hospitals. This could be a
relatively significant limitation considering that many of the hospitals in the
study are close to the state’s borders.
Additionally, we were also not able to perform individual level analyses due
to the fact that data is only available at the discharge level. Instead, we ag-
gregated our data to the most granular level possible, namely the ZCTA. But
despite being a natural geographic unit of analysis, ZCTAs present potential
pitfalls for researchers. The most common one stems from the fact that ZIP
codes do not represent discretely bounded geographic areas (i.e., polygons),
but are instead linear features associated with specific roads and addresses
(Grubesic 2008), first implemented in 1963 as a way to codify US Postal Ser-
vice delivery routes. ZCTAs, in contrast, are geographic areas created by the
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US Census Bureau in 2000 based on allocation of entire census blocks to aid
research activities using administrative data which contain patient addresses
(Grubesic and Matisziw 2006). Although ZCTAs represent a five-digit ZIP code
where possible, there are a number of ”point” ZIP codes which tend to corre-
spond to large businesses or other non-residential settings.
Another feature of ZIP codes that may introduce the potential for geographic
mismatch is the fact that some residents (particularly in rural areas) use Postal
Office (PO) boxes to receive their mail. These PO boxes may be near work, in
commercial zones, or other locations, making the ZIP code reported by patients
an improper indicator of residence location. To mitigate the impact of this, we
conducted additional analyses in which we exclude ZIP codes labeled as PO
boxes and aggregated at the ZCTA level, including the utilization of point ZIP
codes in their containing ZCTAs.
The issue of data availability for the ZCTA population counts which serve
as the denominator for our outcome measures may also introduce bias in our
analyses. Our data are based on the best available estimates from the same
vendor used by HSCRC. They are constructed by allocating Census tracts to
ZCTAs and aggregating population projections from the decennial Census and
estimates from the American Community Survey, but are still measured with
error. Moreover, because the ZCTA is not a standard place in the methodology
of the US Census Bureau, these estimates may not be fully reliable. To mit-
igate these concerns at least partially, we repeated our analyses with official
estimates from the Census Bureau for 2010-2013 and extrapolated for 2008-
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2009. Our results (not shown here) do not change appreciably when we use this
alternative source of data. In principle, this limitation could be overcome with
the use of health insurance claims data, which would allow an individual level
analysis including people with no hospital utilization, but Maryland’s Depart-
ment of Mental Health and Hygiene (DHMH) only recently began making the
subset of private insurance claims data available to researchers. Finally, a re-
lated limitation here is that we may be underpowered to detect policy-relevant
effects as we aggregate the data to the ZCTA level.
The second main set of limitations relates to measure validity—particularly
those for the measures of preventable utilization. For inpatient care, although
AHRQ’s Preventable Quality Indicators have been validated rigorously and
have a strong track record of being used by researchers, they reflect the product
of expert consensus based on available evidence and may exclude many other
types of conditions for which the evidence is lacking. Moreover, our analyses
of readmissions only capture intra-hospital readmissions due to the absence
of unique patient identifiers. If inter-hospital readmissions increased in ei-
ther the treatment or the control group at different rates, our analysis would
not capture this trend. A mitigating factor here, however, is the fact that intra-
hospital readmissions make up approximately 70 percent of total readmissions,
and this figure is likely much higher for rural hospitals like those in our study.
Regarding the validity of our outpatient care measures, it is generally not
possible to assess with certainty using administrative data whether a specific
ED visit was preventable without detailed chart review. Therefore, the Billings
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algorithm assigns each visit a probability of being in one of the categories of in-
terest. Despite evidence suggesting that the Billings categories differentiate
ED visits based on the need for hospitalization and mortality risk in commer-
cially insured patients (Ballard et al. 2010), the algorithm was formulated us-
ing claims data from New York City in 1994 and 1998 (Billings et al. 2000). It
is possible that patterns of emergency care are different in Maryland hospitals
or that they have evolved considerably over the past two decades.
The third limitation relates to the choice of control groups to identify the ap-
propriate counterfactual for the treated units. In our particular case, the main
challenge is the non-random assignment of hospitals to the treatment group.
As evident from the summary tables in Chapter 5, TPR hospitals serve rural
populations with a higher level of morbidity and lower socioeconomic status
than those served by rural control hospitals. This translates into consistently
higher levels of hospital care utilization in treatment areas. On a more funda-
mental level, the fact that enrollment in the TPR program was voluntary raises
the question of whether the managers of the three rural hospitals that declined
participation had a reason to expect that their hospitals would not perform well
under global budgets due to factors that are unobservable to researchers. Al-
though informal conversations with HSCRC staff suggest that this was not the
case, the voluntary enrollment without randomization still raises the possibil-
ity of confounding due to characteristics which affect hospital behavior over
time in unobserved ways. Our analyses which include the suburban and urban
areas in Maryland into our control group partially mitigate this self-selection
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concern. Even without obvious self-selection, the assumption of conditional
exogeneity upon which the difference-in-differences technique relies may be
violated. The conventional DD estimator assumes independent state-year as-
signment, but in our sample hospitals adopt the global budget system only
once, leading to inadequately short confidence intervals and therefore a large
Type I error (Bertrand et al. 2004).
The fourth limitation relates to unobserved hospital behavior after the global
budget program was introduced. One powerful tool that hospitals have to game
the regulatory system is the ability to change their coding practices. The re-
porting system in Maryland, like in other countries, relies on voluntary data
submissions by hospitals to the HSCRC. This system is susceptible to gaming
by hospitals. Previous studies have shown that “upcoding” is relatively preva-
lent when reporting DRGs (Busse et al. 2013). One other potential avenue for
hospitals to game the payment system would be to more carefully code Present-
on-Admission (POA) indicators.
The fifth limitation relates to potential confounding by other concurrent pol-
icy changes. That is, other changes in the demand for hospital care or programs
affecting either health status or utilization may have differentially affected the
treatment and control groups. One possibility is that geographic patterns of
travel for care change over time in a way that is not captured in our assign-
ment of ZCTAs to hospital service areas. Another possibility relates to changes
induced by Accountable Care Organizations and other initiatives which were
started during the study period. A third possibility relates to our analyses of
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readmission rates. As described in Chapter 2, in 2011 a group of 27 hospitals
implemented the Admission-Readmission Revenue (ARR) program, a bundled
payment initiative grouping each admission with the readmissions following it
within a 30-day period. All three rural control hospitals (and many other ur-
ban hospitals in the state) were part of this group of hospitals, but none of the
TPR hospitals implemented the program. Thus, we expect the control hospitals
to pay particular attention to this measure. Because we observe readmission
rates decreasing at similar rates in both groups, one possibility is that the TPR
program is at least as effective as another intervention more specifically tar-
geted at reducing readmissions.
8.3 Policy implications and recommendations
Even in the absence of complete evidence on the impact of global budgets, these
findings suggest several potential avenues for health policy in Maryland and
in other states.
In Maryland, one important such direction is to foster hospital collaboration
as a way to strengthen care coordination and achieve population health. Mary-
land policymakers could accelerate the formation of hospital collaborations
springing up across the state by rewarding coordination and shared learning.
One example in which the HSCRC is already doing this is the eight recently
awarded Regional Partnerships for Health System Transformation grants to-
taling $2.5 million (Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 2015). One
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such partnership is the Southern Maryland Regional Coalition for Health Sys-
tem Transformation which focuses on the care coordination of high-risk Medi-
care beneficiaries in Calvert and Prince George’s County (Doctors Community
Hospital 2015). Another partnership is the Advanced Health Collaborative,
comprised of nine hospitals from five different hospital systems (which do not
compete with each other in any of their markets) which focuses on sharing
best practices for integration of primary care and behavioral health services
(Adventist Healthcare 2015).
Global budgets can play an important role in this transformation, as the in-
centives to keep patients in the hospital and to compete for as many patients as
possible are loosened. Of course, this approach still requires a delicate balance
between improving care coordination and collaboration while preventing hos-
pital collusion, although concerns surrounding market consolidation are less of
an issue in Maryland’s system of rate setting.
Second, Maryland policymakers should address hospital fears that their
revenues will be reduced drastically over time through shrinking the global
budgets. Part of the long-term transformation of care may require downsizing
and repurposing some hospital facilities towards other types of care, but it
is reasonable that some hospitals managers would find this transformation
difficult and would be skeptical of its outcomes. State leaders could facilitate
the expansion of the scope of hospitals to support other aspects of population
health.
Third, the realignment of incentives should not be limited to hospitals. One
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potential reason why our analysis shows relatively small effects is the fact
that most physicians were still paid FFS. Maryland could use hospital global
budgets as a lever to drive care coordination further through the health care
system, towards truly integrated services that achieve population health. Part-
nerships could be promoted between hospitals, physicians, and other non-acute
care providers, including local health departments, community groups, and so-
cial service providers. This would allow Maryland to address health not just
medically but with a focus on public health and socioeconomic determinants.
An example of such a partnership already developing is the collaboration be-
tween Baltimore hospitals and the Baltimore City Health Department on a
project that identifies high users of ED visits (Cornish et al. 2015).
There are policy implications for stakeholders in other states as well, taken
with the caveat that global budgets will surely be more difficult to implement
in the absence of all-payer rate regulation. Nevertheless, the experience in
Maryland suggests that hospitals can accept limits on their revenues in ex-
change for financial stability and predictability. This stability frees up staff to
focus on keeping patients healthy instead of worrying about driving up admis-
sions for increased revenue. Rural hospitals in other states are a particularly
good candidate for programs resembling TPR, because of their non-overlapping
markets and relatively higher share of Medicare beneficiaries. The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services can thus play a crucial role in facilitating the
implementation of global budgets, by supporting states through state-specific
waivers, federal regulations, and facilitation of learning communities across
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states and health system stakeholders.
Other agencies and state-based partners can play an important role as well,
first by recognizing that health care spending competes with other priorities for
limited state resources. The growth in health care expenditures can be changed
by incentivizing population health, and the evidence so far suggests that global
budgets have the potential to decrease low-value care while protecting access
to acute and emergent conditions in rural areas. Nevertheless, we would en-
courage policymakers to implement global budgets with an eye for continuous
evaluation so that policies may be adapted as new evidence emerges.
8.4 Future research directions
First, it will be important to examine the continued effects of Maryland’s
TPR reform past 2013, as our study may not capture the full long-term effects
of global budgets. Chronic disease management and prevention are difficult in
a system built under FFS payment, and transforming care processes to pro-
mote coordination of services takes considerable leadership, effort, and time.
Future research should also study the impact of the GBR program introduced
in 2014. However, this research is likely to face limitations as well, because
ideal control groups would have to be out-of-state areas, introducing further
bias given Maryland’s unique rate-setting system, and because the program
implementation coincides with the health insurance coverage expansion of the
Affordable Care Act.
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Second, more in-depth research is needed on whether hospitals changed
their clinical processes to improve quality of care or if they improved coordi-
nation of services. Other outcomes like the rates of discretionary and non-
discretionary services should also be examined. Indicators of mortality or rel-
evant outcomes for important conditions should reveal whether hospitals re-
structured care in meaningful ways. Moreover, examining the data from the
Consumer Assessment of Health Plans and Systems (CAHPS) surveys would
shed light on any changes in patient satisfaction with care communication,
timeliness, and coordination. Semi-structured interviews with clinical staff
and hospital managers would also help elucidate the impact of global budgets
on clinical care processes and staff incentives on the front lines of care.
Third, individual-level claims data would allow an in-depth analysis of spe-
cific subgroups of patients, particularly vulnerable populations such as Medi-
care and Medicaid beneficiaries and patients with multiple chronic conditions.
Moreover, it would be important to determine whether global budgets have any
impact on racial and ethnic disparities in care, particularly in a racially diverse
population like Maryland’s.
Fourth, it is essential to examine the impact of global budgets on the total
cost of care per capita and on non-hospital service utilization, given the pay-
ment system’s central role in accomplishing Maryland’s goal of limiting health
care spending growth to within the growth of the gross state product. While
hospital services are a large portion of total expenditures, physician services
and prescription drugs are often substitutes to inpatient care. Any changes in
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these categories of services may affect total spending and therefore contribute
to achieving Maryland’s waiver target.
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Table A.1: ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Codes for PQI Ambulatory Care Sensitive Con-
ditions
Indicator ICD-9-CM Codes
PQI 01 - Diabetes Short-Term Complications 250.10-250.13, 250.20-250.23, 250.30-
250.33
PQI 02 - Perforated Appendix 540.0, 540.1, 540.9, 541
PQI 03 - Diabetes Long-Term Complications 250.40-250.43, 250.50-250.53, 250.60-
250.63, 250.70-250.73, 250.80-250.83,
250.90-250.93
PQI 05 - COPD or Asthma in Older Adults COPD: 491.0, 491.1, 491.20-491.22,
491.8, 491.9, 492.0, 492.8, 494, 494.0,
494.1, 496;
Asthma: 493.00-493.02, 493.10-
493.12, 493.20-493.22, 493.81, 493.82,
483.90-493.92
Acute bronchitis: 466.0, 490
PQI 07 - Hypertension 401.0, 401.9, 402.00, 402.10, 402.90,
403.00, 403.10, 403.90, 404.00, 404.10,
404.90
PQI 08 - Heart Failure 398.91, 402.01, 402.11, 402.91, 404.01,
404.03, 404.11, 404.13, 404.91, 404.93,
428.0, 428.1, 428.20-428.23, 428.30-
428.33, 428.40-428.43, 428.9
PQI 09 - Low Birth Weight 764.01-764.28, 764.90-764.98, 765.01-
765.18
PQI 10 - Dehydration 276.5, 276.50-276.52, 276.0, 008.61-
008.67, 008.69, 008.8, 009.0-009.3,
558.9, 584.5-584.9, 586, 997.5
PQI 11 - Bacterial Pneumonia 481, 482.2, 482.30-482.32, 482.39,
482.41, 482.42, 482.9, 483.0, 483.1,
483.8, 485, 486
PQI 12 - Urinary Tract Infection 590.10, 590.11, 590.2, 590.3, 590.80,
590.81, 590.9, 595.0, 595.9, 599.0
PQI 13 - Angina without Procedure 411.1, 411.81, 411.89, 413.0, 413.1,
413.9
PQI 14 - Uncontrolled Diabetes 250.02, 250.03
PQI 15 - Asthma in Younger Adults 493.00-493.02, 493.10-493.12, 493.20-
493.22, 493.81, 493.82, 493.90-493.92
PQI 16 - Lower-Extremity Amputation in Diabetics 841.0-841.9
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Figure B.1: Trends in Diabetes Short-Term Complications Admissions Rate for
















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Years
TPR Reform Rural Controls Only






























Table B.1: Estimates of the effects of TPR on diabetes short-term complications admissions rate, with various sample
restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −5.42 −9.01 0.075 0.042 −0.014 0.011 −0.0067 0.0043
(N=1206) (8.87) (11.7) (3.11) (3.97) (0.063) (0.11) (0.020) (0.030)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 2.23 −1.56 2.65 2.68 0.031 0.044 0.0094 0.020
(N=1566) (8.70) (10.3) (2.89) (3.70) (0.059) (0.091) (0.018) (0.025)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 2.21 −2.99 0.11 −1.70 0.040 0.025 −0.00067 −0.0098
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (7.60) (8.67) (2.39) (2.87) (0.053) (0.069) (0.016) (0.019)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 1.74 −5.24 −0.00035 −2.60 0.035 0.016 −0.0025 −0.013
(N=2760) (7.50) (7.99) (2.39) (2.75) (0.054) (0.066) (0.016) (0.019)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.2: Trends in Perforated Appendix Admission Rate for the Treatment
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Table B.2: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the perforated appendix admission rate, with various sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −4.79 0.48 −3.03 −3.17 −0.026 −0.014 −0.013 −0.013
(N=1206) (10.2) (12.9) (3.00) (3.46) (0.036) (0.045) (0.0100) (0.012)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −0.54 0.65 −1.63 −1.87 −0.010 −0.0035 −0.0080 −0.0074
(N=1566) (10.1) (11.2) (2.90) (3.14) (0.034) (0.038) (0.0092) (0.010)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 6.52 3.13 0.15 −0.79 0.013 0.0083 −0.0023 −0.0046
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (8.50) (9.26) (2.24) (2.26) (0.026) (0.030) (0.0069) (0.0074)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 4.79 3.16 −0.43 −0.70 0.0089 0.0089 −0.0037 −0.0039
(N=2760) (8.27) (8.59) (2.20) (2.17) (0.025) (0.028) (0.0068) (0.0070)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.3: Trends in Diabetes Long-Term Complications Admission Rates for
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Table B.3: Estimates of the effects of TPR on diabetes long-term complications, with various sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −10.1 −9.62 −2.38 −2.19 −0.14 −0.11 −0.041 −0.033
(N=1206) (7.14) (8.22) (2.29) (2.82) (0.11) (0.14) (0.030) (0.037)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −5.53 −5.05 −0.30 −0.22 −0.062 −0.019 −0.010 0.0014
(N=1566) (6.93) (6.67) (2.24) (2.31) (0.10) (0.12) (0.030) (0.032)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −11.3∗∗ −11.3∗ −3.14 −3.61∗ −0.12 −0.10 −0.040 −0.041∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (5.32) (5.42) (1.95) (1.96) (0.087) (0.089) (0.026) (0.025)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −11.9∗∗ −15.7∗∗∗ −3.34∗ −4.98∗∗ −0.10 −0.099 −0.033 −0.041
(N=2760) (5.19) (5.12) (1.92) (1.98) (0.088) (0.092) (0.026) (0.027)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.4: Trends in the Rates of COPD or Asthma Admissions for the Treat-
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Table B.4: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of COPD or asthma admissions in older adults, with various
sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −13.0∗∗ −10.8∗ −5.14∗∗∗ −4.42∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(N=1206) (5.05) (5.32) (1.80) (1.76) (0.29) (0.30) (0.096) (0.10)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −11.7∗∗ −7.10 −4.50∗∗∗ −3.26∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗
(N=1566) (4.71) (4.58) (1.63) (1.51) (0.28) (0.24) (0.089) (0.082)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −12.8∗∗∗ −13.4∗∗∗ −5.25∗∗∗ −5.68∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (3.87) (3.65) (1.41) (1.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.087) (0.083)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −12.4∗∗∗ −13.3∗∗∗ −5.07∗∗∗ −5.76∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗ −0.57∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(N=2760) (3.87) (3.55) (1.41) (1.32) (0.28) (0.26) (0.087) (0.085)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.5: Trends in Preventable Admission Rates due to Chronic Ambulatory
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Table B.5: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of preventable admissions due to chronic ambulatory care
sensitive conditions, with various sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −5.01 −9.60 −2.12 −4.39 −0.043 −0.12 −0.019 −0.049∗
(N=1206) (10.6) (12.4) (3.17) (4.07) (0.077) (0.099) (0.021) (0.029)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 3.80 8.72 0.84 1.44 0.030 0.051 0.0037 0.00060
(N=1566) (9.86) (12.1) (2.87) (3.65) (0.072) (0.090) (0.020) (0.025)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −11.5∗∗ 0.81 −4.58∗∗∗ −2.24 −0.093∗∗ −0.012 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.017
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (4.81) (7.94) (1.62) (2.45) (0.041) (0.058) (0.012) (0.016)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −11.3∗∗ −7.95 −4.58∗∗∗ −4.78∗∗ −0.049 0.032 −0.016 −0.0077
(N=2760) (4.86) (6.12) (1.62) (2.01) (0.045) (0.055) (0.013) (0.016)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Table B.6: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of heart failure admissions, with various sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −5.07 −0.86 −2.28 −1.26 −0.55∗ −0.30 −0.17∗∗ −0.14∗
(N=1206) (3.98) (4.04) (1.42) (1.37) (0.29) (0.24) (0.082) (0.076)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −3.04 −1.87 −1.54 −1.36 −0.38 −0.29 −0.12 −0.12
(N=1566) (3.91) (3.96) (1.42) (1.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.084) (0.085)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −4.89 −6.68∗∗ −2.44∗ −3.24∗∗∗ −0.49∗ −0.39 −0.16∗∗ −0.15∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (3.36) (3.24) (1.29) (1.14) (0.28) (0.28) (0.080) (0.079)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −5.50 −8.49∗∗ −2.73∗∗ −3.79∗∗∗ −0.38 −0.37 −0.14∗ −0.15∗
(N=2760) (3.27) (3.22) (1.27) (1.23) (0.28) (0.29) (0.080) (0.082)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.7: Trends in the Rates of Dehydration Admission for the Treatment
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Table B.7: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of dehydration admissions, with various sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 8.95∗ 8.12 1.33 0.99 −0.046 0.060 −0.044 −0.027
(N=1206) (5.27) (6.19) (1.46) (1.78) (0.14) (0.14) (0.041) (0.042)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 4.85 7.43 0.42 1.16 −0.14 −0.0056 −0.070∗ −0.038
(N=1566) (4.87) (5.62) (1.33) (1.50) (0.13) (0.12) (0.039) (0.038)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 1.47 −2.69 −0.22 −1.90 −0.19 −0.23∗∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (3.85) (4.30) (1.09) (1.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.035) (0.033)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −0.28 −4.19 −0.31 −1.83 −0.16 −0.18∗ −0.062∗ −0.078∗∗
(N=2760) (3.75) (3.87) (1.07) (1.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.035) (0.035)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.8: Trends in Bacterial Pneumonia Admission Rates for the Treatment
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Table B.8: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of bacterial pneumonia admissions, with various sample
restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 15.2∗∗∗ 13.3∗ 3.74∗∗ 3.21∗ 0.19 0.23 0.040 0.046
(N=1206) (6.32) (7.34) (1.61) (1.70) (0.19) (0.21) (0.052) (0.054)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 13.7∗∗ 11.2∗ 2.59 1.76 0.20 0.16 0.026 0.0050
(N=1566) (5.82) (6.74) (1.63) (1.91) (0.18) (0.21) (0.052) (0.062)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 13.5∗∗∗ 6.54 2.83∗∗ 0.61 0.15 0.064 0.017 −0.025
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (4.89) (5.61) (1.44) (1.76) (0.16) (0.19) (0.048) (0.055)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND 14.3∗∗∗ 6.02 3.11∗∗ 0.68 0.20 0.089 0.034 −0.016
(N=2760) (4.80) (5.37) (1.41) (1.73) (0.16) (0.19) (0.048) (0.057)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Table B.9: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of UTI admissions, with various sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −2.04 −9.11 −0.87 −2.31 −0.11 −0.22 −0.040 −0.064
(N=1206) (6.76) (7.58) (2.02) (2.34) (0.14) (0.16) (0.040) (0.045)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −8.62 −9.20 −2.76 −2.74 −0.20 −0.21 −0.064 −0.066
(N=1566) (6.18) (7.16) (1.96) (2.21) (0.13) (0.15) (0.039) (0.043)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −10.4∗∗ −18.5∗∗∗ −2.92∗ −5.11∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.062∗ −0.097∗∗
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (4.77) (4.95) (1.67) (1.90) (0.12) (0.13) (0.035) (0.038)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −10.4∗∗ −18.4∗∗∗ −2.79∗ −5.15∗∗∗ −0.22∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.058∗ −0.095∗∗
(N=2760) (4.67) (4.81) (1.64) (1.89) (0.11) (0.13) (0.035) (0.039)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.10: Trends in the Rates of Angina without Procedure Admissions for
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Table B.10: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of angina without procedure admissions, with various sample
restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY 44.4∗∗ 32.6 7.85 1.28 0.10 0.15∗ 0.012 0.019
(N=1206) (21.4) (22.8) (5.26) (5.67) (0.077) (0.087) (0.020) (0.024)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS 31.2∗∗ 29.2∗ 6.59 6.40 0.10 0.19∗∗ 0.018 0.040∗∗
(N=1566) (17.0) (17.1) (4.50) (4.65) (0.065) (0.073) (0.017) (0.020)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY 3.76 23.1∗ −0.87 3.53 −0.065 0.11 −0.027∗ 0.016
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (11.2) (14.7) (3.35) (3.70) (0.059) (0.088) (0.015) (0.023)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −3.56 18.5 −3.48 2.43 −0.069 0.073 −0.027∗ 0.0058
(N=2760) (10.2) (13.6) (3.22) (3.57) (0.055) (0.074) (0.014) (0.019)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.11: Trends in the Rates of Uncontrolled Diabetes for the Treatment
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Table B.11: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of uncontrolled diabetes admissions, with various sample
restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −4.10 −10.9 0.20 −1.33 0.0028 −0.00043 0.0029 0.0027
(N=1206) (16.3) (19.0) (4.65) (5.67) (0.025) (0.032) (0.0063) (0.0083)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −2.94 −10.5 1.14 −1.11 0.0078 0.0028 0.0052 0.0035
(N=1566) (13.9) (14.7) (3.84) (4.53) (0.021) (0.024) (0.0052) (0.0063)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −12.1 −5.38 −2.71 −1.15 0.0026 0.029 0.0028 0.0087
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (10.2) (12.8) (2.94) (3.42) (0.020) (0.038) (0.0050) (0.0097)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −10.1 −6.11 −1.88 −1.68 0.011 0.040 0.0062 0.011
(N=2760) (10.3) (11.6) (2.96) (3.05) (0.019) (0.031) (0.0049) (0.0076)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.12: Trends in Admission Rates for Asthma in Younger Adults in the
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Table B.12: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of admission for asthma in younger adults, with various
sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −19.1∗ −17.4 −6.76 −6.31 −0.040 −0.038 −0.012 −0.013
(N=1206) (10.4) (15.0) (4.31) (5.40) (0.034) (0.044) (0.011) (0.014)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −18.8∗ −18.5 −5.36 −4.79 −0.041 −0.046 −0.0096 −0.012
(N=1566) (9.24) (11.6) (3.78) (4.74) (0.030) (0.034) (0.0094) (0.011)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −12.9 −15.8 −4.77 −5.68 −0.033 −0.036 −0.011 −0.010
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (7.49) (8.83) (3.02) (3.78) (0.022) (0.026) (0.0074) (0.0087)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −17.4∗∗ −19.8∗∗ −6.19∗∗ −6.87∗∗ −0.023 −0.022 −0.0072 −0.0076
(N=2760) (6.93) (7.76) (2.92) (3.37) (0.022) (0.026) (0.0075) (0.0086)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes
all Maryland ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals.
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Figure B.13: Trends in the Rates of Lower-Extremity Amputation among Pa-
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Table B.13: Estimates of the effects of TPR on the rates of lower-extremity amputation among patients with diabetes,
with various sample restrictions
Poisson (offset = log(population)) Weighted OLS (rate per 1,000 capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years TPR TPR TPR Years TPR Years
RURAL AREAS ONLY −7.31 −16.1 4.60 5.40 −0.012 −0.025 0.0060 0.0088
(N=1206) (16.0) (17.6) (4.72) (5.44) (0.025) (0.032) (0.0067) (0.0083)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO LARGE URBAN AREAS −0.47 −1.12 6.31 8.14∗ −0.00028 0.0024 0.0098 0.014∗
(N=1566) (14.5) (16.8) (4.19) (4.61) (0.023) (0.030) (0.0064) (0.0077)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
NO INNER CITY −5.27 −0.92 2.05 3.99 −0.0096 0.0014 0.0026 0.0066
BALTIMORE (N=2634) (11.3) (12.5) (3.42) (3.55) (0.019) (0.021) (0.0052) (0.0055)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
ALL OF MARYLAND −5.64 −2.26 1.22 2.68 −0.0092 −0.0039 0.0019 0.0045
(N=2760) (11.1) (12.1) (3.29) (3.33) (0.019) (0.021) (0.0052) (0.0054)
Time-varying controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models control for ZIP code and year fixed effects. OLS models
are weighted for average ZIP code population. Poisson models report percent incidence rate differences. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) report
the effect of the TPR reform as the coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and the post period indicator (equal to 1 for
years 2010-2013, 0 otherwise). Models (3), (4), (7), and (8) report the effect of an additional year of TPR reform implementation as the
coefficient on the interaction between the reform indicator and a post linear time trend indicator (equal to 0 in the pre-reform period, 1 in
the first reform year, 2 in the second, etc. The first sample includes ZCTAs assigned to the 8 TPR hospitals and 3 rural control hospitals.
The second sample contains the ZCTAs in the first sample plus ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which don’t belong to the
CBSAs 12580 (Baltimore-Columbia-Towson) and 47900 (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria). The third sample uses as controls all Maryland
ZCTAs assigned to non-participating hospitals which are outside the Baltimore City county (FIPS code 24510). The fourth sample includes





APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
218
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile














5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
219
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS














5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile














5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
220
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
221
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
222
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS














5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile













5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
223
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile














5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
224
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile
225
APPENDIX C. QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS
















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Quantile




















ABF Activity-Based Funding. 53
ACC Accountable Care Collaborative. 5
ACO Accountable Care Organization. 174
ACOs Accountable Care Organizations. 4
ACS American Community Survey. 84
ACSC Ambulatory Care Sensitive Condition. iii, 114, 117
ACSCs Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions. 7, 86, 111, 119, 175
AHA American Hospital Association. 17
AHRF Area Health Resource File. 84
AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. iii, 36, 74, 86, 108, 120,
179
AMI Acute Myocardial Infarction. 73
AQC Alternative Quality Contract. 5
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Acronyms
ARR Admission-Readmission Revenue. 31, 182
CAHPS Consumer Assessment of Health Plans and Systems. 30, 36, 186
CBSA Core-Based Statistical Area. 79, 102
CBSAs Core-Based Statistical Areas. 78, 79, 81
CMMI Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation. 3
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 3–6, 8, 9, 19, 24, 29, 30, 37,
38, 84, 173, 174
CON Certificate-of-Need. 17, 51
COPD Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease. 86, 119
CPT Current Procedural Terminology. 83, 87, 88
DD difference-in-differences. iii, 6, 7, 107, 155
DHMH Department of Mental Health and Hygiene. 179
DRG Diagnostic-Related Group. 45, 50, 67
DRGs Diagnostic-Related Groups. 22
EAPG Enhanced Ambulatory Patient Group. 24, 67
ED Emergency Department. ii, iii, 7
FFS fee-for-service. 72, 174, 184
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Acronyms
FQHCs Federally Qualified Health Centers. 84
GBR Global Budget Revenue. ii, 37
GSP Gross State Product. 37
HCFA Health Care Financing Administration. 19, 52
HCPCS Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System. 25
HMO Health Maintenance Organization. 2
HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration. 84
HSA Hospital Service Area. 80
HSCRC Health Services Cost Review Commission. ii, 7, 19, 27, 73, 74, 78, 81
ICD-9-CM International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical
Modification. 25, 83
IPPS Inpatient Prospective Payment System. 4, 24, 45
JCAHO Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 30
MCMC Markov Chain Monte Carlo. 96
MHAC Maryland Hospital-Acquired Conditions. 30
MMPP Maryland Multi-Payor Patient Centered Medical Home Program. 31
MS-DRG Medicare Severity DRG. 24
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Acronyms
NCQA National Committee for Quality Assurance. 38
NQF National Quality Forum. 38, 86, 88
OLS Ordinary Least Squares. 94
OMB Office of Management and Budget. 79
P4P pay-for-performance. 4
PCMH Patient Centered Medical Homes. 31
PEIA Public Employees Insurance Agency. 16
PO Postal Office. 178
POA Present-on-Admission. 181
PPCs Potentially Preventable Complications. 30, 37
PQIs Prevention Quality Indicators. iii, 74, 86, 108, 111, 120
QBR Quality-Based Reimbursement. 30
RCCOs Regional Care Collaborative Organizations. 5
RVUs Relative Value Units. 23
SAHIE Small Area Health Insurance Estimates. 84
SIM State Innovation Models. 5
SSA Secondary Service Area. 78
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Acronyms
TPR Total Patient Revenue. ii, 5, 6, 10, 49, 77
VBP Value-Based Payment. 30
VCF Variable Cost Factor. 26, 67, 72
WMRMC Western Maryland Regional Medical Center. 79, 137
ZCTA ZIP Code Tabulation Area. ii, iii, 7, 77, 178
ZIP Zone Improvement Plan. 177
231
Bibliography
3M Health Information Systems (2016). 3M™ Enhanced Ambulatory Patient
Grouping System. Fact Sheet. 3M, 1–4.
Adventist Healthcare (2015). “Five Maryland-Based Health Systems Come To-
gether to Form “Advanced Health Collaborative”.” In: Adventist Healthcare.
AHRQ, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2016). National Quality
Forum (NQF) Endorsed Individual and Composite Measures.
Anderson, Gerard F., Uwe Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey, and Varduhi Petrosyan
(2003). “It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is So Different From
Other Countries.” In: Health Aff (Millwood) 22:3, 89–105.
Ansari, Zahid, James N. Laditka, and Sarah B. Laditka (2006). “Access to
Health Care and Hospitalization for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions.”
In: Medical Care Research and Review 63:6, 719–741.
Atkinson, G and R Murray (2008). “The Use of Ambulatory Patient Groups for
Regulation of Hospital Ambulatory Surgery Revenue in Maryland.” In: The
Journal of Ambulatory Care Management 31: 17–23.
232
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baicker, Katherine and Amitabh Chandra (2009). “A Trillion-Dollar Geography
Lesson.” In: Health Aff (Millwood) 28:5, 1448–1451.
Ballard, Dustin W. et al. (2010). “Validation of an Algorithm for Categorizing
the Severity of Hospital Emergency Department Visits.” In: Medical care
48:1.
Barnum, Howard, Joseph Kutzin, and Helen Saxenian (1995). “Incentives and
provider payment methods.” In: The International journal of health plan-
ning and management 10:1, 23–45.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). “How
much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?” In: The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 119: 249–275.
Biles, Brian, Carl J Schramm, and J Graham Atkinson (1980). “Hospital cost
inflation under state rate-setting programs.” In: The New England Journal
of Medicine 303: 664–668.
Billings, John, Nina Parikh, and Tod Mijanovich (2000). “Emergency Room Use
- The New York Story.” In: Issue brief (Commonwealth Fund), 1–11.
Bindman, A. B., A. Chattopadhyay, et al. (2005). “The impact of Medicaid man-
aged care on hospitalizations for ambulatory care sensitive conditions.” In:
Health Services Research 40:1, 19–37.
Bindman, A B, K Grumbach, et al. (1995). “Preventable hospitalizations and
access to health care.” In: JAMA 274: 305–311.
Block, James A, Donna I Regenstreif, and Paul F Griner (1987). “A community
hospital payment experiment outperforms national experience: the hospital
233
BIBLIOGRAPHY
experimental payment program in Rochester, NY.” In: JAMA 257:2, 193–
197.
Brown, Samuel L. (2009). “All-Payer Hospital rate-setting in Maryland.” In:
Public Performance & Management Review 33: 106–121.
Burwell, Sylvia M. (2015). “Setting Value-Based Payment Goals — HHS Efforts
to Improve U.S. Health Care.” In: New England Journal of Medicine 372:10,
897–899.
Busse, Reinhard et al. (2013). “Diagnosis related groups in Europe: moving
towards transparency, efficiency, and quality in hospitals?” In: BMJ 346:
f3197.
Calikoglu, S., R. Murray, and D. Feeney (2012). “Hospital pay-for-performance
programs in Maryland produced strong results, including reduced hospital-
acquired conditions.” In: Health Aff (Millwood) 31:12, 2649–58.
Card, David, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas (2009). “Does Medicare Save
Lives?” In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124:2, 597–636.
Casparie, Anton F and Dick Hoogendoorn (1991). “Effects of budgeting on health
care services in Dutch hospitals.” In: American journal of public health 81:
1442–1447.
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (2017a). Innovation Models.
— (2017b). Pennsylvania Rural Health Model.




Chalkley, Martin and James M. Malcomson (2000). “Chapter 15 - Government
Purchasing of Health Services.” In: Handbook of Health Economics. Ed. by
Anthony J. Culyer and Joseph P. Newhouse. Vol. 1, Part A. Handbook of
Health Economics. Elsevier, 847–890.
Chernew, Michael E., Robert E. Mechanic, Bruce E. Landon, and Dana Gelb
Safran (2011). “Private-Payer Innovation In Massachusetts: The ‘Alterna-
tive Quality Contract’.” In: Health Affairs 30:1, 51–61.
Chu, David K W (1992). “Global budgeting of hospitals in Hong Kong.” In: So-
cial science & medicine 35: 857–868.
Claritas, Inc. (2006). Claritas Demographic Update Methodology. Methodologic
Report, 1–27.
Colmers, J and R Murray (2010). “Cost Containment and Quality Improve-
ment: Maryland Hospital Rate Setting System.” In: Case Study. National
Governors Association.
Cornish, Audie and Andrea Hsu (2015). In Maryland, A Change In How Hos-
pitals Are Paid Boosts Public Health.
Correa, Adolfo et al. (2015). “Trends in Prevalence of Diabetes Among Delivery
Hospitalizations, United States, 1993-2009.” In: Maternal & Child Health
Journal 19:3, 635–642 8p.
Crozier, D. A. (1982). “State rate setting: a status report.” In: Health Aff (Mill-
wood) 1:3, 66–83.
Cutler, David M. and Richard J. Zeckhauser (2000). “Chapter 11 - The Anatomy
of Health Insurance.” In: Handbook of Health Economics. Ed. by Anthony
235
BIBLIOGRAPHY
J. Culyer and Joseph P. Newhouse. Vol. 1, Part A. Handbook of Health Eco-
nomics. Elsevier, 563–643.
Cylus, Jonathan and Rachel Irwin (2010). “The challenges of hospital payment
systems.” In: Euro Observer 12: 1–3.
Deber, Raisa B et al. (2008). “Canadian healthcare: Need and utilization in an
almost-universal system.” In: Harvard Health Policy Review 9:1, 78–87.
Declercq, Eugene et al. (2007). “Maternal Outcomes Associated With Planned
Primary Cesarean Births Compared With Planned Vaginal Births:” in: Ob-
stetrics & Gynecology 109:3, 669–677.
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (2015). DHMH, HSCRC Award
$2.5 Million to 8 Regional Partnerships.
Detsky, Allan S, Sidney R Stacey, and Claire Bombardier (1983). “The effec-
tiveness of a regulatory strategy in containing hospital costs. The Ontario
experience, 1967-1981.” In: The New England journal of medicine 309: 151–
159.
Doctors Community Hospital (2015). Southern Maryland Regional Coalition
for Health System Transformation Awarded $200,000 Planning Grant.
Dredge, Robert (2009). “Hospital Global Budgeting.” In: Designing and Imple-
menting Health Care Provider Payment Systems: How-To Manuals. World
Bank Publications, 215–253.
Eichler, Rena, Paul Auxila, and John Pollock (2001). “Performance-based pay-
ment to improve the impact of health services: evidence from Haiti.” In:
World Bank Institute Online Journal April, 1–11.
236
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ellis, Randall P. and Thomas G. McGuire (1993). “Supply-Side and Demand-
Side Cost Sharing in Health Care.” In: The Journal of Economic Perspectives
7:4, 135–151.
Fisher, E. S., M. B. McClellan, et al. (2009). “Fostering accountable health care:
moving forward in medicare.” In: Health Aff (Millwood) 28:2, w219–31.
Fisher, Elliott S. and John E. Wennberg (2003). “Health care quality, geographic
variations, and the challenge of supply-sensitive care.” In: Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine 46:1, 69–79.
Fisher, ES and et al. (2009). Health Care Spending, Quality, and Outcomes:
More Isn’t Always Better. Tech. rep. The Dartmouth Institute for Health
Policy & Clinical Practice.
Gottret, Pablo and George Schieber (2006). Health Financing Revisited: A Prac-
titioner’s Guide. DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-6585-4. Washington, DC: The World
Bank.
Green Mountain Care Board (2016). Vermont All-Payer Accountable Care Or-
ganization Model Agreement. Model Agreement. Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.
Griner, Paul F. (1994). “Rochester, New York, Experience.” In: Changing the
Health Care System: Models from Here and Abroad. The Richard and Hinda
Rosenthal Lectures. Institute of Medicine, 1–110.
Grubesic, Tony H. (2008). “Zip codes and spatial analysis: Problems and prospects.”
In: Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 42:2, 129–149.
237
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Grubesic, Tony H. and Timothy C. Matisziw (2006). “On the use of ZIP codes
and ZIP code tabulation areas (ZCTAs) for the spatial analysis of epidemio-
logical data.” In: International journal of health geographics 5:1, 1.
Ham, C. (2003). “Autonomization and Centralization of UK Hospitals.” In: In-
novations in health service delivery. Ed. by Alexander S Preker and April
Harding. Vol. 434. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
Hirshon, Jon Mark et al. (2013). “Health systems and services: the role of acute
care.” In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization 91:5, 386–388.
IMPAQ International (2014). Evaluation of the Maryland Multi-Payor Patient
Centered Medical Home Program. First Annual Report. Maryland Health
Care Commission.
Intner, Scott K. and Richart T. Pellegrino (2014). Maryland’s New Medicare
Waiver Model: How Will It Impact Care Delivery and Provider Aligmnent?
Jegers, Marc, Katrien Kesteloot, Diana De Graeve, and Willem Gilles (2002).
“A typology for provider payment systems in health care.” In: Health policy
60:3, 255–273.
Kalman, Noah S, Bradley G Hammill, Robert B Murray, and Kevin A Schulman
(2013). “Removing a constraint on hospital utilization: a natural experiment
in Maryland.” In: The American journal of managed care 20: e191–9.
Kastor, John A. and Eli Y. Adashi (2011). “Maryland’s Hospital Cost Review
Commission at 40. A Model for the Country.” In: JAMA: The Journal of the
American Medical Association 306: 1137–1138.
238
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kaufman, Brystana, George Pink, and Mark Holmes (2016). Prediction of Fi-
nancial Distress among Rural Hospitals. Tech. rep. Chapel Hill, NC: North
Carolina Rural Health Service Program, Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health
Services Research, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1–5.
Keckley, Paul (2015). A Fresh Look at Physician Employment by Hospitals.
Kent, C (1993). “Perspectives. Global budgets: defined by the details.” In: Faulkner
& Gray’s medicine & health 47: suppl–4.
Kutzin, Joseph (2001). “A descriptive framework for country-level analysis of
health care financing arrangements.” In: Health policy 56:3, 171–204.
Langenbrunner, Jack, Cheryl Cashin, and Sheila O’Dougherty (2009). Design-
ing and Implementing Health Care Provider Payment Systems: How-to Man-
uals. Google-Books-ID: vyJP GvskEIC. World Bank Publications.
Leonard, Kevin J., Marion S. Rauner, Michaela-Maria Schaffhauser-Linzatti,
and Richard Yap (2003). “The effect of funding policy on day of week ad-
missions and discharges in hospitals: the cases of Austria and Canada.” In:
Health Policy 63:3, 239–257.
Louis, Daniel Z et al. (1999). “Impact of a DRG-based hospital financing system
on quality and outcomes of care in Italy.” In: Health services research 34:
405–415.
Maarse, J A M, A Van der Horst, and E J E Molin (1993). “Hospital budgeting in
the Netherlands: Effects upon hospital services.” In: The European Journal
of Public Health 3: 181–187.
239
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Maarse, Johannes A M (1989). “Hospital budgeting in Holland: aspects, trends
and effects.” In: Health Policy 11: 257–276.
Maceira, Daniel (1998). Provider payment mechanisms in health care: Incen-
tives, outcomes, and organizational impact in developing countries. Partner-
ships for Health Reform, Abt Associates.
Manning, Willard G. et al. (1987). “Health Insurance and the Demand for Med-
ical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment.” In: The American Eco-
nomic Review 77:3, 251–277.
Marini, Giorgia and Andrew Street (2007). “A transaction costs analysis of
changing contractual relations in the English NHS.” In: Health Policy 83:1,
17–26.
Martin, Anne B. et al. (2016). “National Health Spending: Faster Growth In
2015 As Coverage Expands And Utilization Increases.” In: Health Affairs,
10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1330.
Maryland Health Care Commission (2012). State Health Care Expenditures.
Annual Report. Center of Information Services and Analysis, 1–7.
— (2013). Annual Report on Selected Maryland Acute Care and Special Hospi-
tal Services, Fiscal Year 2013. Annual Report. Center for Hospital Services.
Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (2010). Agreement between
the Health Services Cost Review Commission and Hospitals Regarding the
Adoption of the Total Patient Revenue System - Contract Template.
McDonough, John E (1997). “Tracking the demise of state hospital rate set-
ting.” In: Health Aff (Millwood) 16: 142–149.
240
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mortensen, Karoline, Chad Perman, and Jie Chen (2013). “Innovative payment
mechanisms in Maryland Hospitals: An empirical analysis of readmissions
under total patient revenue.” In: Healthcare.
Mossialos, Elias, Martin Wenzl, Robin Osborn, and C. Anderson (2016). “2015
International Profiles of Health Care Systems.” In: The Commonwealth Fund.
Muhlestein, David and Mark McClellan (2016). Accountable Care Organiza-
tions In 2016: Private And Public-Sector Growth And Dispersion.
Murray, R. (2009). “Setting hospital rates to control costs and boost quality: the
Maryland experience.” In: Health Aff (Millwood) 28:5, 1395–405.
Murray, Robert and Robert A Berenson (2015). “Hospital Rate Setting Revis-
ited: Dumb Price Fixing or a Smart Solution to Provider Pricing Power and
Delivery Reform?” In: 1–88.
National Institutes of Health (2006). NIH State-of-the-Science Conference State-
ment on cesarean delivery on maternal request. Tech. rep. National Insti-
tutes of Health, 1–29.
North Carolina Rural Health Service Program (2017). Rural Hospital Closures:
January 2010 - Present.
Obama, Barack (2016). “United States Health Care Reform: Progress to Date
and Next Steps.” In: JAMA 316:5, 525–532.
OECD (2010). Health care systems: Getting more value for money. OECD Eco-




Office of Inspector General (2001). Medicare Hospital Prospective Payment Sys-
tem: How DRG Rates Are Calculated and Updated. White paper OEI-09-00-
00200. Office, Evaluation, and Inspections, 18.
Patel, Ankit et al. (2015). “Maryland’s Global Hospital Budgets - Preliminary
Results from an All-Payer Model.” In: New England Journal of Medicine
373: 1899–1901.
Podulka, Jennifer, Elizabeth Stranges, and Claudia Steiner (2011). Hospital-
izations Related to Childbirth, 2008. HCUP Statistical Brief #110. Rockville,
MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
Powell, David (2014). “Did the economic stimulus payments of 2008 reduce la-
bor supply? Evidence from quantile panel data estimation.” In: RAND Labor
& Population WR0710-3.
Press, Matthew J et al. (2013). “Limits of readmission rates in measuring hos-
pital quality suggest the need for added metrics.” In: Health Aff (Millwood)
32: 1083–1091.
Rajkumar, Rahul et al. (2014). “Maryland’s All-Payer Approach to Delivery-
System Reform.” In: New England Journal of Medicine 370: 493–495.
Redmon, D Patrick and Paul J Yakoboski (1995). “The nominal and real effects
of hospital global budgets in France.” In: Inquiry 32: 174–183.
Reinhardt, Uwe (2012). “Divide et Impera: Protecting the Growth of Health
Care Incomes (Costs).” In: Health Economics 21: 41–54.
242
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rodin, Diana and Sharon Silow-Carroll (2013). “Medicaid payment and deliv-
ery reform in Colorado: ACOs at the regional level.” In: The Commonwealth
Fund 11: 1–16.
Rosenberg, Marjorie A. and Mark J. Browne (2001). “The impact of the inpa-
tient prospective payment system and diagnosis-related groups: A survey
of the literature.” In: North American Actuarial Journal; Schaumburg 5:4,
84–94.
Schoen, Cathy et al. (2010). “How Health Insurance Design Affects Access To
Care And Costs, By Income, In Eleven Countries.” In: Health Affairs 29:12,
2323–2334.
Schwartz, Friedrich Wilhelm, Howard Glennerster, and Richard B. Saltman
(1997). Fixing health budgets: experience from Europe and North America.
Ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm Schwartz, Howard Glennerster, and Richard B.
Saltman. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Sharfstein, Joshua M. (2016). “Global Budgets for Rural Hospitals.” In: The
Milbank Quarterly 94:2, 255–259.
Shrank, William (2013). “The Center For Medicare And Medicaid Innovation’s
Blueprint For Rapid-Cycle Evaluation Of New Care And Payment Models.”
In: Health Affairs 32:4, 807–812.
Song, Zirui et al. (2014). “Changes in Health Care Spending and Quality 4




Squires, David A. (2012). “Explaining high health care spending in the United
States: an international comparison of supply, utilization, prices, and qual-
ity.” In: Issue Brief (Commonwealth Fund) 10: 1–14.
Squires, David and Chloe Anderson (2015). U.S. Health Care from a Global
Perspective. Issue Brief 1819. The Commonwealth Fund, 1–15.
Stempniak, Marty (2015). “Don Berwick Offers Health Care 9 Steps to End
Era of ’Complex Incentives’ and ’Excessive Measurement’.” In: Hospitals &
Health Networks Magazine.
Street, Andrew and Stephen Duckett (1996). “Are waiting lists inevitable?” In:
Health policy 36:1, 1–15.
Sutherland, Jason M. (2011). Hospital Payment Mechanisms: An Overview and
Options for Canada.
Sutherland, Jason M., Morris L. Barer, Robert G. Evans, and R. Trafford Crump
(2011). “Will Paying the Piper Change the Tune?” In: Healthcare Policy 6:4,
14.
Sutherland, Jason M, Elliott S Fisher, and Jonathan S Skinner (2009). “Getting
past denial—the high cost of health care in the United States.” In: New
England Journal of Medicine 361: 1227–1230.
Sutherland, Jason M, Erik Hellsten, Trafford R Crump, and D Mooney (2016).
“Healthcare funding news, policy, and analysis.” In: Centre for Health Ser-
vices and Policy Research 6:1.
244
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sutherland, Jason M., Guiping Liu, R. Trafford Crump, and Michael Law (2016).
“Paying for volume: British Columbia’s experiment with funding hospitals
based on activity.” In: Health Policy 120:11, 1322–1328.
Wennberg, J. E. and Meghan McAndrew Cooper, eds. (1998). The Dartmouth
Atlas of Health Care. Chicago, IL: American Hospital Publishing.
Wennberg, J. E., E. S. Fisher, J. S. Skinner, and K. K. Bronner (2007). “Extend-
ing the P4P agenda, part 2: how Medicare can reduce waste and improve
the care of the chronically ill.” In: Health Aff (Millwood) 26:6, 1575–85.
West Virginia Legislature (2016). Senate Bill 68.
WHO (2014). Paying for Performance in Health Care Implications for Health
System Performance and Accountability: Implications for Health System Per-
formance and Accountability. World Health Organization, European Obser-
vatory on Health Systems and Policies: OECD Publishing.
Wolfe, Patrice R. and Donald W. Moran (1993). “Global budgeting in the OECD
countries.” In: Health Care Financing Review 14:3, 55.
Zheng, Tian, Matthew J. Salganik, and Andrew Gelman (2006). “How Many
People Do You Know in Prison?: Using Overdispersion in Count Data to
Estimate Social Structure in Networks.” In: Journal of the American Statis-
tical Association 101:474, 409–423.
245
Vita
Nicolae Done received his B.A. degree in Biochemical
Sciences and a Certificate in Health Policy from Har-
vard College in 2009. He then worked as a research
analyst in the Program in Health Care Financing at
the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
Nicolae enrolled in the PhD Program in Health
Economics and Policy at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
in 2011 as a Sir Arthur Newsholme Scholar. He received the Sommer Scholar
Doctoral Fellowship in 2013 and was elected President of the School’s Student
Assembly in 2014. His research focuses on innovative health care financing
and payment systems and their impact on quality, access, and affordability.
Nicolae will be continuing his research as an AcademyHealth Delivery Sys-
tem Science Fellow (DSSF) within the Partnered Evidence-Based Policy Re-
source Center (PEPReC) in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs in Boston,
MA.
246
